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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses and answers two questions: (1) What are the
impacts of market uncertainty and technological uncertainty? (2) What is
the best way for a firm to manage demand information and technological
knowledge in the face of competition?
The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates a problem of competitive invest-
ment with payo↵ externalities and uncertain but partially observable prof-
itability. This essay examines a duopoly game, which, under appropriate
conditions, reduces to a war of attrition game in the sense that both firms
have incentives to be the follower. We find that due to the strategic inter-
actions, payo↵ externalities and learning opportunities have counterintuitive
e↵ects on investment strategies and on the time to the first investment. In
particular, we find that an increase in the rate of learning, which usually ben-
efits the follower, may hasten or delay the first investment depending on the
rate of learning and the prior probability that the investment is profitable.
Overall, the results of this chapter suggest that firms facing entry into an
unproven market need to consider the strategic e↵ects arising from learning
and externalities.
The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the strategy of investment in
R&D projects when completion time of R&D is uncertain. By examining a
game theoretic model of two firms competitively engaged in R&D projects,
we find that the more innovative firm may or may not have an incentive to
unilaterally share technological knowledge with its opponent; the result de-
pends on the more innovative firm’s tradeo↵ between reduction of competitive
pressure and reduction of the competitor’s imitation. A direct implication of
this result is that a firm may achieve superior performance by strategically
managing its technological knowledge without incurring cost.
The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates a problem of competitive invest-
ment in R&D projects to examine (1) the impacts of uncertainties and (2)
ii
the strategies of managing demand information and technological knowledge.
We find that market uncertainty can improve or diminish a firm’s payo↵ due
to strategic interactions between firms and the interplay of learning e↵ects
and externalities. Our results also indicate that technological uncertainty
can alter the relationship between the time to completion and the fierce-
ness of competition. More specifically, we find that an increase in the time
to completion may or may not increase the fierceness of the competition.
Lastly, this essay compares the impact of disclosing demand information and
that of disclosing technological knowledge. The results show that disclosing
technological knowledge can only improve a firm’s ex-ante payo↵, whereas
disclosing demand information can improve both the ex-ante and ex-post
payo↵s. Hence, our results indicate that the disclosed contents and the time
to disclose are important when firms consider voluntary disclosure to reduce
competition.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the context of investment decisions under uncertainty, making “good” de-
cisions can be a challenging task because of the unknown impacts of uncer-
tainties and the strategic interactions between firms. My dissertation mainly
investigates two aspects of the decision-making process in two aspects: (1)
understanding the impacts of uncertainties and (2) providing managerial in-
sights for managing operational resources, such as information regarding mar-
ket demand, intellectual properties, and research and development (R&D)
resources. With these two broad themes, the dissertation consists of three
essays (Chapter 2 - Chapter 4).
1. Impacts of Uncertainties
This dissertation focuses on two types of uncertainty: market uncertainty
and technological uncertainty. chapter 2 and Chapter 4 consider the impact
of market uncertainty, and Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 consider technological
uncertainty.
When there is significant uncertainty associated with the market reception
of new products or the performance of technologies, it can be beneficial to
delay an investment if time will yield more demand information, from which
a firm can learn about the investment’s future prospects. Furthermore, firms’
investments can entail externalities, which means a firm’s returns from an
investment can improve or diminish with an increase in the number of firms
in the market. Because of these two features, understanding the impact of
learning and externalities becomes a preliminary step toward investigating
the impact of market uncertainty. In chapter 2, by examining a game the-
oretical duopoly investment model, we find the interplay between learning
and externalities gives rise to counterintuitive e↵ects on investment strategies
and payo↵s: Contrary to the conventional theory of war of attrition where
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an increase in follower’s payo↵ generally delays the first move, an increased
rate of learning that tends to benefit the follower may hasten or delay the
first investment, depending on the rate of learning and the initial beliefs of
firms (prior probability) that the investment is profitable. Utilizing the im-
pact of learning and externalities found in chapter 2, Chapter 4 examines
the impact of market uncertainty, and shows that market uncertainty has
non-monotonic relationships with both investment time and payo↵s. Unlike
other works that explore the impact of uncertainty with decision theoretical
models or empirical data, the results in Chapter 4 are driven by the strategic
interactions between firms, and the interplay of learning and externalities.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study two models related to technological un-
certainty in the context of R&D investment. Although Chapter 3 focuses
on firms’ incentives to unilaterally increase technological knowledge spillover
to competitors, our results indicate that technological uncertainty reduces
such an incentive. Chapter 4 also investigates the impact of uncertain time-
to-completion (the lag between a firm’s time of investment and the time to
complete the project) on the fierceness of competition. The results show
that longer time-to-completion may or may not result in fiercer competition,
depending on the firms’ beliefs about market demand.
2. Managing Operational Resources Strategically
Two types of resources are discussed in this work: demand information and
technological knowledge. Demand information is defined as the information
that can help to resolve market uncertainty, such as forecasts about future
demand, or sales data that imply current demand. Technological knowledge
is the knowledge which helps to facilitate or accelerate the innovation of
products or processes, such as the designs for new products or the expertise
of skilled workers.
Chapter 3 focuses on managing technological knowledge resources. More
specifically, it examines the impact of natural spillover on R&D investment
strategies when the R&D completion times are uncertain and one firm can
receive spillover from another. The analysis shows that natural spillover can
improve the profit of an innovative firm. Furthermore, an innovative firm may
even have an incentive to unilaterally share technological knowledge with its
opponent. Chapter 4 focuses on managing demand information resources. It
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shows that firms can also have an incentive to freely disclose more demand
information to competitors. Although both disclosing demand information
and technological knowledge can be beneficial to firms, Chapter 4 points out
the di↵erence between these two types of disclosing: only disclosing demand
information benefits firms’ ex-post payo↵s. Hence, our results indicate that
the disclosed contents as well as timing are important when firms consider
voluntary disclosure.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPACT OF BAYESIAN LEARNING AND
EXTERNALITIES ON STRATEGIC
INVESTMENT
2.1 Introduction
Investment decisions in business such as the introduction of products in un-
proven markets or the adoption of unproven technologies often involve sig-
nificant uncertainty associated with the market reception of new products or
the performance of technologies. In competitive scenarios, returns on invest-
ments can also depend upon the timing of the investments. For example, it
may be beneficial to delay an investment if time will bring more information
from which a firm can learn about the future prospects of the investment,
provided the opportunity to invest does not disappear (Carruth et al. 2000,
Dixit 1992). Returns on investments can also depend upon the investment
decisions made by other firms in the market. If there are positive external-
ities, a firm’s returns can improve with an increase in the number of firms
in the market; and if there are negative externalities, a firm’s returns can
diminish with an increase in the number of firms. The existing literature on
investment under uncertainty has examined these two factors, i.e., learning
e↵ects and externalities, separately.
In this paper, we examine a duopoly game of investment with uncertain
profitability where learning e↵ects and externalities coexist. In our model,
if one firm enters the market as a leader, then the other firm (the follower)
has the opportunity to observe the leader’s performance in the market and
learn about the true profitability of the market. By observing the leader’s
performance, the follower can also make an investment to enter the market.
If the two firms are in the market at the same time, their profit streams
exhibit externalities. We study the following comparative statics in detail:
(1) how the follower’s time to invest changes with the rate of learning , (2)
how the leader’s payo↵ changes with the rate of learning and (3) how the time
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to first investment changes with the rate of learning. We find the presence
of a ubiquitous single-crossing property (property of changing its sign at
most once) of the derivatives of the payo↵ and the time to investment with
respect to the rate of learning. This result is driven by the interplay between
externalities and learning, which are the salient features of the model that
we investigate.
Under appropriate conditions, our model reduces to a war of attrition,
which is a game in which the leader’s payo↵ is less than the follower’s payo↵.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium in the conventional war of attrition, each
player may delay their investments in an attempt to be the follower (Section
2.4.2). It is well known that in such an equilibrium, an increase in the
follower’s reward delays both players’ decisions to move first (Hendricks et al.
1988). Hence, one would expect that an increased rate of learning, which
enables the follower to learn faster about the profitability of the investment,
would induce both firms to delay their investments. However, we find that
the e↵ect of an increased rate of learning is more nuanced.
In this study, there are three main findings. The first finding is that an
increased rate of learning has two opposing e↵ects on the follower’s time of
investment: (a) it can hasten the follower’s investment because the follower
can acquire more meaningful information within a shorter time, or (b) it
can delay the follower’s investment because of increased value of waiting
(to collect more information on the profitability of the investment). Either
e↵ect can dominate; we find that the derivative of the follower’s time to
investment with respect to the rate of learning exhibits a single-crossing
property. To understand the underlying mechanism of this result, we note
that the follower’s optimal policy is to invest when p (the probability that
the market has a high profit) exceeds a threshold ✓F (Proposition 1). As is
well-known in the literature (see, for example, Proposition 2 of Kwon and
Lippman 2011), the threshold ✓F increases in the learning rate of the follower
because a higher learning rate increases the value of waiting and learning,
which delays the follower’s investment. Thus, when p is su ciently close to
✓F , the follower’s time of investment is strongly influenced by the comparative
statics of ✓F , and consequently, e↵ect (b) dominates. In contrast, when p is
su ciently far away from ✓F (for su ciently low values of p), the follower’s
time of investment is less influenced by the comparative statics of ✓F . In this
case, due to the influence of e↵ect (a), the follower’s investment is hastened by
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an increased rate of learning. Thus, the comparative statics of the follower’s
time to investment changes as p increases: e↵ect (a) dominates for low values
of p, and e↵ect (b) dominates for high values of p. Indeed, our analysis shows
a single-crossing property of the comparative statics as shown in Theorem 1
and illustrated in Figure 2.3.
The second finding is that the interplay of externalities with learning drives
the single-crossing property of the comparative statics of the leader’s payo↵.
Under positive externalities, an earlier investment of the follower improves
the leader’s payo↵ because of the time value of money (i.e., discounting).
Therefore, for p su ciently close to ✓F when e↵ect (b) dominates, the leader’s
payo↵ (mixed strategy equilibrium payo↵) decreases with the rate of learning.
On the other hand, for su ciently low p when e↵ect (a) dominates, the
leader’s payo↵ increases with the rate of learning. Thus, the comparative
statics of the leader’s payo↵ also exhibits a single-crossing property. Under
negative externalities, the comparative statics are reversed since an early
investment of the follower diminishes the leader’s payo↵. These results are
reported as Theorem 2 and illustrated by Figure 2.4.
The third finding is that the comparative statics of the time to the first
investment also has a single-crossing property. For example, in the case of
positive externalities, if the leader’s payo↵ increases (decreases) in the learn-
ing rate, then the time to the first investment tends to decrease (increase)
in the learning rate. Thus, the time to the first investment tends to increase
in the learning rate for su ciently high values of p due to e↵ect (b), and it
tends to decrease in the learning rate for su ciently low values of p due to
e↵ect (a). Thus, the derivative of the time to first investment with respect
to the learning rate also has a single-crossing property. These results are
reported as Theorem 3(i) and illustrated by Figure 2.5(a). We also report
similar results for the case of a second-mover advantage in Theorem 4 and
Figure 2.6(b).
Investment problems with both positive and negative externalities are often
seen in real life. Positive externalities can arise from a number of factors,
including network externalities, product complementarity, and economies of
scale. An example of positive externalities through economies of scale is
illustrated by the introduction of organic cotton garments in the mid-1990s.
At the time, introducing organic cotton garments was risky, as organic cotton
garments are indistinguishable by sight and touch from garments made of
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conventionally grown cotton (Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2009), and so it was
not clear whether customers would be willing to pay more for such products.
It would also cost more to procure organic cotton, as firms would need to
invest in growers to support their adoption of specific practices for cultivating
organic cotton. Despite the risk, firms like Patagonia entered the market
as first movers, and second movers such as Gap were able to observe the
performance of the first movers and learn how the garments were received by
consumers. However, Patagonia and Gap were not in competition with each
other since they targeted di↵erent markets: Patagonia made garments for
mountaineering-related activities, while Gap made garments for casual wear.
As more firms introduced organic cotton garments, the growers of organic
cotton benefited from the additional investments made by the new entrants,
which helped lower the procurement costs of organic cotton due to economies
of scale. The lower procurement costs could translate to lower retail prices
for organic cotton garments and thus increased the uptake of such products
by consumers. Thus, the firms’ investments had positive externalities.
Negative externalities can often be observed in the context of new product
launches or adoption of new technologies. For instance, in the mid-1980s, the
steel maker Nucor was pondering the di cult question of whether to adopt
a new thin slab casting technology called compact strip production (CSP).
There was a significant upside profitability potential if the technology was
successful; however, there was also significant uncertainty about the viability
of the technology (Ghemawat and Stander 1998). Moreover, even if Nucor’s
adoption of the new technology turned out to be successful, it was unclear
how large the first-mover advantage would be. Other steelmakers were bound
to notice the performance of CSP and would follow suit within a few years if
Nucor successfully adopted the technology, which could drive down the prof-
its due to competition. Here, the firms’ investments had negative externali-
ties that could potentially disrupt the leader’s e↵orts to appropriate profits
from its investments or deter the investments of followers. These examples
illustrate that when learning e↵ects and externalities combine, investment
decisions under uncertainty become inherently complex.
The proofs of all mathematical statements in the paper are provided in
Appendix A.2.
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2.2 Related Literature
Our work builds on and contributes to several streams of literature: on
Bayesian decision models in investment under uncertainty, learning e↵ects in
investment games, externalities and complementarities in investment games,
and the war of attrition.
Jensen (1982) was one of the first to apply sequential Bayesian decision
models to investment decisions under uncertainty when he examined tech-
nology adoption under uncertain profitability. McCardle (1985) and Ulu and
Smith (2009) studied the problem of technology adoption coupled with exit
decisions when it is costly to acquire information about the technology’s prof-
itability. Using the continuous-time model of Shiryaev (1967) for Bayesian
sequential decisions, Ryan and Lippman (2003) investigated the exit decision
of a firm operating a project with uncertain underlying profitability. Using
a similar framework, Kwon and Lippman (2011) examined the problem of a
firm facing a choice between exit and expansion of a pilot project with uncer-
tain profitability. These papers examine a single decision maker’s problems.
In contrast, this paper investigates investment decisions in a duopoly under
uncertainty.
Another strand of literature has examined the role of externalities in in-
vestment games involving competing firms. Dybvig and Spatt (1983) and
Katz and Shapiro (1986) viewed technology adoptions as providing comple-
mentarities to other firms. Nielsen (2002) studied a duopoly stochastic entry
game in which the return on an investment depends on the number of firms
in the market, through positive or negative externality. Femminis and Mar-
tini (2011) studied a similar stochastic entry game where profit improvement
spills over from the leader to the follower at a Poisson time. Mamer and
McCardle (1987) studied a Bayesian technology adoption game with positive
or negative externalities, but their model separates the technology adoption
stage from the the product launch and competition stage. Weeds (2002)
studied an extreme form of first mover advantage in a winner-takes-all game
of R&D competition. In her model the economic value of the patent follows
a stochastic process and technological success is random. She found that
investments are delayed in a symmetric equilibrium than in a cooperative
equilibrium because firms hold back on investing for fear of starting a patent
race.
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When multiple firms consider similar investment decisions under uncer-
tainty, they can learn from the investment decisions of the competing firms.
A follower can learn from the investment decisions the performance of a
leader, which gives firms an incentive to delay their investments. Such be-
havior reflects a war of attrition, which was first introduced by Smith (1974)
and has subsequently seen widespread application in economics and game
theory, particularly in the context of investment games. Kapur (1995) stud-
ied how the adoption decisions of other firms facilitate learning in a game
of technology adoption between multiple players whose private payo↵s are
independent of the technological progress of other firms. Hoppe (2000) also
studied a duopoly game of new technology adoption and showed that when
the probability of success is low it results in a war of attrition because infor-
mation externalities delay adoption.
In contrast to most papers on investment games, De´camps and Mari-
otti (2004) incorporated both externalities and Bayesian learning in a single
model. They consider the investment decisions of two firms with respect to a
project with unknown profitability, where the firms have private information
about the cost of investment. The follower learns about the profitability by
observing the leader’s performance, and the resulting game is a war of at-
trition, analogous to the one that we identify, for which they find a unique
symmetric equilibrium. Although De´camps and Mariotti (2004) is closely
related to our paper in that they also study the impact of learning on a game
of investment with externality, there are some notable di↵erences from our
paper. Their focus is on the interplay of the information externality and
private information on costs while we focus on the interplay of externality
and learning. Another important di↵erence is that their model assumes that
the leader’s payo↵ is independent of the follower’s time of investment once
the leader-follower relationship has been established, and consequently the
leader’s payo↵ is independent of the follower’s learning rate. In contrast, in
our model, the leader’s payo↵ depends on the follower’s time of investment,
which drives our main results.
Another paper that incorporated both externalities and Bayesian learning
is Thijssen et al. (2006), which studied a preemption or an attrition equilib-
rium in a game of competitive investment with Bayesian learning about the
profitability of the project. Although their model is similar to ours, it as-
sumes that the leader’s investment immediately reveals the true profitability
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to the follower, and hence, the follower’s learning process is not incorpo-
rated. Hence, their model is not designed to address the question that we
investigate.
Choi (1997) also studied a technology adoption process where there is
an interplay between informational externalities and payo↵ interdependency
through network externalities. However, his study was focused on the de-
scription of a herd behavior through a model of sequential technology choice
between two new technologies. Frisell (2003) developed a market entry model
in which payo↵ externalities and informational externalities coexist, and he
found that stronger payo↵ externalities weaken the second-mover advantage
and reduce the delay to market. In his model, each firm receives a private
signal regarding the market demand and enters the market only if the market
demand is favorable. Due to the information asymmetry between the firms,
one firm’s entry is considered a favorable signal for the other firm as well,
and hence it causes an information spillover. In contrast, the information
externalities in our model arise from Bayesian learning based on observing
the other firm’s profit streams, and our focus is on examining the combined
impact of learning and externalities on equilibrium strategies.
2.3 The Game of Externality and Bayesian Learning
We consider two firms indexed as i 2 {1, 2}, and we use j as an index to
denote the opponent of firm i. Each firm has a one-time irreversible option
to make an irreversible investment to enter a new market with unknown
demand. The investments made by the two firms have mutually positive or
mutually negative externalities. The time-averaged market demand can be
either high or low, but neither firm knows the true state of the demand. If one
firm enters the market first, then the other firm can observe its performance
and learn about the true state of the market demand.
To formulate the game, we specify the strategy space, the payo↵ function,
and the objective of each firm. Let Ti 2 [0,1] denote firm i’s time of
investment. Then (T1, T2) 2 [0,1]⇥[0,1] is the strategy profile of the game.
In this section, we assume without loss of generality that firm 1 is the leader
and firm 2 is the follower, so that T1  T2. We let Vi(p;T1, T2) denote the
payo↵ (defined as the expected cumulative discounted profit) for firm i given
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a strategy profile (T1, T2) conditional on the prior probability p (the initial
belief of the firms) that the market demand is high. We define ⌧2 = T2   T1,
which represents the elapsed time between the leader’s investment time T1
and the follower’s investment time T2. Let X = {Xt : t 2 [T1, T2]} denote
the process of the leader’s cumulative profit before the follower invests, and
let r > 0 denote the discount rate for both firms. We model the process X
as a Brownian motion that satisfies
dXt = µdt+  dWt for t 2 [T1, T2] ,
where   > 0 is the noise level of the leader’s income stream before the follower
invests, and the drift µ represents the time-averaged profit per unit time. The
process Wt is a Wiener process that represents the white noise in the profit
stream. The true value of µ is unknown, but it is publicly known to be either
h, if the demand is high, or `, if the demand is low. We assume that both
firms share the same prior belief about µ.
We assume that each firm wants to maximize its expected cumulative
discounted profit. Using the notation Ep[·] for the expectation conditional
on the prior probability p, we express the objective function Vi(p;T1, T2) for
each firm i as follows:
V1(p;T1, T2) = e
 rT1Ep

 k +
ˆ ⌧2
0
e rtdXt + e r⌧2UˆL
 
, (2.1)
V2(p;T1, T2) = e
 rT1Ep
h
e r⌧2(UˆF   k)
i
,
where k is the upfront cost of investment for each firm. The random variables
UˆL and UˆF , defined in (2.2) and (2.3) below, respectively denote the leader’s
and follower’s expected cumulative discounted incomes after the follower in-
vests, conditional on the value of µ. Each firm’s objective is to maximize
its objective function by choosing the optimal time Ti given its opponent’s
strategy Tj.
We first consider the case where ⌧2 > 0, or equivalently, T2 > T1. For
notational convenience, we use an index I 2 {L, F} to denote the role of
each firm; I = L represents the leader, and I = F the follower. In this case
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(i.e., T2 > T1), the random variable UˆI is given as follows:
UˆI ⌘ E
ˆ 1
0
µ(1 + ↵I)e
 rtdt+
ˆ 1
0
e rt IdW It |µ
 
=
µ
r
(1 +↵I) if T1 < T2 .
(2.2)
Here UˆI is essentially the present value of a perpetual income of µ(1 + ↵I)
per unit time with a discount rate r. After the follower invests at time
T2, the income for the role I during an infinitesimal time dt is given by
µ(1 +↵I)dt+  IdW It . The processes W
I
t is a Wiener process that represents
the white noise in the income streams. For instance, if ↵I > 0 (↵I < 0) for I 2
{L, F}, then positive (negative) externality exists between the investments
of the two firms (as the externality from each firm’s investment will have a
similar directional impact for the other firm, we assume that the signs of ↵L
and ↵F coincide). Mixed signs of the externalities such as ↵L > 0 > ↵F or
↵F > 0 > ↵L are also possible.
In the second case, we consider simultaneous investment where T1 = T2.
We assume that each player has an equal (50%) chance of being the leader
or the follower, and hence the degree of externality is e↵ectively ↵S ⌘ (↵L +
↵F )/2. Thus, UˆL and UˆF in the case of a simultaneous investment case can
be expressed as follows:
UˆL = UˆF = UˆS (2.3)
⌘ E
ˆ 1
0
µ(1 + ↵S)e
 rtdt+
ˆ 1
0
e rt Sd(WLt +W
F
t )/2|µ
 
=
µ
r
(1 + ↵S) if T1 = T2 .
Except for Section 2.5.4, we make the following assumption in the rest of
the paper:
Assumption 1 ↵I 2 ( 1,1) for I 2 {L, F}, ↵L   ↵F , 0 < `r < k < hr ,
and 0 < (1+↵I)`r < k <
(1+↵I)h
r for each I.
This assumption implies that investment without learning would be prof-
itable when µ = h and unprofitable when µ = `. If ↵F   1, then there
is no incentive for the follower to invest, and the problem becomes trivial.
Hence, we assume ↵I 2 ( 1,1) for I 2 {L, F}. The condition ↵L   ↵F is
based on the assumption of the first-mover advantage commonly observed in
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competitive contexts. In Section 2.5.4, we consider the case of a second-mover
advantage.
Next we construct the Bayesian updating process for the posterior proba-
bility of µ = h for time t 2 (T1, T2), when the follower observes the leader’s
profit stream and learns about the market demand. Assume that Xt and µ
belong to the same probability space (⌦,F ,P). Let {FXt : t   0} denote the
natural filtration with respect to the observable cumulative profit process X.
We assume that the two firms share common prior and posterior probabilities
concerning the profitability. Let Pt = Pp(µ = h | FXt ) = Ep[1{µ=h} | Xt]
denote the posterior probability of µ = h at time t, conditional on the ini-
tial prior probability p (here 1{·} is the indicator function). In particular, if
T1 = 0 and X0 = 0, then Pt can be expressed in terms of Xt and t as follows:
Pt =
P [{µ = h} \ {Xt}|P0 = p]
P [{µ = h} \ {Xt}|P0 = p] + P [{µ = `} \ {Xt}|P0 = p]
=
p exp{  (Xt ht)22 2t }
p exp{  (Xt ht)22 2t }+ (1  p) exp{  (Xt `t)
2
2 2t }
=

1 +
1  p
p
exp
⇢
 (h  `)
 2

Xt   h+ `
2
t
    1
,
which can be derived from Bayes’ rule (Peskir and Shiryaev 2006, p. 288)
and the fact that Xt   µt =  Wt is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance  2t. Furthermore, the process P = {Pt : t   0} can be shown
(Peskir and Shiryaev 2006, pp. 288-289) to be the unique strong solution to
the stochastic di↵erential equation:
dPt = Pt(1  Pt)h  `
 
dWˆt , where Wˆt =
1
 
✓
Xt  
ˆ t
0
E[µ | FXs ]ds
◆
.
Here Wˆt is an observable Wiener process constructed purely from the ob-
servable process X. Lastly, note that Pt is defined only within the interval
[T1, T2], i.e., before the follower invests. Once the follower invests, it has no
incentive to learn about the true value of µ. Since   is the amplitude of
the noise, the follower learns more quickly if 1/  is higher (Bergemann and
Valimaki, 2000). Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we use   ⌘ 1/  to
represent the rate of learning.
We are now in a position to express the payo↵ functions in terms of Pt.
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Before the leader invests, neither firm receives any profit stream and therefore
neither firm receives any information with which to update the posterior
probability. Thus the probability of {µ = h} coincides with p for all t 2
[0, T1]. Further, if T1 = 1 and T2 = 1, then we have Vi(p;1,1) = 0 for
both i = 1, 2 because there is no profit when neither firm invests. Next, for
notational convenience, we define
m(p) ⌘ Ep[µ] = hp+ `(1  p) ,
so that Ep[µ|FXt ] can be expressed as m(Pt). Then we obtain the expressions
for Vi(p;T1, T2) in terms of the process P when ⌧2 = T2 T1 is a stopping time.
For ease of presentation, we consider the cases ⌧2 > 0 and ⌧2 = 0 separately;
in Proposition 1, we show that the follower’s optimal policy reduces to one
of these two cases.
First, let us consider the case where ⌧2 > 0, or equivalently, T2 > T1. The
leader’s payo↵ reduces to
V1(p;T1, T2) = e
 rT1Ep
h⇣µ
r
  k
⌘
+ ↵L
µ
r
e r⌧2
i
(2.4)
= e rT1
⇢
1
r
m(p)  k + ↵L
r
Ep[e r⌧2m(P⌧2)]
 
,
where we have used the equality Ep[µe r⌧2 ] = Ep[Ep[µe r⌧2 |FX⌧2 ]]. Note
that the term m(p)/r is the expected value of µ/r, which is the cumula-
tive discounted stream of time-averaged profit µ per unit time. The term
↵LEp[e r⌧2m(P⌧2)]/r is the expected value of the additional profit from the
follower’s investment at time T1 + ⌧2. Similarly, the payo↵ to the follower is
given by
V2(p;T1, T2) = e
 rT1Ep
h⇣µ
r
(1 + ↵F )  k
⌘
e r⌧2
i
(2.5)
= e rT1Ep
⇢
e r⌧2

(1 + ↵F )
m(P⌧2)
r
  k
  
.
Here the term µr (1 + ↵F ) is the cumulative discounted stream of the average
profit µ(1 + ↵F ) per unit time.
Second, let us consider the case of simultaneous investment, or ⌧2 = 0 (i.e.
Figure 2.1: The three-stage game.
T2 = T1), in which firms 1 and 2 obtain identical payo↵s:
V1(p;T1, T2) = V2(p;T1, T2) = e
 rT1Ep[UˆS   k] = e rT1

(1 + ↵S)
m(p)
r
  k
 
,
where (1 + ↵S)m(p)/r is the expected value of the cumulative discounted
stream of profit (1+↵S)µ per unit time, which originates from the assumption
that each firm has an equal chance of being a leader or a follower.
In summary, our model can be viewed as a three-stage game (see Figure 2.1
and Table 2.1). The first stage is the time period t < T1, i.e., before the first
investment. The firms are simply waiting for the first investment to happen,
and neither firm earns any profit stream in this stage, so the probability of
the event {µ = h} remains constant. The second stage is the time period
t 2 [T1, T2) in the case where T2 > T1 (the second stage is absent if T1 = T2).
In this stage, the leader (firm 1) earns a cumulative profit stream X and the
follower (firm 2) updates the posterior process P based upon the observed
process X. In our model, the processes X and P are terminated at the end
of the second stage, i.e., as soon as the follower invests at time T2. The third
stage is the period after the follower’s investment, i.e., t   T2. In this stage,
neither firm actively updates the probability of the event {µ = h} because
neither firm has any investment decision to make, and both firms earn their
final profit streams in perpetuity. The most frequently used notations and
mathematical symbols are provided in Table 2.2.
2.4 Classification of Equilibria
In this section, we consider the cases of both positive externalities (↵I > 0
for I 2 {L, F}) and negative externalities ( 1 < ↵I < 0) with the constraint
that ↵L   ↵F , to obtain pure strategy (Section 2.4.1) and mixed strategy
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Table 2.1: The three-stage game.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Probability p Pt evolves No Bayesian
of {µ = h} (No evolution through Bayesian learning
over time) learning takes place
Time-
Leader
No µ µ(1 + ↵L)
averaged profit stream per unit time per unit time
profit
Follower
No No µ(1 + ↵F )
stream profit stream profit stream per unit time
(Section 2.4.2) subgame perfect equilibria.
2.4.1 Pure Strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In the spirit of backward induction, we first obtain the follower’s optimal
policy and its associated payo↵. As in Section 2.3, we suppose that firm 1 is
the leader in the sense that T2   T1 (although we also allow for the possibility
of simultaneous investment). Once the leader invests at time T1, the objective
of firm 2 (the follower) is to maximize its payo↵ (given by (2.5)) with respect
to the stopping time ⌧2 = T2  T1. We let VF (p) ⌘ sup⌧2 0 V2(p; 0, ⌧2) denote
the optimal payo↵ for the follower for T1 = 0 and T2   0.
To obtain VF (p) and the optimal ⌧2, we utilize the well-established ver-
ification theorem (see, for example, Theorem 3(A) of Alvarez (2001)) that
stipulates a number of su cient conditions an optimal value function must
satisfy.
Proposition 1 (i) At time T1, the follower’s optimal payo↵ is given by
VF (p) = max{⇧F (p),⇧S(p)}, where
⇧F (p) =
8<:
 (p)
 (✓F )
h
(1 + ↵F )
m(✓F )
r   k
i
for p < ✓F
1
r (1 + ↵F )m(p)  k otherwise
, (2.6)
⇧S(p) =
1
r
(1 + ↵S)m(p)  k , (2.7)
and ✓F and  (x) are defined by (A.1) and (A.3) in Appendix A. Furthermore,
the follower’s optimal policy is to invest immediately at T1 if ⇧S(p)   ⇧F (p)
and to wait and invest as soon as Pt hits the upper threshold ✓F if ⇧S(p) 
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Table 2.2: Frequently used notations
Notation Definition
k Cost of investment
m(p) m(p) ⌘ Ep[µ] = ph+ (1  p)`
Pt The posterior probability of µ = h at time t
p
The initial belief of the firms that the market
demand is high
r Discount rate
Ti The strategy of firm i (firm i’s time of investment)
Tˆi Firm i’s stage-1-strategy in the mixed strategy game
Vi(p;T1, T2)
Payo↵ to firm i with a prior p given a strategy
profile (T1, T2)
VF (p) The follower’s optimal payo↵
VL(p) The leader’s equilibrium payo↵
VM(p) Symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium payo↵
↵L, ↵F , ↵ The degree of externality
  The rate of learning (  ⌘   1)
    ⌘p1 + 8r 2/(h  `)2
✓c
The boundary between the preemption and
the war of attrition regime
✓F
The follower’s optimal threshold of investment in
stage 2 when T2 > T1
✓0 ✓0 ⌘ lim !0 ✓F
✓L The leader’s equilibrium threshold
✓S
The lower boundary of the region of
simultaneous investment
µ 2 {h, `} The time-averaged profit per unit time
⇧L(p) The leader’s payo↵ from an immediate investment
⇧S(p) The payo↵ from simultaneous investment
  Magnitude of the noise
⌧¯M(p)
Inverse of the arrival rate of Tˆi in the
mixed strategy equilibrium
⌧2 ⌧2 ⌘ T2   T1
⌧F
The follower’s optimal stopping time in stage 2
when T2 > T1
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⇧F (p).
(ii) There exists ✓S  ✓F such that ⇧S(p) > ⇧F (p) if and only if p > ✓S.
Proposition 1 establishes that the follower’s optimal strategy is to invest
at time T2 = T1 + ⌧ ⇤, where
⌧ ⇤ =
8<:⌧F ⌘ inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓F} if ⇧F (p)   ⇧S(p) ,0 if ⇧F (p) < ⇧S(p) . (2.8)
Here ⇧F (p) represents the optimal value function for the follower under the
constraint T2 > T1, and ⇧S(p) is the value function for T1 = T2, i.e., from
simultaneous investment. The functional form of ⇧F (p) for p < ✓F gives the
payo↵ for waiting until Pt hits the threshold ✓F , while ⇧F (p) for p   ✓F
gives the payo↵ for immediate investment. Proposition 1 asserts that when
⇧F (p)   ⇧S(p), the follower’s optimal policy is to invest as soon as Pt hits
the optimal upper threshold ✓F given by (A.1) in Appendix A. This optimal
policy can be understood as the intuitive notion that a follower begins to
learn about the market demand once the leader invests, and it invests only
when its profit prospect (posterior probability Pt of a high profitability) hits
a su ciently high value ✓F .
Intuitively, the optimal threshold ✓F of the follower’s investment can be
obtained as follows. Let us define ⌧✓ = inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓} as the hitting
time for some threshold ✓. By the theory of stopping (Chapter 9 of Oksendal
2003), it is known that the random discount factor e r⌧✓ has the expected
value
Ep[exp( r⌧✓)] =  (p)
 (✓)
. (2.9)
This leads to V2(p; 0, ⌧✓) = [(1 + ↵F )m(✓)/r   k] (p)/ (✓) because the fol-
lower’s payo↵ from investment at time ⌧✓ is (1 + ↵F )m(✓)/r   k. The op-
timal threshold ✓F can be obtained from the necessary first-order condition
dV2(p; 0, ⌧✓)/d✓ = 0.
In the next proposition, we obtain the leader’s (firm 1’s) best response T1
conditional on the follower’s optimal stopping time ⌧ ⇤ given by (2.8). Similar
to the follower’s payo↵, let VL(p) ⌘ supT1 V1(p;T1, T1+⌧ ⇤) denote the optimal
payo↵ for the leader. We establish that there exists a critical value ✓L such
that the leader invests immediately if p   ✓L and never invests if p < ✓L.
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Proposition 2 Given the follower’s time of investment ⌧ ⇤, the leader’s op-
timal payo↵ is given by
VL(p) = max {⇧L(p), 0} , (2.10)
where ⇧L(p) =
m(p)
r
  k + ↵Lm(✓F ) (p)
r (✓F )
for p < ✓S , (2.11)
=
1
r
(1 + ↵S)m(p)  k otherwise . (2.12)
The leader’s best response is to invest at T1 = 0 if p   ✓L and at T1 = 1 if
p < ✓L, where ✓L 2 (0, ✓S] is defined by
✓L = inf{p : ⇧L(p) > 0}. (2.13)
The function ⇧L(p) represents the leader’s payo↵ from an immediate in-
vestment when the follower is expected to invest at time ⌧ ⇤. Note that ⇧L(p)
can be negative, while VL(p) is non-negative because the leader would not
invest when ⇧L(p) is negative. The right-hand side of (2.11) is the leader’s
payo↵ from an immediate investment when the follower is expected to invest
after time ⌧F . On the other hand, equation (2.12) is the payo↵ from invest-
ment when the follower is expected to invest at the same time. The intuition
behind Proposition 2 is that the leader immediately invests if and only if its
net payo↵ from investment exceeds zero; otherwise the leader never invests.
Next, we obtain the strategies in the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibria.
Proposition 3 (i) If p 2 [0, ✓L), neither player invests in the equilibrium.
(ii) If p 2 [✓L, ✓S), there are two pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria,
each of which has a leader and a follower. The leader invests at ⌧L = 0, and
the follower invests at a stopping time ⌧F = inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓F} > 0, where
✓F is given by (A.1).
(iii) If p 2 [✓S, 1], then there exists a symmetric pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in which players invest immediately at the same time at t = 0.
Under the pure strategy equilibria obtained in Proposition 3(ii) for p 2
[✓L, ✓S), a leader and a follower exist. The role of the leader and the follower
may be determined through the common expectation that both firms will
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Figure 2.2: Values of ✓0, ✓L, ✓c, ✓S, and ✓F when h = 2, ` = 0.12, r = 0.1,
and k = 10. (a) shows the case ↵L = 0.3 and ↵F = 0.2, and (b) shows the
case ↵L =  0.02 and ↵F =  0.05.
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choose to play a predetermined role to attain a specific equilibrium (Fuden-
berg and Tirole 1991, p. 18). For example, the firm that is publicly known
to be a more proactive investor will be the leader in this game. However,
it is not essential for a natural leader and a follower to exist in our model,
and the indeterminacy may result in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Under
a mixed strategy equilibrium, each firm’s strategy for its first investment is
to invest at a random time with a probability distribution specified by its
strategy. In this case, the leader is randomly determined, but the follower’s
best response reduces to that of the pure strategy equilibrium in Proposition
1. The details are discussed in Section 2.4.2.
Next, we report that both a war of attrition region (VF (p) > VL(p)) and a
preemption region (VL(p) > VF (p)) can exist within the interval [✓L, ✓S).
Lemma 1 There exists ✓c 2 (✓L, ✓S] at which VL(p) > VF (p) for p 2 (✓c, ✓S)
and VF (p) > VL(p) for p 2 (✓L, ✓c), with the understanding that (✓c, ✓S) is
empty whenever ✓c = ✓S.
The relative values of ✓0 ⌘ lim !0 ✓F , ✓L, ✓c, ✓S, and ✓F are illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
For the remainder of the paper, we call the interval [✓L, ✓c) a war of attrition
(WA) region, the interval (✓c, ✓S) a preemption (PE) region, and the interval
[✓S, 1] a simultaneous move (SM) region.
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2.4.2 Mixed Strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the
War of Attrition Region
In this subsection, we obtain mixed strategy equilibria in the WA region
[✓L, ✓c) by employing the results of Hendricks et al. (1988) pertaining to a
war of attrition in continuous time. Unlike in the previous sections, we do
not assume that any one firm is predetermined to take the leader’s role.
In the WA region, a mixed strategy profile is completely characterized by
(i) each firm’s stopping time for investment as a follower in stage 2 in case the
other firm invests first, and (ii) each firm i’s probability distribution of the
random time Tˆi of investment for stage 1. Note that the random strategy Tˆi
is applicable only in the first stage of the game. For example, if Tˆi < Tˆj, then
firm i becomes the leader at time Tˆi, at which point stage 1 is terminated. In
this case, firm j’s initial strategy Tˆj is never realized because it becomes the
follower in stage 2. As shown in Section 2.4.1, a subgame perfect equilibrium
requires that the follower’s best response should be to invest at time ⌧F given
by (2.8). Hence, we focus on specifying G(i)p (·) : R+ ! [0, 1], which denotes
firm i’s cumulative probability distribution function for time Tˆi given the
prior probability p. In what follows, to keep the notation brief, we let G(i)p (·)
denote the strategy of firm i with the understanding that the follower’s time
of investment is ⌧F . By our convention, the strategy profile is represented by
(G(1)p , G
(2)
p ).
Here we adopt the convention that G(i)p (·) is right-continuous with left
limits. We let q(i)p (t) = G
(i)
p (t)  lims"tG(i)p (s) denote the discontinuity of G(i)p
at time t. Intuitively, q(i)p (t) represents the probability that firm i will invest
exactly at time t. Given a strategy profile (G(1)p , G
(2)
p ), the payo↵ for firm i
is given by
Vi(p;G
(1)
p , G
(2)
p ) = E[1{Tˆi<Tˆj}e
 rTˆiVL(p) + 1{Tˆi>Tˆj}e
 rTˆjVF (p) (2.14)
+1{Tˆi=Tˆj}e
 rTˆi⇧S(p)|(G(1)p , G(2)p )]
=
ˆ 1
0
⇢
e rt[1 G(j)p (t)]VL(p) +

lim
u"t
ˆ u
0
VF (p)e
 rsdG(j)p (s)
 
+e rt⇧S(p)q(j)p (t)
 
dG(i)p (t) . (2.15)
In (2.14), the term 1{Tˆi<Tˆj}e
 rTˆiVL(p) represents the payo↵ for the event that
firm i happens to invest before firm j, in which case firm i expects VL(p) at
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time Tˆi. Note that firm j will not invest at time Tˆj if Tˆi < Tˆj, because Tˆj is j’s
investment time conditional on j being the first one to invest; if i happens to
have invested first, then j will invest at time Tˆi+⌧F , which is j’s best response.
Analogously, 1{Tˆi>Tˆj}e
 rTˆjVF (p) represents the payo↵ for the event that firm
j invests before firm i, in which case firm i’s expected payo↵ is VF (p) at
time Tˆj because firm i will invest at time Tˆj + ⌧F . Lastly, 1{Tˆi=Tˆj}e
 rTˆi⇧S(p)
represents the payo↵ for the event of simultaneous investment in the case
where Tˆi = Tˆj.
Note that there are no dynamics or updating of the probability p until
the time min{Tˆi, Tˆj}, because the time t < min{Tˆi, Tˆj} belongs to stage 1
of the game (see Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). Therefore, at time min{Tˆi, Tˆj},
the leader’s payo↵ is VL(p) and the follower’s payo↵ is VF (p) without any
dependence on min{Tˆi, Tˆj}. It follows that the mixed strategy game for
t  min{Tˆi, Tˆj} reduces to a static game of a war of attrition in the sense
that the state variable p has no dynamics before the first move from either
player.
Equation (2.15) is the integral representation of (2.14) with respect to
the investment times of the two firms. Given firm i’s investment time t,
the probability that i will be the leader is 1   G(j)p (t) and the probabil-
ity that both firms invest at t is q(j)p (t), which explains the terms e rt[1  
G(j)p (t)]VL(p) and e rt⇧S(p)q
(j)
p (t) within the curly brackets in (2.15). The
term limu"t
´ u
0 VF (p)e
 rsdG(j)p (s) is the integral over the payo↵ in the event
that firm j invests before time t. Now we use the payo↵ function described
above to characterize the mixed strategy equilibria through the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 (i) For p 2 [✓L, ✓c), a strategy profile (G(1)p , G(2)p ) with q(1)p (0) <
1 and q(2)p (0) < 1 is a subgame perfect mixed strategy equilibrium if and only
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) (q(1)p (0), q
(2)
p (0)) 2 [0, 1)⇥ [0, 1) and q(1)p (0)q(2)p (0) = 0.
(b) For both i = 1 and 2,
G(i)p (t) = 1 
⇥
1  q(i)p (0)
⇤
exp [ t/⌧¯M(p)] ,(2.16)
where ⌧¯M(p) =
VF (p)  VL(p)
rVL(p)
. (2.17)
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(ii) Under the subgame perfect mixed strategy equilibrium, the payo↵ for firm
i is given by
Vi(p;G
(1)
p , G
(2)
p ) = q
(j)
p (0)VF (p) + [1  q(j)p (0)]VL(p) . (2.18)
Furthermore, the expected time to the first investment is given by
E
h
min{Tˆ1, Tˆ2}
i
=
⇥
1  q(1)p (0)  q(2)p (0)
⇤ ⌧¯M(p)
2
. (2.19)
Note that the equilibria are parameterized by the initial probabilities of
the firms’ entry, i.e., q(1)p (0) and q
(2)
p (0). Note also that q
(i)
p (t) = 0 for all
t > 0. In other words, one of the firms may strategically allocate a positive
probability of being the leader at time t = 0, but once the time has elapsed
beyond t = 0, the two firms’ strategies are characterized by a continuous
probability distribution G(i)p (·).
The non-zero values of q(i)p (t) are confined to t = 0 for the following reason:
In a mixed strategy equilibrium for all t > 0, each player i must be indi↵erent
regarding to the time Tˆi of investment; otherwise, the mixing of all strategies
Tˆi > 0 would not be feasible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. It implies
that the equilibrium strategy of distribution G(i)p (t) must be time-invariant
in the sense that at any time t > 0, the game must look exactly the same
as at any other time t0 > 0 for any t0 6= t. If, however, q(i)p (⌧) > 0 for
some deterministic time ⌧ > 0, then the time-invariance is broken because
the game before ⌧ and after ⌧ look di↵erent to player j; in this hypothetical
case, player j would prefer to invest after time ⌧ due to the advantage of
being the follower. Therefore, q(i)p (t) = 0 must hold for all t > 0 for a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. The time-invariance is not necessary at t = 0
because the players do not need to consider a strategy before t = 0, so either
q(1)p (0) > 0 or q
(2)
p (0) > 0 is permissible even in a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Note also that at least one of q(1)p (0) and q
(2)
p (0) must be zero. If firm 1
chooses q(1)p (0) > 0, it is taking the role of the leader with a probability of
q(1)p (0) at time t = 0, so the equilibrium probabilistically takes a characteristic
of a pure strategy equilibrium. In this case, because there is a non-zero
probability that firm 1 will be a leader, firm 2 has no incentive to place any
positive probability of investing at time t = 0 since being a follower is more
profitable than being a leader; it would rather first wait to see if firm 1 does
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invest at time t = 0. Hence, when q(1)p > 0, firm 2’s best response is to set
q(2)p = 0. By symmetry of the game, it follows that there is no equilibrium in
which q(1)p (0) > 0 and q
(2)
p (0) > 0 at the same time.
If we focus on a completely symmetric equilibrium between the two firms,
we can set q(1)p (0) = q
(2)
p (0) = 0. Let VM(p) denote the mixed strategy
equilibrium payo↵ for q(1)p (0) = q
(2)
p = 0. It is worth noting that by (2.18),
VM(·) coincides with VL(p) because the payo↵ for investment at any time
for either firm is identically given when the opponent plays the equilibrium
strategy given by (2.16). In this case, each firm’s investment time Tˆi is
exponentially distributed with a rate 1/⌧¯M(p). Thus, we can interpret the
hazard rate 1/⌧¯M(p) as the rate of each firm’s investment at any moment
in time. From the property of exponential distributions, the expected time
of the first investment from any firm is given by E[min{Tˆ1, Tˆ2}] = ⌧¯M(p)/2.
Thus, ⌧¯M(p)/2 characterizes how long it takes for the first investment to
occur. In general, due to equation (2.19), ⌧¯M(p) is the single most important
quantity that characterizes the expected time to the first investment, even if
q(1)p (0) or q
(2)
p (0) is nonzero. We defer the investigation of the comparative
statics of ⌧¯M(p) until Section 2.5.
Lastly, we briefly comment on the possibility of a mixed strategy equi-
librium in the PE region. Just as in the case of the WA game, if there is
no natural leader, then a mixed strategy equilibrium makes more sense in
practice even in a PE game. We refer the reader to Thijssen et al. (2012)
for details on mixed strategy equilibria when VL(p) > VF (p) > ⇧S(p). Nev-
ertheless, it is worth noting that even in a mixed strategy equilibrium, the
first investment occurs at time t = 0+ (as soon as the game begins) in a
preemption game. Since the focus of our paper is on a war of attrition, we
forgo further discussion of the preemption equilibria.
2.5 Impact of Learning
In this section, we explore the impact of learning on the equilibrium strategies
and show that there exists an interplay between learning and externalities
due to strategic interactions between the firms. In Section 2.5.1, we first
study a benchmark model in which externalities do not exist while Bayesian
learning does, and we obtain a benchmark result regarding the impact of
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learning. Then we return to the model presented in Section 2.4 to obtain
the comparative statics for the firms’ equilibrium strategies and payo↵ with
respect to learning. We study the comparative statics of the follower’s payo↵
and strategy in Section 2.5.2. In Section 2.5.3, we study the impact of learn-
ing on VM(·) and ⌧¯M(p). (As noted in Section 2.4.2, the comparative statics
of ⌧¯M(p) coincide with that of the expected time to the first investment.)
Lastly, in Section 2.5.4, we study the case of a second-mover advantage.
2.5.1 Benchmark Model
In our benchmark model, we show that the expected time to the first in-
vestment monotonically increases1 with the rate of learning. This agrees
with the intuition that an increase in benefits to the follower delays the first
investment in a war of attrition.
Suppose that each firm can invest once, but there is no externality between
the two investments. Then the mixed strategy equilibrium reduces to the one
considered in Section 2.4 with ↵L = ↵F = 0. In this case, the leader’s payo↵
is independent of the follower’s action, so we have VL(p) = m(p)/r   k for
p   ✓L, which does not depend on   or the follower’s strategy. The follower’s
optimal payo↵ is given by
VF (p) = E
p
h
e r⌧F
⇣µ
r
  k
⌘i
=
✓
m(✓F )
r
  k
◆
 (p)
 (✓F )
.
By Proposition 2 of Kwon and Lippman (2011), VF (p) increases with  , which
is consistent with the intuition that a higher rate of learning improves the
follower’s profit. Further, from (2.17), it follows that ⌧¯M(p) increases with  ,
which is consistent with the intuition that a player will delay investment if
the followers payo↵ improves with a higher rate of learning.
2.5.2 The Follower’s Payo↵ and Strategy
In this section, we study the comparative statics of VF (·), ✓F , and Ep[⌧F |
⌧F < 1] with respect to   for non-zero ↵L and ↵F . (We do not study the
1Throughout the paper, we make no distinction between increasing and non-decreasing
functions; similarly, we do not distinguish between decreasing and non-increasing func-
tions.
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comparative statics of Ep[⌧F ] because Ep[⌧F ] = 1 for any p < ✓F .) We
will use these results to provide intuitive explanations for the main results in
2.5.3 and 2.5.3.
We first establish the comparative statics of VF (·) and ✓F . By Proposi-
tion 2 of Kwon and Lippman (2011), the value function and the investment
threshold are both non-increasing in  , so VF (p) and ✓F are non-decreasing
with  . VF (p) increases with   because a higher learning rate improves the
follower’s payo↵. Due to the improved value of waiting and learning before
investment, the follower delays its investment as the learning rate increases.
This intuition explains why ✓F increases with  . This result is consistent
with the conventional result that the signal-to-noise ratio (h  `)/  increases
the value of waiting as well as the upper threshold of investment (Bergemann
and Valimaki, 2000).
Next, we obtain the form of Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1]:
Lemma 2
Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1] = log
✓
✓F
p
1  p
1  ✓F
◆
4 2
(h  `)2 . (2.20)
For notational convenience, we define
✓0 ⌘ lim
 !0
✓F =
kr   `(1 + ↵F )
(1 + ↵F )(h  `) . (2.21)
By virtue of Proposition 2 of Kwon and Lippman (2011), ✓F > ✓0 for all
values of  . Note also that ✓L may or may not be larger than ✓0, and there
is no general ordering between ✓L and ✓0 as illustrated by Figure 2.2. Now
we characterize the regions in which Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1] increases or decreases
with  .
Theorem 1 For fixed   2 (0,1), there exists ✓ˆF ( ) 2 (✓0, ✓F ) such that
Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1] decreases with   for p 2 (0, ✓ˆF ( )) and increases with
  for p 2 (✓ˆF ( ), ✓F ). For fixed p 2 (✓0, ✓F ), there exists  ˆF (p) such that
Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1] increases with   for   2 (0,  ˆF (p)) and decreases with   for
  2 ( ˆF (p),1). For fixed p < ✓0, Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1] decreases with  .
A noteworthy feature of Theorem 1 is the single-crossing property: the
sign change of dEp[⌧F | ⌧F <1]/d  occurs at most once as   increases with
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Figure 2.3: The impact of   on Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1]. The shaded (unshaded)
area represents the region in which Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1] increases (decreases)
with  . (a) shows the case where ↵F = 0.2 and ↵L = 0.3, and (b) shows the
case where ↵F =  0.05 and ↵L =  0.02. Here we set h = 2, ` = 0.12,
r = 0.1, and k = 10.
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fixed p or as p increases with fixed   (see Figure 2.3 for a numerical illus-
tration). Theorem 1 reflects the fact that an increase in the rate of learning
has two countervailing e↵ects on the follower’s time to investment (Kwon
and Lippman, 2011). On the one hand, such an increase may hasten the
follower’s investment because the follower acquires more meaningful infor-
mation within a shorter time when the learning rate increases. On the other
hand, an increase in the rate of learning may delay the follower’s investment
because of the increased value of waiting in order to collect more information.
Either e↵ect can be dominant, depending on the values of p and  .
When p is su ciently close to ✓F , the comparative statics of Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1]
is strongly influenced by the comparative statics of ✓F . For instance, as the
learning rate   increases, the investment threshold ✓F increases due to the
increase in the value of waiting, so the follower’s time to investment also
increases if p is very close to ✓F . On the other hand, if p is su ciently far
away from ✓F , the comparative statics of ✓F has little e↵ect on Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1]
since it takes a long time for Pt to reach the vicinity of ✓F . Furthermore,
in this regime, the higher learning rate hastens the follower’s investment
because it takes less time to collect su cient information to make a decision.
For instance, if ✓F hypothetically did not have any dependence on  , then
Ep[⌧✓|⌧✓ <1] can be shown to decrease in  . Thus, the comparative statics
of the follower’s time to investment changes as p increases from small values
to the vicinity of ✓F .
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The single-crossing property in p also explains the single-crossing property
in   because ✓F strictly increases with  : For a fixed p, the threshold ✓F is
su ciently close to p for su ciently low values of  . Thus, Ep[⌧F |⌧F < 1]
increases with   for su ciently low  . For su ciently large values of  , ✓F
takes a high value, so it is far from p. It follows that Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1] decreases
with   for large  . Thus, the comparative statics of Ep[⌧F |⌧F <1] changes
as   increases.
2.5.3 The Impact of Learning on the Mixed Strategy
Equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the impact of learning on the equilibrium payo↵
VM(·) and ⌧¯M(·). We also supplement our analyses with selected numerical
examples.
The dependencies of ✓F , ✓S, ✓L, and ✓c on   play an important role, so we
will denote these dependencies as ✓F ( ), ✓S( ), ✓L( ), and ✓c( ). We define
the open set of pairs (p,  ) in the WA region as
W = {(p,  ) 2 (0, 1)⇥ (0,1) : ✓L( ) < p < ✓c( )} ,
and we also define  
p
⌘ inf{  : ✓c( ) > p > ✓L( )}, which is the smallest
value of   at which a given value of p belongs to the WA region. For a fixed
value of p, if   <  
p
, then p may belong to the SM region or the PE region.
Comparative Statics of the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Payo↵
Now we obtain the comparative statics of VM(·) and ✓L with respect to  
under positive and negative externalities.
Theorem 2 (i) Suppose ↵I > 0 for I 2 {L, F}. For p > ✓0, there exists
 ˆM(p) 2 [ p,1) such that VM(p) decreases with   for {  : (p,  ) 2 W ,   <
 ˆM(p)} and increases with   for {  : (p,  ) 2W ,   >  ˆM(p)}. Furthermore,
for a fixed  , there exists ✓ˆM( ) 2 [✓L( ), ✓c( )] such that VM(p) increases
with   if ✓L( ) < p < ✓ˆM( ) and decreases with   if ✓ˆM( ) < p < ✓c( ).
If ✓L( ) < p < ✓0, then VM(p) increases with   for su ciently large or
su ciently small values of  .
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Figure 2.4: The impact of   on VM(·), ✓F , ✓L, and ✓c. The shaded
(unshaded) area represents the region in which dVM(p)/d  > 0
(dVM(p)/d  < 0). (a) shows the case where ↵L = 0.3 and ↵F = 0.2, and (b)
shows the case where ↵L =  0.02 and ↵F =  0.05. Here we set h = 2,
` = 0.12, r = 0.1, and k = 10.
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(ii) Suppose ↵I < 0 for I 2 {L, F}. For p > ✓0, there exists  ˆM(p) 2
[ 
p
,1) such that VM(p) increases with   for {  : (p,  ) 2 W ,   <  ˆM(p)}
and decreases with   for {  : (p,  ) 2 W ,   >  ˆM(p)}. Furthermore, for a
fixed  , there exists ✓ˆM( ) 2 [✓L( ), ✓c( )] such that VM(p) decreases with  
if ✓L( ) < p < ✓ˆM( ) and increases with   if ✓ˆM( ) < p < ✓c( ). If ✓L( ) <
p < ✓0, then VM(p) decreases with   for su ciently large or su ciently small
values of  .
Figure 2.4 provides a numerical illustration of Theorem 2. The salient
feature of this theorem is the single-crossing property of dVM(p)/d  : the
sign change of dVM(p)/d  occurs at most once, as p increases for fixed   or as
  increases for fixed p > ✓0. For fixed  , the sign change of dVM(p)/d  occurs
when p crosses ✓ˆM( ), and for fixed p > ✓0, the sign change of dVM(p)/d 
occurs when   crosses  ˆM(p). We do not have analytical results for p < ✓0,
but numerical examples suggest that the sign of dVM(p)/d  does not change
as   increases for fixed p < ✓0.
Interestingly, the single-crossing property of the comparative statics of
Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1] (Theorem 1) provides an intuitive explanation for the
single-crossing property of dVM(p)/d . First, we examine the case where
↵I > 0 for I 2 {L, F}, as illustrated by Figure 2.4(a). For small values
of  , Theorem 1 implies that an increase in   increases Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1],
which tends to decrease the leader’s payo↵ VL(·) = VM(·) because a delayed
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investment of the follower diminishes the leader’s payo↵ due to the positive
externality. This is reflected by Theorem 2(i) and Figure 2.4(a) for small
values of  . For large values of  , Theorem 1 implies that Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1]
decreases (increases) with   for low (high) values of p. This tendency is
exactly reflected in Theorem 2(i) and Figure 2.4(a) for large  : VL(·) = VM(·)
increases (decreases) with   for low (high) values of p. Then we examine
the case where ↵I < 0 and find a similar result except that the sign of
the comparative statics is opposite due to the opposite sign of ↵L. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.4(b).
Comparative Statics of ⌧¯M(p)
Now we examine the impact of learning on ⌧¯M(p) and focus on the compar-
ative statics of ⌧¯M(p) for large values of  . (The WA region shrinks to an
almost null set in the limit   ! 0, so it is di cult to obtain meaningful
analytical results in the small-  limit.)
Theorem 3 (i) Suppose ↵I > 0 for I 2 {L, F}.For su ciently high values
of p in the interval (✓L, ✓c), ⌧¯M(p) increases with  . Furthermore, whenever
  >  c for some  c > 0, there exists q( ) 2 (✓L, ✓c) such that ⌧¯M(p) decreases
with   for p 2 (✓L, q( )) and increases with   for p 2 (q( ), ✓c).
(ii) If ↵I < 0 for I 2 {L, F}, then for each fixed value of p, there exists
 c(p) > 0 such that ⌧¯M(p) increases with   whenever   >  c(p).
Theorem 3 states that the comparative statics of ⌧¯M(p) also has a single-
crossing property (changes the sign at most once). Most importantly, con-
trary to the na¨ıve expectation that a higher rate of learning induces the
firms to delay their first investment (based on the analysis of Section 2.5.1),
Theorem 3 establishes that ⌧¯M(p) decreases with   under certain conditions.
Figure 2.5(a) numerically confirms Theorem 3. For positive externalities
in Figure 2.5(a), d⌧¯M(p)/d  changes its sign once as p increases. In contrast,
even though there exists no general result for the intermediate values for
negative externalities, Figure 2.5(b) suggests that d⌧¯M/d  is always positive
for p between ✓L and ✓c, which is consistent with our asymptotic results in
Theorem 3.
In the presence of positive externalities, the parameter region ( , p) in
which Ep[⌧F |⌧F < 1] decreases with   tends to coincide with the region in
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Figure 2.5: The impact of   on ⌧¯M(·). The shaded (unshaded) area
represents the region in which d⌧¯M(p)/d  > 0 (d⌧¯M(p)/d  < 0). (a) shows
the case where ↵L = 0.3 and ↵F = 0.2, and (b) is where ↵L =  0.02 and
↵F =  0.05. Here we set h = 2, ` = 0.12, r = 0.1, and k = 10.
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which dVM(p)/d  > 0 and d⌧¯(p)/d  < 0, i.e., for small p and large  . In the
presence of negative externalities, we need to take into account another e↵ect
from the strategic behavior of the follower. On the one hand, an increase in  
can increase (decrease) ⌧F , which would increase (decrease) the value of the
leader’s investment as the follower delays (advances) the investment. On the
other hand, an increase in   can also influence the follower’s opportunistic
behavior: If the follower learns faster, then it can selectively invest whenever
the profit potential is high. Thus, the follower’s selective action diminishes
the leader’s payo↵ when the profit prospect is good. As a result, a higher
rate of learning can have a negative impact on the leader’s payo↵ for high
values of p. Hence, even though the leader’s payo↵ can increase with   for
higher values of p, the increase in VF (·) tends to overshadow the increase in
VL(·), so we only observe d⌧¯M(p)/d  > 0. This phenomenon is illustrated in
Figure 2.5(b).
Discussion on the Interplay of Externality and Learning
Overall, the impact of learning on the equilibrium payo↵s and the time to
the first investment is non-trivial. In the WA region, the follower has the
opportunity to learn about the unknown profitability of the investment by
observing the leader’s performance. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that
firms will tend to delay their investments with an increased rate of learning
because learning tends to benefit the follower. However, our results show
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that an increased rate of learning may improve the leader’s payo↵ and hence
hasten the firms’ investments. In fact, we obtain a single-crossing property
in the comparative statics of the payo↵ and the expected time to the first
investment.
This finding is driven by the following two conditions: (a) The value of
the leader’s investment decreases (increases) with the follower’s time to in-
vestment under positive (negative) externalities. (b) The follower’s time to
investment depends on the learning rate  . For example, in the case of pos-
itive externalities of our model, the follower’s earlier investment improves
the leader’s payo↵, so it satisfies condition (a). In addition, the follower’s
time to investment increases in   for high p and decreases in   for low p,
which implies condition (b). The combined e↵ect of these two conditions
causes the leader’s payo↵ to decrease with   for high p and increase with  
for low p. Incidentally, condition (b) is satisfied by the benchmark model
(↵L = ↵F = 0) since Theorem 1 holds even when ↵L = ↵F = 0. However,
as shown by Section 2.5.1, ⌧¯M(p) always increases with   because condition
(a) is absent. We conclude that the combined e↵ect of (a) and (b) leads to
our results on the single-crossing property of the comparative statics of the
payo↵ and the time to investment.
2.5.4 Case of Second-Mover Advantage
Next we consider an interesting case when ↵F > 0 > ↵L, which represents
situations with second-mover advantage. For example, even though Apple
was the first-mover in the smart-phone market, its position as the world’s
most profitable mobile phone maker was soon taken over by Samsung, which
was the second-mover2. Furthermore, this was a situation with both learning
and externalities. Samsung’s smartphones benefited from Apple’s pioneering
e↵orts on the development of the smartphone and hence it enjoyed positive
externalities from Apple’s entry into the smart phone market. Moreover, by
observing Apple’s initial performance, Samsung was able to learn that there
was very high demand in the smartphone market.
First, note that Theorem 1 always holds irrespective of the sign of ↵F .
Next, we establish the following:
2Samsung overtakes Apple as world’s most profitable mobile phone maker, The
Guardian (July 26, 2013)
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Figure 2.6: The impact of   on VM(p) and ⌧¯M(p). Here we set ↵L =  0.1,
↵F = 0.2, h = 2, ` = 0.12, r = 0.1, and k = 10.
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Proposition 5 If ↵F > 0 > ↵L, then (✓L, 1) is the WA region.
In other words, the regions of PE and SM do not exist because of the second-
mover advantage. Furthermore, VM(·) and ⌧¯M(·) have no dependence on  
for p > ✓F because VF (p) =
1
r (1+↵F )m(p) k and VL(p) = 1r (1+↵L)m(p) k
for p > ✓F . Thus, we focus on the comparative statics within the interval
(0, ✓F ).
It is straightforward to prove that the statements of Theorem 2(ii) exactly
apply for the case ↵F > 0 > ↵L. In other words, the sign of dVM(p)/d 
changes at most once as p or   increases, and hence, the single-crossing
property holds. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6(a). The proof is essentially
identical to that for Theorem 2(ii), and hence omitted.
Lastly, we obtain the following comparative statics of ⌧¯M(p):
Theorem 4 Suppose ↵F > 0 > ↵L. For su ciently high values of p in the
interval (✓L, ✓F ), ⌧¯M(p) decreases with  . Furthermore, there exist  c > 0
and a function pc( ) 2 (✓L, ✓F ) such that ⌧¯M(p) increases with   whenever
( , p) 2 ( c,1)⇥ (✓L, pc( )).
This establishes that the comparative statics of ⌧¯M(p) changes in p at least
once (an odd number of times) for large values of  . In fact, the numerical
example in Figure 2.6(b) shows that d⌧¯M(p)/d  changes its sign exactly once
in p for su ciently large   (for   > 0.335). For small values of  , the sign
change of d⌧¯M(p)/d  may not happen at all, as shown in Figure 2.6(b) for   <
0.281. For the intermediate values of   (0.281 <   < 0.335), Figure 2.6(b)
shows that the sign change of d⌧¯M(p)/d  happens twice as p increases. Even
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Figure 2.7: The impact of ↵ on VM(·). The shaded (unshaded) area
represents the region in which dVM(p)/d↵ > 0 (dVM(p)/d↵ < 0). Here we
set h = 2, ` = 0.12, r = 0.1, k = 10,   = 1.
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if we account for regime of small to intermediate values of  , our numerical
examples indicate that d⌧¯M(p)/d  exhibits a single-crossing property as  
changes from small to large values with a fixed value of p. Overall, Figure
2.6(b) demonstrates that the qualitative behavior of d⌧¯M(p)/d  is the same as
the case of the first-mover advantage in the sense that there exists at most one
single boundary between the regions of d⌧¯M(p)/d  > 0 and d⌧¯M(p)/d  < 0.
In summary, the main e↵ect of the second-mover advantage with di↵erent
signs of ↵F and ↵L is that there is no PE region. This is because both
the externalities and the opportunity of learning favor the follower’s payo↵.
Nevertheless, the single-crossing property largely remains true for this case
as well.
2.6 The Impact of Externality
In this section, we briefly discuss the impact of externality. For simplicity, we
consider the case where ↵L = ↵F = ↵ and illustrate examples of numerical
comparative statics with respect to a single parameter ↵.3 Here we remark
that an increase in the externality means an increase in the value of ↵. This
implies that when ↵ < 0, an increase in externality implies a decrease in the
magnitude of the externality (a decrease in |↵|).
We first illustrate the comparative statics of VM(·) in Figure 2.7. With
3The mathematical proofs of the main results illustrated in this section are available
although they are not presented in this paper.
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Figure 2.8: The impact of ↵ on ⌧¯M(·). The shaded (unshaded) area
represents the region in which d⌧¯M(p)/d↵ < 0 (d⌧¯M(p)/d↵ > 0). Here we
set h = 2, ` = 0.1, r = 0.1, k = 12, and   = 1.
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the positive externalities in Figure 2.7(a), VM(p) always increases with ↵.
If ↵ > 0, then the equilibrium payo↵ VM(·) increases with ↵ because the
leader’s profit stream after the follower’s investment is proportional to (1 +
↵), combined with the fact that the follower’s expected time of investment
Ep[⌧F | ⌧F < 1] decreases with ↵. It follows that ✓L decreases with ↵.
In contrast, if ↵ < 0, then an increase in ↵ has two countervailing e↵ects:
On the one hand, an increase in ↵ improves the leader’s payo↵ after the
follower invests. On the other hand, the strategic behavior of the follower
diminishes the leader’s payo↵. More specifically, the follower tends to be
discouraged from investing in the presence of negative externality; hence, if
↵ increases, the follower is more encouraged to invest, and so the leader’s
payo↵ may decrease. Thus, if ↵ < 0, the comparative statics of ✓L or VM(·)
with respect to ↵ are not clear a priori, based on intuitive reasoning alone.
Figure 2.7(b) demonstrates the insight about the two countervailing e↵ects
of the negative externality. For the negative externalities in Figure 2.7(b),
VM(p) is non-monotonic and may increase or decrease with ↵.
Next, Figure 2.8 provides a numerical illustration of the comparative stat-
ics for ⌧¯M(p). It illustrates that while an increase in positive externality
encourages firms to invest earlier, the same is not necessarily true in the
presence of negative externality. In the presence of the positive externality
as in Figure 2.8(a), firms tend to invest earlier when ↵ increases because
greater externality definitely improves firms’ payo↵. In contrast, in the pres-
ence of the negative externality as in Figure 2.8(b), the time to the first
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investment does not necessarily decrease with ↵ since ⌧¯M(p) increases with
↵ near ✓c while it decreases with ↵ near ✓L. For high values of p close to
✓c, due to the possibility of high profit, the follower has a greater incentive
to invest as ↵ increases, but the leader’s payo↵ may not improve much as ↵
increases because of the higher likelihood that the follower will invest. By
the functional form of ⌧¯M(p) in (2.17), if the follower’s payo↵ increases with
↵ to a larger extent than does the leader’s payo↵, then it makes intuitive
sense that ⌧¯M(p) increases with ↵. The intuition for p close to ✓L coincides
with that for the case of positive externality.
Overall, the comparative statics results indicate that a higher degree of
positive externality encourages firms to invest earlier. In contrast, the impact
of negative externality is more nuanced.
2.7 Some Related Models
In this section, we briefly discuss two related models and check whether our
main results hold.
2.7.1 Non-Zero Cost of Learning
We consider the case in which it is costly for the follower to collect information
and learn the true market demand in stage 1. Let Vi(p;T1, T2; k, c) denote
firm i’s payo↵, where k is the cost of investment and c is the follower’s
per-unit-time cost of observing the leader’s payo↵ in stage 1. For example,
without loss of generality, suppose that firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the
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follower. Defining k0 ⌘ k   c/r, we obtain
V1(p; 0, ⌧2; k, c) = E
p

 k +
ˆ ⌧2
0
e rtdXt + e r⌧2UˆL
 
=  c
r
+ Ep

 k0 +
ˆ ⌧2
0
e rtdXt + e r⌧2UˆL
 
= V1(p; 0, ⌧2; k
0, 0)  c
r
,
V2(p; 0, ⌧2; k, c) = E
p
ˆ ⌧2
0
( c)e rtdt+ e r⌧2(UˆF   k)
 
=  c
r
+ Ep
h
e r⌧2(UˆF   k0)
i
= V2(p; 0, ⌧2; k
0, 0)  c
r
.
Thus, the game with a non-zero c can be conveniently transformed into an-
other game with k0 = k   c/r and its associated payo↵ reduced by c/r for
each player. Thus, all the results of the previous sections continue to hold
for this model, except that ✓L = inf{p : V1(p; 0, ⌧2; k, c) > 0} takes a higher
value than inf{p : V1(p; 0, ⌧2; k0, 0) > 0}. We conclude that the follower’s cost
of collecting information does not alter the essential impact of learning and
externalities.
2.7.2 Learning From a Public Signal
In some cases, the signal of the market demand is exogenous and public.
Hence, it is useful to consider a model with learning from a public signal and
to compare its results with our main findings. Let X denote the cumulative
public signal that satisfies dXt = µdt+  dWt for t 2 [0,1) where µ 2 {h, `}
with h > ` > 0, and µ is unknown. For example, X can be the cumulative
profit stream from a closely related industry.
In stage 1, no one has invested, but the signal process X evolves, and the
posterior probability Pt evolves as
Pt =

1 +
1  p
p
exp
⇢
 (h  `)
 2

Xt   h+ `
2
t
    1
.
Suppose that firm 1 is the leader who invests at some time T1. In stage
2, we assume that the leader’s profit for the duration dt is simply  dXt for
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some positive constant  . This assumption ensures that the public signal is
the only source of information regarding the quality of the market and that
the leader’s profit stream does not add any extra information.
Suppose that firm 2 invests at T2   T1. Then in stage 3, we assume that
both the leader and the follower earn  (1+↵)dXt for some ↵ that represents
the degree of externality.
Based on the model assumptions, the payo↵s to the firms are given by the
following:
V1(p;T1, T2) = E
p
ˆ T2
T1
e rt dXt +
ˆ 1
T2
e rt (1 + ↵)dXt
 
,
V2(p;T1, T2) = E
p
ˆ 1
T2
e rt (1 + ↵)dXt
 
.
We do not present a detailed analysis, but it can be shown that in this
model of a purely public signal, a war of attrition never happens. This is
because in such a model the signal is already being generated and neither
player would need to wait for the other to invest first to learn about the
market demand. In contrast, in the model of Section 2.3, the war of attrition
occurs because each firm wants the other to invest first and start producing
the signal, which generates a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both wait
for the other to invest first. Since a war of attrition does not take place with
purely public signals, we conclude that this model lies outside the scope of
this paper.
2.8 Conclusions
Investments in new unproven projects in competitive situations are fraught
with uncertainty. In general, returns from such investments are governed
by positive or negative externalities from investments made by competing
firms. Moreover, firms often have the opportunity to learn the potential
value of investing in similar projects by observing the performance of their
competitors’ investments. In this paper, we investigate the impact of learning
and externalities on equilibrium investment strategies. We find that due
to the strategic interactions, externalities and learning opportunities have
counterintuitive e↵ects on investment strategies and on the time to the first
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investment. In particular, a single-crossing property in p and   is exhibited
by the comparative statics of the payo↵ and the expected time to investment
with respect to the rate of learning. Thus, depending on the values of p and
 , a higher learning rate may hasten the first investment, which is in contrast
to the conventional result from the benchmark model without externalities.
Overall, our results suggest that firms facing entry into an unproven mar-
ket need to consider the strategic e↵ects arising from the interplay between
externalities and learning. In particular, the e↵ect of externalities needs to be
incorporated when modeling a competitive investment problem with learning
opportunities as a war of attrition.
39
CHAPTER 3
R&D COMPETITION WITH SPILLOVERS
AND UNCERTAIN COMPLETION TIMES
3.1 Introduction
Investment in research and development (R&D) projects, particularly in
high-technology sector, entails many challenges. There is significant un-
certainty in the completion times of R&D projects in high-tech industries
(Lynn et al., 1996). Furthermore, in high-tech industries, there is significant
spillover of knowledge to competitor firms, which will potentially diminish
the innovator’s payo↵ (Carlino and Carr, 2013). In the context of invest-
ments in R&D projects in the presence of knowledge spillovers and uncertain
completion times, our paper addresses the following questions: (1) What is
the impact of natural spillover upon innovative firms’ payo↵s? (2) Does an
innovative firm have incentives to unilaterally increase the spillover to its
competitor?
Throughout the paper, we make distinctions between “natural spillovers”
and “controllable spillovers”. The natural spillovers are the spillovers that
naturally occur between firms, and they are often generated by some intrinsic
characteristics of the resulting product or service from the innovation. For
instance, when iPhone was launched in 2007, Google was able to assimilate
similar features (look and feel) of iOS to develop Android OS by simply
observing its appearance. To some extent, the degree of natural spillovers
can be understood as a measure of intrinsic imitability of an innovation: high
(low) degrees of natural spillovers occur because of high (low) degrees of
imitability. Most often, the extent of these spillovers are symmetric between
firms, and the direction of the spillovers is not pre-determined: regardless
of the size or the capability, any firm can receive (send) spillovers from (to)
other firms. Because imitability is an internal factor of innovations, a firm
cannot change the degree of natural spillover unilaterally. In contrast, a firm
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can unilaterally change “controllable spillovers” from itself to other firms.
For instance, firms can patent their innovations to decrease the spillover, or
disclose some information about their innovations to other firms to increase
spillover.
The resource-based theory suggests that imitability diminishes the dura-
bility of a firm’s competitive advantage which is obtained by superior in-
novative resources (Barney, 1991). Hence, one might expect that natural
spillovers tend to diminish an innovative firm’s performance (profit) as well.
Furthermore, conventional wisdom also suggests that spillovers should be un-
desirable from an innovator’s standpoint (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Hence, it
behooves an innovative firm to minimize the controllable spillovers through
such measures as patent protection and maintaining high wages to retain
employees. However, this line of reasoning requires careful scrutiny. For
instance, Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) provide a counterexample:
“In the early 1980s, ...., AMD had access to Intel’s 286 chip tech-
nology. Hence, AMD simply waited until Intel’s release of 80286
chip, and developed its own chip AM286 based on Intel’s product
specifications in 1982. However, in 1984 Intel refused to share
the design of the next generation “386” chip with AMD. Such a
change in Intel’s policy forced AMD .... adopted a strategy to
design products in competition with Intel. ....AMD’s change in
its strategy diminished Intel’s financial performance. ”
In fact, as shown by Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) in their the-
oretical model, the impact of controllable spillovers (unilateral disclosure of
knowledge) can be more complicated than what a naive intuition might sug-
gest. Our paper extends this question and addresses the impact of natural
spillover on an innovative firm’s performance.
Natural spillovers can have two countervailing e↵ects on an innovative
firm’s payo↵: Increased spillovers allow competitors to be more competitive
in the market by accelerating their paces of R&D, but increased spillovers also
can reduce competition pressure by encouraging competitors to be followers
who simply imitate the technology. Furthermore, if there is uncertainty in
the completion times of R&D, then even the more innovative firm may end
up being the imitator who is the beneficiary of natural spillover. Hence, the
ultimate impact of spillovers is particularly di cult to discern in the presence
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of technological uncertainty.
To answer our research questions, we investigate a game theoretic duopoly
model to examine the impact of natural spillovers on R&D investment strate-
gies when the R&D completion times are random. Each firm can choose when
to initiate the R&D project. Furthermore, each firm can control their e↵ort
levels on its R&D, which determine the expected completion times. Because
of the randomness of completion times, either firm may randomly complete
its R&D before the other. We define the firm that first completes R&D to
be the innovator and the other firm to be the imitator. By this definition,
even the more innovative firm may end up being the imitator rather than
the innovator due to uncertain completion times. After the innovator’s com-
pletion of R&D, knowledge spillovers take place, which boost the pace of the
imitator’s R&D.
3.2 Related Literature
Our work builds on and contributes to three streams of literature: resource-
based view of firms, investment under uncertainty, and R&D investment
with spillovers. Our paper contributes to the literature on the resource-
based view of firms by examining the impact of imitability. The resource-
based view in strategy suggests that imperfect imitability is one attribute of
those resources that possess the potential for sustained competitive advan-
tage (Barney, 1991), because imitability diminishes the durability of a firm’s
competitive advantage. Hence, it is intuitive to expect that low degrees of
imitability is desirable for firms to achieve superior performance. This intu-
itive expectation is also corroborated by empirical evidence which shows that
imitability has negative impact on firms’ performance. (See, for example,
De Carolis, 2003). In contrast, the empirical study by Autio et al. (2000) re-
veals positive e↵ect of imitability on firms’ international sales growth. Autio
et al. (2000) suggest that this positive e↵ect is because suppliers, customers,
and exchange partners are more likely to accept an imitable technology that
is easy to understand and learn. In our paper, we focus on the dynamics
between two competing firms, and our work complements the resource-based
theory by showing that imitability may improve performance of innovative
firms under certain conditions.
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In the industrial organization literature, there is an extensive body of work
that examines investment strategies under uncertainties. There are mainly
three sources of uncertainties that have often been addressed in the context
of technology investment. The first uncertainty comes from the technological
obsolescence, which is often considered in technology adoption problems, in
which firms obtain new technologies from others (Balcer and Lippman, 1984;
Hoppe, 2002). The second one is uncertain profitability. This uncertainty
concerns the uncertain market demand once the resulting product of the
projects are launched in the market in an investment problem, or it concerns
the uncertain quality of a new technology in technology adoption problems.
This uncertainty can be resolved gradually by observing signals, such as profit
streams of other firms who have invested in the same or similar projects; see,
for example, Miltersen and Schwartz (2004),De´camps and Mariotti (2004),
Canan and Smith (2013), and Kwon et al. (2015). Although they do not
specifically address the problems of R&D investment, both De´camps and
Mariotti (2004) and Kwon et al. (2015) consider strategic investments under
uncertain value of projects. Canan and Smith (2013) consider a technol-
ogy adoption problem with an unknown value of the technology. The third
one, which mainly exists in the research stage in R&D projects (Reinganum,
1985), is the technological uncertainty concerning the consequence of the ef-
fort exerted in R&D projects. For instance, we model this uncertainty by
considering the uncertain completion time of R&D projects as other prece-
dent work on R&D race models (see, for example, Weeds, 2002, Reinganum,
1985, and Reinganum, 1989)
In the literature on R&D investment, some papers address knowledge
spillovers (for example, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) whereas others
do not (for example, Loury, 1979, and Lee and Wilde, 1980). In the well-
explored theoretical work on R&D investment with spillovers, both Kort
et al. (2007) and Leung and Kwok (2013) characterize various Nash equi-
libria. Kort et al. (2007) consider deterministic completion times by endo-
genizing the time-to-build of R&D projects, and find that the asymmetry
between the firms’ R&D e ciency determines whether the equilibrium is a
preemption game or a war of attrition. Leung and Kwok (2013) incorporate
uncertain completion times and show the existence of a sequential, preemp-
tive and simultaneous equilibrium. The two major di↵erences between Leung
and Kwok (2013) and our work are the payo↵ structure and the timing of
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spillover. First, the payo↵ structure considered by Leung and Kwok (2013)
is characterized by “winner-takes-all”, whereas our model assumes that both
firms can extract profit from their innovations. Second, Leung and Kwok
(2013) assume that mutual spillover that occurs before the discovery of inno-
vation (completion of R&D), whereas we examine spillovers that occur after
the first completion of R&D. Furthermore, we assume that only one firm (im-
itator) can receive spillovers from the other firm (innovator). The structure
of payo↵s and the timing of spillover that our paper considers is similar to
those considered by Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012).
Although the majority of work on R&D spillover (for example, Harho↵,
1996) shows that spillovers are not desirable for innovators, Pacheco-de Almeida
and Zemsky (2012) and Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2007) show that an
increase in unilateral spillover may be beneficial for the innovator. Pacheco-
de Almeida and Zemsky (2007) and Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012)
investigate a game of two competing firms who decide the timing of resource
development in the presence of spillover. Instead of assuming the predeter-
mined sequence of investments as done in Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky
(2007), the model examined by Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) al-
lows the possibility that the follower (less capable firm) develops concurrently
with the leader (more capable firm). Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012)
find that there always exists a critical degree of unilateral spillover at which
the leader has an incentive to freely reveal knowledge (increase the degree
of unilateral spillover) to the follower to induce it to begin resource devel-
opment after the leader’s completion of innovation. Our work reexamines
firms’ incentives to voluntarily increase spillover when technological uncer-
tainty exists. More importantly, we mainly focus on the impact of natural
spillovers, which are not present in Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012),
to examine the impact of imitability on firms’ performance. Driven by di↵er-
ent research questions, our model is distinct from Pacheco-de Almeida and
Zemsky (2012)’s model in three aspects: (a) Our work separates the natural
spillovers from controllable spillovers; (b) Instead of assuming that the more
capable firm never invests later than the weaker rival, our model endoge-
nizes firms’ decisions on timing of investment. (c) Pacheco-de Almeida and
Zemsky (2012) investigates the development process of innovation, whereas
we focus on the research process that entails uncertain completion times.
Hence, our model incorporates random completion times that allow for the
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possibility that the less e cient firm wins the R&D race.
3.3 Model
In this section, we present the game theoretic model that we investigate.
We also classify the model parameter regimes into four distinct types that
correspond to four classes of equilibria.
We consider two firms indexed i 2 {1, 2}. Each firm is about to initiate
an R&D project and produce a new technology in order to enter the same
market. The firm that completes its R&D project first (innovator) enjoys
a monopoly profit until the other firm (imitator) completes its own R&D
project. Let j denote the index of the opponent of firm i. Each firm can
initiate an R&D project at any point in time. Let T 0i   0 denote the time at
which firm i initiates an R&D project. The initiation times T 01 and T
0
2 are
strategic choices of the firms. If T 01 < T
0
2 , we call firm 1 the leader and firm
2 the follower. We also define time-to-completion Ti   0 as the duration of
firm i’s R&D project. It follows that firm i completes its R&D project at
T 0i + Ti.
Let ⌧I = mini2{1,2}{T 0i + Ti} denote the time at which the innovator com-
pletes its R&D project and ⌧M = maxi2{1,2}{T 0i + Ti} denote the time at
which the imitator completes its R&D project. In the time period t 2
[min{T 01 , T 02 }, ⌧I), the time-to-completion of firm i’s R&D is an exponen-
tial random variable with a rate  i, where  i is firm i’s choice of e↵ort level.
Suppose firm i completes its R&D first. In the time period t 2 [⌧I , ⌧M), the
imitator (firm j) gains additional e ciency of R&D as a result of inter-firm
knowledge spillover. Hence, firm j’s arrival rate of the completion of R&D
is enhanced by a factor of si 2 [1,1), which is the degree of spillover from
firm i to firm j. In this time period, firm j’s (imitator’s) choice of e↵ort level
is µj, which does not have to coincide with  j. Then firm j’s arrival rate
of R&D completion is siµj. We also assume a symmetric mutual spillover
between the two firms, i.e., si = sj = s except in Section 3.4.2.
We assume that each firm i’s primary strategy is the R&D initiation time
T 0i . We also assume that the decisions on ( i, µi) are made after the strategy
profile (T 0i , T
0
j ) 2 [0,1)⇥ [0,1) is determined, because the time to initiate
R&D is a corporate level strategic decision, whereas the e↵ort levels are
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largely operational decisions. If T 01 = T
0
2 , then (T
0
1 , T
0
2 ) is called a concurrent
strategy profile. If T 0i < T
0
j , then (T
0
1 , T
0
2 ) is called an imitative strategy
profile, in which case firm i is the leader and firm j is the follower. The
objective of each firm is to maximize its expected cumulative discounted
profit given the opponent’s strategy.
A firm earns no profit before its completion of R&D. After ⌧I , the innovator
earns ⇡10 per unit time until ⌧M , whereas the imitator earns zero profit stream
until ⌧M . After ⌧M , each firm receives ⇡11 per unit time. We assume that
⇡10 > ⇡11   0; ⇡10 is the monopoly profit, whereas ⇡11 is the duopoly profit,
and hence it is natural to assume ⇡10 > ⇡11. We call ⇡10   ⇡11 the monopoly
rent. We assume two types of R&D expenses. One is the upfront setup cost
c   0 that occurs when a firm initiates its R&D. It includes, but is not limited
to, expenditures on equipments and the costs of assembling a research team.
The setup costs for the two firms are assumed to be identical. The other
type of expenses is the variable cost ki 2i per unit time, which is a convex
function of  i (Kwon et al., 2010). Here, ki is a measure of firm i’s R&D cost
e ciency.
In order to define the payo↵ as a function of the strategy profile, we need
to specify how the strategy profile determines the equilibrium R&D e↵ort
levels. We let ⇧i(⇤i,⇤j;  ) denote firm i’s expected cumulative discounted
profit with a discount rate r when firms’ e↵ort levels are ⇤i ⌘ ( i, µi) and
⇤j ⌘ ( j, µj), and the strategy profile is given by   ⌘ (T 0i , T 0j ). Then we can
define the equilibrium e↵ort levels as ⇤⇤i ⌘ ( ⇤i , µ⇤i ) and ⇤⇤j ⌘ ( ⇤j , µ⇤j) that
satisfy the following:
⇧i(⇤
⇤
i ,⇤
⇤
j ;  ) = max
⇤i
⇧i(⇤i,⇤
⇤
j ;  ),⇧j(⇤
⇤
i ,⇤
⇤
j ;  ) = max
⇤j
⇧i(⇤
⇤
i ,⇤j;  ) . (3.1)
We let Vi(T 01 , T
0
2 ; s1, s2) ⌘ ⇧i(⇤⇤i ,⇤⇤j ;  ) denote the expected cumulative dis-
counted profit of firm i given a strategy profile (T 01 , T
0
2 ) and the degrees of
spillover (s1, s2).
In the spirit of examining the equilibria of the simplest structure, we limit
our attention to the set of strategy profiles that respect the memoryless
property of the exponential arrival of R&D completion. For example, given
firm j’s strategy T 0j , firm i’s best response is to initiate its R&D only when
a significant event happens, i.e., at either T 0j or T
0
j + Tj, because the arrival
of the R&D completions is a memoryless exponential process. Let ⌃ denote
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the set of strategy profiles with either T 0i = T
0
j or T
0
i = T
0
j + Tj, to which
our analysis is confined throughout the paper. Focusing on the case in which
the first initiation time min{T 0i , T 0j } is zero without loss of generality, we can
classify Vi(T 0i , T
0
j ; s1, s2) for each firm i into three distinct types as follows:
V Ci (s1, s2) ⌘ Vi(0, 0; s1, s2)
V ILi (s1, s2) ⌘ Vi(0, Ti; s1, s2)
V IFi (s1, s2) ⌘ Vi(Tj, 0; s1, s2) .
Here V Ci (s1, s2) is firm i’s payo↵ from a concurrent strategy profile when
T 0i = T
0
j . Furthermore, V
IL
i (s1, s2) and V
IF
i (s1, s2) are respectively firm i’s
payo↵s as the leader (when T 0i = 0 and T
0
j = Ti) and the follower (when
T 0j = 0 and T
0
i = Tj) from an imitative strategy profile. Here we can express
V Ci (s1, s2) = E
✓
 
ˆ Ti
0
e rtki 2i dt+
ˆ Tj
Ti
e rt⇡10dt (3.2)
+
ˆ 1
Tj
e rt⇡11dt
!
1{Ti<Tj} +
✓
 
ˆ Tj
0
e rtki 2i dt
 
ˆ Ti
Tj
e rtkiµ2i dt+
ˆ 1
Ti
e rt⇡11dt
!
1{Ti>Tj}   c
#
V ILi (s1, s2) = E

 
ˆ Ti
0
e rtki 2i dt+
ˆ Tj+Ti
Ti
e rt⇡10dt (3.3)
 c+
ˆ 1
Tj+Ti
e rt⇡11dt
#
(3.4)
V IFi (s1, s2) = E

e rTj
✓
 c 
ˆ Ti
0
e rtkiµ2i dt (3.5)
+
ˆ 1
Ti
⇡11e
 rtdt
◆ 
(3.6)
where  i, µi,  j, and µj are the equilibrium e↵ort levels that satisfy (3.1).
We call (T 01 , T
0
2 ) a pure strategy profile if min{T 01 , T 02 } is deterministic,
i.e., when the first firm to initiate R&D does not randomize its initiation
time. We say that (T 01 , T
0
2 ) is a mixed strategy profile if both firms randomize
their initiation times T 01 and T
0
2 . The characteristics of the resulting Nash
equilibrium depends on the model parameter of the game.
Now we assume s1 = s2 and characterize four distinct model parameter
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regimes depending on the relative sizes of V Ci (s, s), V
IF
i (s, s) and V
IL
i (s, s),
which are the payo↵ functions when min{T 01 , T 02 } = 0
(a) Concurrent regime: The game belongs to this regime if V Ci (s, s)  
V IFi (s, s) for i = 1, 2. In a concurrent regime, being the follower is a dom-
inated strategy for either firm because it gives the firm a lower payo↵ than
does a concurrent strategy. Therefore, both firms have the incentives to ini-
tiate R&D at time 0, and the equilibrium is characterized by a concurrent
strategy profile, i.e., T 0i = T
0
j = 0. We call this equilibrium a concurrent
equilibrium.
(b)War of Attrition regime: The game belongs to this regime if V IFi (s, s) >
V ILi (s, s) for i = 1, 2, and V
IF
i (s, s) > V
C
i (s, s) for some i 2 {1, 2}. In
other words, there is at least one firm, say firm i, that satisfies V IFi (s, s) >
max{V ILi (s, s), V Ci (s, s)}. Then each firm has a stronger incentive to be the
follower than to be the leader. Hence, the equilibrium is characterized as a
war of attrition, and there are exactly two pure strategy equilibria, each of
which has a leader and a follower. In this regime mixed strategy equilibria
also exist as discussed in Section 3.4. Note that once the leader-follower
roles are already determined, the sequence of events under this equilibrium
is identical to that of an imitative equilibrium defined below.
(c) Preemption Regime: The game belongs to this regime if V ILi (s, s) >
V IFi (s, s) > V
C
i (s, s) for i = 1, 2. Both firms have incentives to be the leader,
so the equilibrium is characterized as a preemption game (Hendricks and
Wilson, 1992).
(d) Imitative Regime: The game belongs to this regime if it belongs to none
of the above regimes. In this regime, one of the two following conditions is sat-
isfied: (1) For one firm i, V ILi (s, s) > V
IF
i (s, s) holds while for the other firm
j, V IFj (s, s) > V
C
j (s, s) holds; in addition, V
IL
i (s, s) > V
IF
i (s, s) > V
C
i (s, s)
can hold for at most one firm i. (2) For one firm i, V ILi (s, s) > V
IF
i (s, s) >
V Ci (s, s) holds while for the other firm j, V
C
j (s, s) > V
F
j (s, s) > V
IL
j (s, s)
holds. Under either conditions (1) and (2), the equilibrium is characterized
as an imitative strategy profile in which firm i is the leader who initiates
R&D at time zero and firm j is the follower who initiates it at time Ti. We
call this equilibrium an imitative equilibrium.
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3.4 Classification of Equilibria
In this section, we characterize Nash equilibria of the game. We first discuss
a special case in which the firms are symmetric and the upfront setup cost c
is su ciently small in Section 3.4.1. Section 3.4.2 will examine the general
case.
3.4.1 Case of Symmetric Firms in the Small c Limit
Consider the case of symmetric firms (k1 = k2 = k) with a very small setup
cost c. It turns out that, in this case, the only possible regimes are the
concurrent regime and the war of attrition regime.
In the spirit of backward induction, we first solve the optimal strategy for
the imitator after ⌧I . Assume that firm i is the innovator. Let Wj(µj; si) and
Ui(µj; si) respectively be the firm j’s and firm i’s payo↵s that are discounted
to ⌧I when firm j (the imitator) employs the equilibrium e↵ort level µj after
⌧I . Then Wj(µj; si) and Ui(µj; si) are given by
Wj(µj; si) = max
µj
E
"
 
ˆ Tj ⌧
0
e rtkjµ2jdt+
ˆ 1
Tj ⌧
e rt⇡11dt | ⌧I = ⌧ < Tj
#
=
1
r
⇡11
siµj
siµj + r
  kjµ
2
j
siµj + r
,
Ui(µj; si) = E
"ˆ Tj ⌧
0
⇡10e
 rtdt+
ˆ 1
Tj ⌧
⇡11e
 rtdt | ⌧I = ⌧ < Tj
#
=
1
r
⇡11
siµj
sµj + r
+
⇡10
siµj + r
.
From the first order condition dWj(µj; si)/dµj = 0, the optimal µ⇤j that
maximizes Wj(µi; si) is obtained as follows:
µ⇤j =  
r
s
+
r
(
r
s
)2 +
⇡11
kj
. (3.7)
Firm i’s equilibrium payo↵ after ⌧I is given by
Wj(si) ⌘ Wj(µ⇤j ; si) =
1
r
⇡11
siµ⇤j
siµ⇤j + r
  kjµ
⇤2
j
siµ⇤j + r
. (3.8)
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Firm j’s equilibrium payo↵ after ⌧I is given by
Ui(si) ⌘ Ui(µ⇤j ; si) =
1
r
⇡11
siµ⇤j
sµ⇤j + r
+
⇡10
siµ⇤j + r
. (3.9)
Because we assume perfect symmetry between the two firms, the firm index
i is dropped from the functions Wi(·) and Ui(·) for the remainder of this
section.
Below we obtain the firms’ strategies and payo↵s of the two classes of
equilibria. Throughout the paper, we assume c < Wi(1), i.e., the upfront
cost is su ciently small so that both firms have incentives to initiate their
R&D projects even without spillover.
Proposition 6 (I) In an equilibrium with a concurrent strategy profile, firm
i’s strategy is given by T 0i = 0 for i 2 {1, 2} . Then the e↵ort levels µ⇤i for
t 2 [⌧I , ⌧M) are given by (3.7), and the e↵ort levels  Ci for t 2 (0, ⌧I) are
given by
 Ci =
p
(2kr   U(s) +W (s))2 + 12krU(s)  (2kr   U(s) +W (s))
6k
. (3.10)
The equilibrium payo↵s are given by
V Ci (s, s) = (U(s) +W (s))
 Ci
2 Ci + r
  k( 
C
i )
2
2 Ci + r
  c. (3.11)
(II) In an equilibrium with an imitative strategy profile, where firm i is the
leader, the strategy profile is given by (0, Ti). Then firm i’s e↵ort level  ILi
for t 2 (0, Ti) is given by
 ILi =  r +
r
r2 +
rU(s)
k
, (3.12)
and firm j’s e↵ort level µ⇤j for t 2 [Ti, ⌧M) is given by (3.7).
The equilibrium payo↵s are given by
V ILi (s, s) =  
k( IL1 )
2
 IL1 + r
+ U(s)
 IL1
r +  IL1
  c, (3.13)
V IFj (s, s) = (W (s)  c)
 IL1
r +  IL1
. (3.14)
Next, we establish some su cient conditions for each parameter regime.
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Proposition 7 (I) If either of the following conditions is satisfied, then the
game belongs to the concurrent strategy regime: (a) ⇡11  8r2k and s is
su ciently small or su ciently large, or (b) ⇡11 > 8r2k and s is su ciently
small.
(II) If ⇡11 > 8rk2 and s is su ciently large, then the game belongs to the
war of attrition regime.
When the duopoly profit stream ⇡11 is relatively small, a firm has a strong
incentive to initiate its R&D earlier in order to attain the monopoly profit
stream ⇡10. Thus, both firms initiate their R&D at time zero. When ⇡11 is
su ciently large, delaying the initiation of an R&D project has two counter-
vailing e↵ects on a firm’s payo↵. On the one hand, a firm obtains higher cost
e ciency after ⌧I due to spillover, so delaying the R&D project and thereby
being the imitator may increase the payo↵. On the other hand, a delay in
an R&D project may diminish the time value of the profit. When s is su -
ciently small, the first e↵ect is dominated by the second e↵ect, because the
increment in cost e ciency arising from delaying the R&D project is very
small. Hence, both firms choose to initiate their R&D projects at time zero
for small s.
If the spillover s and the duopoly profit ⇡11 are su ciently large, then it
behooves a firm to be the imitator, because the first e↵ect dominates the
second e↵ect. In this case, both firms prefer to be the follower since their
incentives are identical if k1 = k2 and s1 = s2. Specifically, if V IFi (s, s) >
V Ci (s, s) and V
IF
i (s, s) > V
IL
i (s, s) are satisfied, then as discussed in Section
3.3, the game belongs to the war of attrition regime, and the equilibrium is
characterized as a war of attrition (Tirole, 1988; Hendricks et al., 1988).
In a pure strategy equilibrium of a war of attrition, one firm takes the
leader’s role while the other takes the follower’s role. The designation of the
leader and the follower falls outside the scope of the mathematical specifica-
tion of the game, but is rather determined by social expectation. If one of
the firms is expected to be more proactive, possibly because of the past track
records and public expectations, then it naturally takes the role of a leader.
If the social expectation cannot determine the leader and the follower roles,
the game results in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Under a mixed strategy
equilibrium, each firm initiates its R&D project at a random time. In this
case, the firm that happens to initiate the R&D first becomes the leader. The
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best response of the other firm is to be the follower. A mixed strategy profile
is characterized by each firm i’s cumulative probability distribution for the
random time T 0i of initiation of R&D. Let Fi(t) : R+ ! [0, 1] denote firm
i’s cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) for time T 0i . Then
the mixed strategy profile is characterized by the pair of CDFs (F1(t), F2(t)).
We let qi(t) = Fi(t)   limt0"t Fi(t0) represent the discontinuity of Fi(t) at
time t. Then by virtue of Hendricks et al. (1988), we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 8 In a war of attrition regime, a mixed strategy equilibrium
characterized by a strategy profile (F1(t), F2(t)) with q1(0) < 1 and q2(0) < 1
exists, if and only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) (q1(0), q2(0)) 2 [0, 1)⇥ [0, 1) and q1(0)q2(0) = 0.
(2) For both i = 1 and 2,
Fi(t) = 1  [1  qi(0)] exp
✓
  t
⌧Mi
◆
,
where ⌧Mi =
V IFj (s, s)  V ILj (s, s)
rV ILj (s, s)
. (3.15)
The mixed strategy equilibrium payo↵ is given by
V Mi = qj(0)V
IF
j (s, s) + [1  qj(0)]V ILj (s, s).
Proposition 8 reveals that each firm’s investment time T 0i is exponentially
distributed with parameter 1/⌧Mi . The function qi(t) is the discontinuity in
the CDF Fi(t; s), and it is the probability that firm i initiates R&D at time
t. The function qi(t) can never be positive when t > 0, but qi(0) can be
positive.
The fact that qi(t) = 0 for t > 0 can be understood as follows. Suppose
that qi(t0) > 0 for some t0 > 0, i.e., firm i initiates R&D at time t0 with a
positive probability. Then firm j has an incentive to initiate R&D after t0
due to the higher payo↵ to the follower than that to the leader. However,
this contradicts the fact that firm j should be indi↵erent among all T 0j > 0
in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence, qi(t) should be zero for all t > 0.
Moreover, Proposition 8 states that at most one of q1(0) and q2(0) is pos-
itive. Whenever qi(0) > 0, i.e., firm i has non zero probability to initiate
R&D at time 0, firm j’s best response is to definitely delay R&D because it
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is more profitable to be the follower than to be the leader. Thus, qj(0) = 0
whenever qi(0) > 0.
In summary, in a war of attrition, even though the equilibrium has the
characteristic of an imitative strategy profile, either firm can be the leader
depending on the social expectation (in case of a pure strategy equilibrium)
or by chance (in case of a mixed strategy equilibrium). As shown below,
this feature of a war of attrition remains true even when the two firms are
asymmetric.
3.4.2 Case of Asymmetric Firms
In this subsection, we generalize our model in Section 3.4.1 by assuming c > 0
and k1 6= k2. Unless otherwise specified, we assume k1  k2 in the remainder
of the paper. For notational convenience, define k ⌘ k2 and q ⌘ k1/k so
that q 2 (0, 1]. We call 1   q 2 [0, 1) the degree of asymmetry. Unlike
the symmetric cases investigated in Section 3.4.1, we obtain the concurrent,
imitative, and a war of attrition equilibria. In some limiting cases, we are
able to obtain su cient conditions for the three classes of equilibria.
We first obtain the strategies and payo↵s for various equilibria.
Proposition 9 (I) In a concurrent equilibrium, firm i’s strategy is given by
T 0i = 0 for i 2 {1, 2}. Firm i’s e↵ort level µ⇤i for t 2 (⌧I , ⌧M) is defined in
(3.7), and firms’ e↵ort levels ( C1 , 
C
2 ) for t 2 (0, ⌧I) are the unique pair of
solutions that satisfies
r +  C1 +  
C
2 =
s
(r +  C1 )
2 + ( C1 )
U2(s) W2(s)
k2
+
r
k2
U2(s) (3.16)
r +  C1 +  
C
2 =
s
(r +  C2 )
2 + ( C2 )
U1(s) W1(s)
k1
+
r
k1
U1(s) (3.17)
 C1   0 ,  C2   0 (3.18)
where Ui(s) and Wi(s) are defined in (3.9) and (3.8).
(II) In an imitative or a war of attrition equilibrium where firm i is the
leader, firm i’s e↵ort level  ILi is given by
 ILi =  r +
s
r2 +
rUi(s)
ki
. (3.19)
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Although we cannot obtain the explicit expression of  Ci as in the symmet-
ric case, Proposition 9 shows that there exists a unique pair of ( C1 , 
C
2 ) in a
concurrent equilibrium. It is technically di cult to delineate the conditions
for a concurrent equilibrium. However, progress can be made when we con-
sider limiting cases of q ! 1 and q ! 0. Next, we establish some su cient
conditions for each parameter regime.
Proposition 10 (I) If either of the following conditions is satisfied, the
game belongs to the concurrent regime. (a) c and s are su ciently small;
(b) c is su ciently small, q is su ciently close to 1, ⇡11 < 8r2k, and s is
su ciently large.
(II) If q is su ciently close to 1, c is su ciently small, ⇡11 > 8r2k, and s
is su ciently large, then the game belongs to the war of attrition regime.
(III) If q is su ciently close to 0 and s is su ciently large, then the game
belongs to the imitative regime.
When the degree of spillover is su ciently low and the upfront cost is
su ciently small, a firm does not have much incentive to wait for the other
firm to complete its R&D. Hence, a concurrent equilibrium occurs as stated
by Proposition 10 (I.a).
When q is su ciently close to 1, the game is very close to the symmetric
case. Hence the intuition behind Proposition 10 (I.b) is exactly the same as
that of Proposition 7 (I.a), and both firms choose to initiate R&D at time
0. When c is su ciently small, the intuition behind Proposition 10 (II) is
exactly the same as that of Proposition 7 (II), and both firms have incentives
to be the follower, so the game becomes a war of attrition. Larger values of
c only reinforce a firm’s incentive to delay its R&D because of the additional
upfront cost.
When q is su ciently close to 0 and s is su ciently large, the less e cient
firm can benefit from significant cost reduction due to spillover, so it has
an incentive to wait for the other firm’s completion. In contrast, the more
e cient firm has an incentive to initiate R&D immediately because waiting
for the less e cient firm’s completion is extremely time consuming due to
the extreme asymmetry. Therefore, as stated by Proposition 10 (III), the
game belongs to the imitative regime.
Figure 3.1 provides numerical illustrations of Proposition 7 and 10. When
⇡11 < 8kr2, the war of attrition regime does not exist for su ciently large q,
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Figure 3.1: Various regimes of the game. The parameters for (a) are:
k = 1, ⇡10 = 200, ⇡11 = 20, r = 0.1, c = 150; the parameters for (b) are
k = 50, ⇡10 = 200, ⇡11 = 1, r = 0.1, c = 0.6.
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i.e., q ! 1, as illustrate by Figure 7 (b). Figure 7 (a) represents the case in
which ⇡11 > 8kr2.
Although our analytical results of Proposition 7 and 10 only discuss the
limiting cases of q and s, various model parameter regimes are numerically
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
There are two noteworthy features of Figure 3.1 (a). First, if q is su -
ciently close to 1, the imitative regime does not occur; if the two firms are
nearly symmetric, then because their payo↵s are similar, neither firm has
strong incentive to be either the leader or the follower, and hence the imi-
tative regime does not take place. Secondly, if the two firms are extremely
asymmetric, there is no war of attrition regime even if s is very large. If the
asymmetry is su ciently high, the more e cient firm never prefers to be the
follower because it takes the less e cient firm a long time to complete the
R&D.
Another noteworthy feature of the model is that the war of attrition regime
does not have to occur in the space of (s, q). Figure 3.1 (b) illustrates a model
parameter regime (k = 50) where the war of attrition regime is absent even
for large values of s or q.
Lastly, we characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium in a war of attrition
regime for an asymmetric case. The following proposition is analogous to
Proposition 8 for the symmetric case.
Proposition 11 In a war of attrition regime, a mixed strategy equilibrium
that is characterized by a strategy profile (F1(t), F2(t)) with q1(0) < 1 and
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q2(0) < 1 exists if and only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) (q1(0), q2(0)) 2 [0, 1)⇥ [0, 1) and q1(0)q2(0) = 0.
(2) For both i = 1 and 2,
Fi(t; s) = 1  [1  qi(0)] exp[  t
⌧Mi
],
where ⌧Mi =
V IFj (s, s)  V ILj (s, s)
rV ILj (s, s)
(3.20)
The mixed strategy equilibrium payo↵ is given by
V Mi = qj(0)V
IF
j (s, s) + [1  qj(0)]V ILj (s, s).
One striking feature of the war of attrition is that the more e cient firm
is not necessarily the first firm to initiate R&D in either the pure strategy
equilibrium or the mixed strategy equilibrium.
3.5 The Impact of Spillover
In this section, we examine the impact of natural spillover on the equilibrium
payo↵s in various regimes. Then we show that a firm may or may not have an
incentive to unilaterally increase the spillover depending on the magnitude
of the natural spillover and the degree of asymmetry. As in Section 3.4, we
assume k1  k2 so that firm 1 is the more e cient firm and firm 2 is the less
e cient firm in the remainder of the paper.
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increased spillover should increase
the imitator’s payo↵ whereas it decreases the innovator’s payo↵. However,
the following two examples demonstrate that this wisdom does not always
hold.
Figure 3.2 (a) shows an example in which the game switches from the con-
current regime to the war of attrition regime as s increases. In this example
where the degree of asymmetry is low (q = 0.02) and the monopoly rent
⇡10   ⇡11 is not very large (⇡10 = 30, ⇡11 = 10), even the more e cient firm
benefits from increased spillover when the game belongs to the concurrent
regime because both firms have a chance to be the imitator due to random
completion times. However, in the war of attrition regime, if firm 1 (the
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Figure 3.2: The impact of spillovers upon equilibrium payo↵s. In (a), the
shaded (unshaded) area represents concurrent (war of attrition) regime; In
(b), the shaded (unshaded) area represents concurrent (imitative) regime.
Here, the parameters for (a) are
k = 1, ⇡10 = 30, ⇡11 = 10, r = 0.1, c = 50, q = 0.02; the parameters for (b)
are k = 1; ⇡10 = 12, ⇡11 = 10, r = 0.1, c = 0, q = 0.9.
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more e cient firm) is the leader then it cannot benefit from spillover, and
its payo↵ decreases in s as a result of a shorter length of time over which it
receives monopoly profit; if firm 1 is the follower, firm 1’s payo↵ increases in
s.
Figure 3.2 (b) shows an example in which the game switches from the
concurrent regime to the imitative regime as s increases. In the imitative
regime, firm 1 initiates R&D first. In the concurrent regime, because of the
high degree of the asymmetry (q = 0.9), spillover tends to decrease firm 1’s
payo↵. However, at the transition point s⇤, firm 1’s payo↵ increases dis-
continuously in s. The intuition behind this phenomenon is that, across the
transition from the concurrent regime to the imitative regime, firm 2 switches
from the concurrent strategy to the imitative strategy, which discontinuously
increases firm 1’s payo↵ because firm 2’s imitative strategy lessens its com-
petition against firm 1.
From these two examples, we see that an increased spillover does not always
diminish the more e cient firm’s payo↵. Now we investigate how prevalent
these results and associated insights are. We first investigate the comparative
statics of V Ci (s, s),V
IL
i (s, s) and V
IF
i (s, s) with respect to s in various regimes
to examine the impact of natural spillover upon firms’ payo↵s.
Theorem 5 (I) For q su ciently close to 1 and c su ciently small, we
obtain the following: (a) Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 10 (I)
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are satisfied so that the game belongs to the concurrent regime. Then V Ci (s, s)
decreases in s if ⇡10 ⇡11 is su ciently large, and it increases in s if ⇡10 ⇡11
is su ciently small. (b) Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 10 (II)
are satisfied so that the game belongs to the war of attrition regime. Then
V ILi (s, s) decreases in s. Furthermore V
IF
i (s, s) decreases in s if ⇡10   ⇡11 is
su ciently large, whereas it increases in s if ⇡10   ⇡11 is su ciently small.
(II) For q is su ciently close to 0, we obtain the following: (a) Suppose
that the conditions of Proposition 10 (I) are satisfied so that the game belongs
to the concurrent regime. Then V C1 (s, s) decreases in s whereas V
C
2 (s, s)
increases in s. (b) Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 10 (III) are
satisfied so that the game belongs to the imitative regime. Then V IL1 (s, s)
decreases in s whereas V IF2 (s, s) increases in s.
Theorem 5 (II.a) can be understood as follows. In the concurrent regime,
for high degrees of asymmetry between the two firms, i.e., if q is su ciently
close to 0, the more e cient firm is more likely to become the innovator.
Hence, firm 1’s payo↵ mainly depends on the payo↵ that it receives as an
innovator, and firm 2’s payo↵ mainly depends on the payo↵ that it receives
as an imitator. Because an increase in s diminishes the innovator’s payo↵
and increases the imitator’s payo↵ by shortening the imitator’s completion
time, firm 1’ payo↵ decreases in s whereas firm 2’s payo↵ increases in s.
If the degree of asymmetry 1  q is su ciently low, i.e., if q is su ciently
close to 1, the two firms are almost equally likely to be the innovator or the
imitator. Hence, from the formula (3.11), a firm’s payo↵ mainly depends
on the sum of the payo↵s it receives as an innovator and an imitator. Then
Theorem 5 (I.a) can be understood as follows. If the monopoly rent ⇡10 ⇡11 is
su ciently small, the innovator’s payo↵ is insensitive to the completion time
of the imitator. It follows that the innovator’s payo↵ is relatively insensitive
to s, because the only e↵ect of s is to decrease the completion time of the
imitator. However, the imitator’s payo↵ remains sensitive to s. Because the
imitator’s payo↵ increases in s, it follows that each firm’s payo↵ increases in s.
If the monopoly rent is su ciently large, the innovator’s payo↵ is diminished
dramatically by the imitator’s earlier completion time when s increases, so
the impact of s upon the innovator’s payo↵ dominates the impact of s upon
the imitator’s payo↵. As a result, the firms’ payo↵s decrease in s.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the impact of the natural spillover s upon a firm’s
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Figure 3.3: The impact of the natural spillover s upon V Ci (s, s) under
di↵erent values of the monopoly rent. (a)
k1 = k2 = 10, ⇡10 = 12, ⇡11 = 10, r = 0.1, c = 0; (b)
k1 = k2 = 10, ⇡10 = 200, ⇡11 = 10, r = 0.1, c = 0; (c) k1 = k2 = 1, ⇡10 = 3,
⇡11 = 1, r = 0.1, c = 0.
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concurrent payo↵ under various values of the monopoly rent. Figure 3.3
(a) and (b) are consistent with Theorem 5 (I.a) when the monopoly rent
is su ciently small or su ciently large. Figure 3.3 (c) illustrates the case
where the value of monopoly rent is intermediate. For su ciently small s,
the change in the imitator’s completion time is relatively insignificant, so
the innovator’s payo↵ does not decrease much in s. Thus the comparative
statics of the concurrent payo↵ with respect to s are mainly a↵ected by the
increment in the imitator’s payo↵. In contrast, for su ciently large s, the
innovator’s payo↵ is much more sensitive to large decrement in the imitator’s
completion time than the imitator’s payo↵. Hence, the concurrent payo↵ is
mainly a↵ected by the reduction in the innovator’s payo↵.
In the war of attrition regime, higher spillover diminishes V ILi (s, s) be-
cause the leader must be the innovator. As stated in Theorem 5 (I.b), the
follower’s payo↵ V IFi (s, s) does not always increase in spillover. Instead,
the comparative statics of V IFi (s, s) with respect to s depend on the magni-
tude of the spillover and the monopoly rent. This is because an increase in
spillover has two opposing e↵ects on the follower’s payo↵: On the one hand,
increased spillover improves the follower’s payo↵ by raising the follower’s ef-
ficiency. On the other hand, increased spillover may decrease the follower’s
payo↵ because it may increase the leader’s time-to-completion; the leader’s
time-to-completion may increase in s because the leader reduces the e↵ort
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level when s increases. If the monopoly rent is small, the leader’s e↵ort level
does not change significantly as s increases, so the first e↵ect dominates and,
as a result, V IFi (s, s) increases in s. In contrast, if the monopoly rent is
su ciently large, then the leader’s e↵ort level is su ciently sensitive to s. It
follows that the second e↵ect dominates, and V IFi (s, s) decreases in s.
Now we examine the impact of increased spillover across the transition
point s⇤. In particular, by the definitions of various regimes in Section 3.3,
we define s⇤ as the smallest degrees of natural spillover at which a transition
from the concurrent regime to the other regime occurs.
Theorem 6 (I) For q su ciently close to 1, and ⇡11 > 8kr2, We obtain
V Ci (s
⇤, s⇤)   V IFi (s⇤, s⇤), and V Ci (s⇤, s⇤) > V ILi (s⇤, s⇤) for both i 2 {1, 2}.
(II) For q su ciently close to 0, Firm 1 is the leader, and we obtain
V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤) < V IL1 (s
⇤, s⇤) and V C2 (s
⇤, s⇤) = V IF2 (s
⇤; s⇤).
As illustrated by Figure 3.2 (a), if the degree of asymmetry is su ciently
low, firm 1’s payo↵ discontinuously decreases as s crosses s⇤ regardless of
whether firm 1 is the leader or the follower in the war of attrition regime.
If the degree of asymmetry is high, an increase in spillover across s⇤ (at the
transition from the concurrent to the imitative regime) has two countervailing
e↵ects on firm 1’s payo↵. (a) An increase in spillover increases firm 1’s
payo↵, which has been demonstrated by Figure 3.2 (b) and explained by
accompanying comments; (b) An increase in spillover across s⇤ induces firm
2 to switch to imitative strategy, and consequently firm 1 loses a chance
to benefit from spillover. However, in the presence of high asymmetry in
e ciency, firm 1’s chance of receiving spillover is very small even in the
concurrent regime. Hence, the first e↵ect dominates the second e↵ect, and
firm 1’s payo↵ increases in s across s⇤.If q is not very small, Figure 3.4 shows
an example in which the negative e↵ect dominates the positive e↵ect, and
firm 1’s profits decreases in s across s⇤ as the game crosses over from the
concurrent to the imitative regime.
Theorems 5 and 6 examine the impact of natural spillover. Next we inves-
tigate the impact of unilateral increase in spillover. Specifically, we assume
that firm 1 can change the spillover s1 from firm 1 to firm 2 and examine
its impact. (The spillover s1 has been defined in Section 3.3). For instance,
firm 1 (the more innovative firm) can achieve this by disclosing information
about its innovation to its competitor after it completes the project. The
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Figure 3.4: Firm 1’s payo↵ decreases when the game crosses over from
concurrent regime to imitative regime. The shaded (unshaded) area
represents concurrent (imitative) regime. Here we set
k = 1; ⇡11 = 20; ⇡10 = 200; r = 0.1; c = 1; q = 0.4.
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following theorem establishes the impact of unilateral increase in spillover s1
by an infinitesimal amount.
Theorem 7 For su ciently small increase ✏ > 0 in the unilateral spillover
from firm 1 to firm 2, we obtain the following:
(I) For q su ciently close to 1, (a) if the game belongs to the concurrent
regime, then the equilibrium payo↵s V C1 (s + ✏, s) < V
C
1 (s, s) for both su -
ciently large ⇡10 and su ciently small ⇡10; (b) if the game belongs to the
war of attrition regime, then V IL1 (s + ✏, s) < V
IL
1 (s, s) and V
IF
1 (s + ✏, s) =
V IF1 (s, s); (c) if k < ⇡11/8r
2 such that the game crosses over from the con-
current regime to the imitative regime at s⇤, then V IL1 (s
⇤+✏, s⇤) < V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤).
(II) For q su ciently close to 0, (a) if the game belongs to the concurrent
regime, then V C1 (s+ ✏, s) < V
C
1 (s, s); (b) if the game belongs to the imitative
regime, then V IL1 (s+ ✏, s) < V
IL
1 (s, s); (c) at the transition point s
⇤, we have
V IL1 (s
⇤ + ✏, s⇤) > V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤).
Theorem 7 (I.a), (I.b), (II.a) and (II.b) state that, regardless of the value
of s, the payo↵s decrease in ✏ within the given regime. In another word, a
firm has no incentive to unilaterally increase spillover as long as the increased
spillover does not move the game to another equilibrium regime. However, at
s⇤, the unilaterally increased spillover may have di↵erent impacts upon firm
1’s payo↵s. If the game crosses over from concurrent to the war of attrition
regime at s⇤, the unilaterally increased spillover diminishes firm 1’s payo↵
whether firm 1 is the leader or the follower. In contrast, Theorem 7 (II.c)
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states that, in case of high asymmetry, firm 1 can ease the competition by
unilaterally increasing the spillover to induce firm 2 to delay the initiation of
R&D.
Although Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) also addresses an inno-
vative firm’s incentives to unilaterally increase spillovers, our results are dif-
ferent from theirs due to the presence of technological uncertainty. Pacheco-
de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) finds that the more e cient firm always has
an incentive to unilaterally increase spillover beyond the critical value s⇤ if
the completion times are deterministic. In contrast, our results suggest that
the more e cient firm may not have the incentive to increase spillover beyond
s⇤ if the completion times are random. (See Figure 3.4). This phenomenon
sometimes happens because the more e cient firm can also benefit from
the natural spillover in the concurrent regime due to substantial probability
that the more e cient firm may end up being the imitator. In contrast, in
the imitative regime, the more e cient firm cannot benefit from the natural
spillover. Hence, the di↵erence in our results is driven by the uncertainty in
the completion times.
3.6 Sequence of Initiation of R&D
In this section, we investigate which firm initiates its R&D first in the war
of attrition regime. In the concurrent regime, both firms initiate R&D at
time zero. Hence, we only need to focus on the imitative regime and the
war of attrition regime. In the imitative regime, the sequence of initiation
of R&D is deterministic: the more e cient firm always initiates R&D earlier
than the less e cient firm firm. In the war of attrition regime, because there
are two pure strategy equilibria, either firm can be the leader or the follower
depending on nom-mathematical factors such as social expectation or tacit
agreement. Even in the mixed strategy equilibrium, if qi(0) > 0, then by
the meaning of qi(0) explained in Section 3.4, there is tacit expectation that
firm i is more likely to be the leader to initiate R&D first. The interesting
question is what happens when there is no such tacit propensity for any firm
to be the leader, i.e., qi(0) = qj(0) = 0. Thus, we examine the probability
that a given firm initiates R&D before its competitor in the completely mixed
strategy equilibrium when qi(0) = qj(0) = 0. We say that firm i is more likely
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to initiate R&D earlier than firm j if P (T 0i < T
0
j | min{T 0i , T 0j } > 0) > 1/2.
By virtue of Proposition 11,we obtain
P (T 0i < T
0
j | min{T 0i , T 0j } > 0) =
⌧Mj
⌧Mi + ⌧
M
j
, (3.21)
where ⌧Mi is given in Proposition 11.
Theorem 8 (I) Suppose that q is su ciently close to 1, ⇡11 > 8r2k, and s
is su ciently large so that the game belongs to the war of attrition regime.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, we have P (T 02 < T
0
1 | min{T 01 , T 02 } > 0) >
1/2.
(II) Suppose that q is su ciently close to 0 and s is su ciently large so
that the game belongs to the imitative regime. In the equilibrium, we have
T 01 < T
0
2 .
Theorem 8 reveals that the less e cient firm is more likely to initiate
R&D first in the completely mixed strategy equilibrium of a war of attrition.
In fact, extensive numerical studies indicate that this result is robust for
the war of attrition regime even if the conditions of Theorem 8(I) are not
satisfied. (The theorem is formally proved only for analytically tractable
model parameter regime).
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, firm i chooses its strategy depending on
firm j’s payo↵ structure in such a way that firm j is indi↵erent among all
initiations times T 0j > 0. Even though both firms have the incentive to
be the follower, the less e cient firm has stronger incentive to wait than
the more e cient firm because it takes longer for the less e cient firm to
complete R&D. If the more e cient firm strategically places high likelihood to
initiate R&D too early, then the less e cient firm would prefer to delaying its
initiation, and firm j would not be indi↵erent among all T 0j > 0. Therefore,
the more e cient firm needs to place significant amount of likelihood on later
times of initiation. This gives the more e cient firm stronger incentive to
place higher probability of initiation at later times. In general, a similar
characteristics is shared by all mixed strategy equilibria of a war of attrition
(Kornhauser et al. 1989, Myatt 1999).
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3.7 Conclusions
Investments in R&D projects are often accompanied by knowledge spillovers
and uncertainty in the projects’ completion times. In this paper, we develop
a game theoretic model to investigate the impact of natural spillover, which
always takes place from the innovator to the imitator. We find the existence
of three equilibrium regimes (concurrent, imitative, and war of attrition) de-
pending on the degree of spillover and that of asymmetry between firms’ cost
e ciencies. Conventional wisdom implies that spillover decreases the more
e cient firm’s profit whereas it increases the less e cient firm’s profit. In
stark contrast, our analysis suggests that the impact of spillover does not
always follow this conventional wisdom. In particular, an increase in natural
spillover may benefit the more e cient firm (a) under low degrees of asym-
metry,low degrees of spillover and small monopoly rent, or (b) under high
degrees of asymmetry at the transition point between a concurrent regime
and an imitative regime.
We also examine which firm is more likely to initiate R&D first. It is
generally accepted that the more e cient firm initiates earlier than the less
e cient rival. In the imitative regime, our result is consistent with this con-
ventional wisdom. In contrast, in the war of attrition regime, we find the
conventional wisdom does not hold anymore: in the pure strategy equilib-
rium, either firm initiates first depending on the social expectation; in the
mixed strategy equilibrium, the less e cient firm is more likely to invest
earlier.
We also investigate the incentive of a firm to increase the degree of R&D
spillover to the competitor despite the possibility of imitation by the com-
petitor. Extant literature of management suggests that knowledge spillover
is thought to diminish an innovator’s payo↵, so one would expect that the
more e cient firm should minimize the knowledge spillover. By allowing the
more e cient firm to increase spillover, we find that the conventional expec-
tation holds only under certain circumstances. More specifically, our analysis
shows that under high degrees of asymmetry, the more e cient firm is better
o↵ by unilaterally increasing spillover to induce the competitor to adopt an
imitative strategy. In contrast, under su ciently low degrees of asymmetry,
even if the competitor is induced to adopt an imitative strategy, the more
e cient firm’s payo↵ is not increased at the transition point. This result is
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in contrast to that of Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012)
Overall, our paper suggests that firms facing investment decisions in R&D
projects need to take the uncertain direction of the spillover into account.
In particular, our analysis suggests that, in the presence of uncertainty and
natural spillover, the asymmetry of firms is an important factor that impacts
the R&D investment strategies. Lastly, we show that reduced imitability
of new innovations does not always improve the performance of innovative
firms.
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CHAPTER 4
MANAGING R&D RESOURCES
THROUGH REAL OPTIONS LENS
4.1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) is essential for the growth of a firm. To
obtain sustainable competitive advantages, firms invest significant resources
and time in R&D activities. For instance, in 2015, Intel spent 20.6% of its
revenue on R&D, Google spent 14.9%, and Pfizer spent 16.9% (Jaruzelski
et al., 2015). Because of the importance of R&D, the valuation of R&D
projects and R&D investment strategies are critical to investors’ decisions.
However, determining a R&D project’s value and making investment deci-
sions can be di cult tasks because of two challenges. The first challenge
is the uncertainty. R&D projects are often fraught by two types of uncer-
tainties. One is the market uncertainty regarding the market demand for
the developed products or processes. Many external factors can cause the
market uncertainty, such as the uncertainty in the customers’ preferences or
government policies. For example, the huge demand for smartphones was
not anticipated before iPhone was launched. The other type of uncertainty
is technological uncertainty, which is the uncertainty around the duration
of R&D projects1. For instance, in pharmaceutical industry, the timeline
of drug development and regulatory approval can be very uncertain. The
second challenge is the presence of strategic interaction among firms. For ex-
ample, high market demand for an innovator’s product can provide favorable
signals to potential competitors and encourage them to invest in developing
similar products. Hence, a firm’s revenue from R&D also depends on other
firms’ R&D investment strategies. Due to these two challenges, a general
question is important for managers: How should firms manage their R&D
1Some literature (for example, Oriani and Sobrero, 2008) refers technological uncer-
tainty as the uncertain life of a technology. For example, a technology may become
obsolete because a new technology emerges.
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resources under uncertainty? To cope with the uncertainties, firms prefer the
flexibility in the timing of decisions. For instance, they can wait to invest
in R&D projects until the market demand of R&D products turns out to
be high, or they can abandon projects when the demand turns out to be
low. The disadvantage of employing traditional net present value (NPV)
approach to evaluate R&D projects is that the NPV approach neglects the
economic value of flexibility. To capture the economic value of flexibility
under uncertainty, real options approach has been widely used in theory (see
Li et al., 2007 for a review). The existing literature on investment under
uncertainty has explored the answers to this general question (for example,
Dixit and Pindyck 1994). This chapter contributes to this strand of research
by answering three research questions using a game theoretic model:
(1) What is the impact of market uncertainty on firms’ investment strate-
gies and payo↵s?
Since McDonald and Siegel (1986) first studied value of waiting in an
investment under uncertainty, a few work have examined the relationship
between value of waiting and market uncertainty (see Carruth et al. 2000
and Li et al. 2007 for a review). The general implication of this strand of
research is that the market uncertainty increases the value of waiting. Then
one might expect that firms tend to postpone investments. However, this
expectation might not be true because of the following reasons: Firstly, a
higher value of waiting does not necessarily mean firms wait longer. The
intuition behind can be seen from Chapter 2. Secondly, most of the previous
studies focus on decision theoretical models. Hence, they leave the question
whether this expectation still holds in the presence of competition, because
the threat of preemption can encourage firms to hasten investment. Due
to these two reasons, it is unclear that whether firms hasten or delay their
investments under higher market uncertainty.
To re-examine the impact of market uncertainty on firms’ investment deci-
sions and payo↵s, we first adopt one type of definition of market uncertainty
in the literature. In this chapter, market uncertainty is defined as the dif-
ference between the best demand and worst demand. Moreover, we assume
firms can learn about the true attractiveness of a market if the firms are
uncertain about it. More specifically, we assume firms learn about market
demand through two ways: (i) firms always observe some public signals that
partially resolve the market demand uncertainty; (ii) if one firm (the inno-
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vator) completes its R&D earlier, then the other firm has the opportunity to
observe the innovator’s profit stream from R&D products and learn about the
true demand. Learning is very common in practice. For instance, Dixit and
Chintagunta (2007) gave an example that discount airlines use sales data to
learn market demand and make exit decisions. Hitsch (2006) also provided a
model where firm learn the true demand from observed sales and he used the
data of U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry to support the predictions
of his model. Because of the definition of market uncertainty and this learn-
ing e↵ect, market uncertainty improves the signal-to-noise ratio, which is a
measurement of learning speed. In other words, higher market uncertainty
can improve the quality of signals, which come from firms’ profit streams.
Our analysis shows that firms may or may not delay their investment for
higher market uncertainty. Moreover, we also show that there can be a
non-monotonic relationship between market uncertainty and the equilibrium
payo↵ of the firm that invests first. This result is similar to that in Oriani
and Sobrero (2008), but we provide an alternative explanation. Oriani and
Sobrero (2008) show that the non-monotonic relationship is driven by growth
options, whereas our results indicate that, even without a growth option,
such a relationship can still exist due to the strategic interactions between
firms. Hence, we suggest that firms need to consider the strategic interactions
between firms when they evaluate R&D projects.
Moreover, our results contribute to the empirical studies and practices on
the valuation of R&D projects. We suggest that managers and researchers
have to be careful about how to measure market uncertainty. There are
at least two kinds of measurement in the literature. One is noise in profit
streams. This measurement is used when the true state of demand is known.
The other is the variation in the true state of demand. The assumption of this
measurement is that the true demand is unknown. These two measurements
have qualitative di↵erent impacts on firms’ investment payo↵s. Firstly, the
net present value of projects is not a↵ected by uncertainty under the first
measurement whereas it is a↵ected under the second measurement. Secondly,
in the presence of learning e↵ect, the impacts of market uncertainty on the
rate of learning are di↵erent under two measurements.
(2) How should an innovator manage its demand information resources? A
relevant question is that whether an innovator has an incentive to voluntarily
disclose market demand information to its competitor.
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A motivating example for this question comes from the competition be-
tween Intel and AMD. In Chapter 3, we have illustrated the example that
Intel shared intellectual properties with AMD in the early 1980s. In the early
1990s, before AMD launched AM486 in 1993, Intel publicly indicated that the
promising demand of its new microprocessor 80486, which had been launched
in 1989. “The demand growth was continuing in its latest-generation 386 and
486 microprocessors, or computer ’brain chip’, and that growth for those
products during the third quarter is expected to o↵set declines in the older
Intel 386 chips.”(Carlton, 1991). However, not all firms are willing to dis-
close demand information or knowledge like Intel did. Hence, we explore
the incentives of voluntary disclosure, and our results indicate that firms can
delay their potential competitors’ entry by strategically disclosing demand
information.
This question is related to the results in Chapter 3. In chapter 3, we show
that a firm can benefit from unilaterally sharing its technological knowledge
with its competitors. However, such benefits are only ex-ante benefits. In
other words, unilaterally disclosing technological knowledge to competitors
is not a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. In this chapter, we show
that disclosing demand information can benefit both ex-ante and ex-post
payo↵s. Hence, unilaterally disclosing demand information can be a subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy. This di↵erence can help to explain the above
example in which Intel still had an incentive to give the news press after
its 80486 microprocessor had launched. Therefore, our results suggest that
the disclosed contents (demand information or technological knowledge) and
the time to disclose play important roles when firms consider voluntarily
disclosure.
(3) In the presence of technological uncertainty, how does the technologi-
cal uncertainty a↵ect a firm’s incentive to invest? Does the longer time-to-
completion induce fiercer competition?
When a firm wants to invest in new R&D projects to enter into a new indus-
try or field, managers concern about the industry’s fierceness of competition,
because the fiercer competition increases the di culty to gain competitive
advantages for making sustainable profits. Moreover, from a practical per-
spective, the duration of R&D projects can be long and highly uncertain.
Hence, there is a lag between a firm’s time of investment in a project and the
time to complete the project. We call this lag time-to-completion. The pres-
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ence of non-zero time-to-completion has countervailing e↵ects on firms’ in-
centive to invest. On the one hand, the lag discourages investments, because
the time discounting reduces the value of the projects and thus firms increase
their thresholds for investment. On the other hand, the lag encourages in-
vestment, because firms may compete to secure the position of an innovator.
Longer lags can increase an innovator’s profit because the innovator can ob-
tain monopoly profits for a longer time. Besides, in the presence of learning
e↵ect, the lag reduces a firm’s incentive to wait for better signals from the
innovators, because now the signals are not available immediately after the
innovator’s investment. Hence, the impacts of time-to-completion on firms’
incentives to invest and the fierceness of competition are unclear. Moreover,
the impacts are even more ambiguous when the time-to-completion is uncer-
tain. Our results show that the competition may or may not be fiercer for a
longer time-to-completion.
4.2 Related Literature
This study builds on the literature on competitive investment with invest-
ment lags under uncertainty. Under the umbrella of this topic, two streams
of research are closely related to our work. The first stream considers the
impact of market uncertainty on the value of waiting. Market uncertainty
can a↵ect the value of waiting in two ways. First, it encourages firms to wait
to collect more demand information to mitigate risks (see Li et al., 2007 for
a review). Secondly, it a↵ects how fast firms can learn about the true state
of the market demand. Higher learning rate also increases the value of wait-
ing. When discussing the impact of market uncertainty, the prior research
only takes the first force into account (for example, McDonald and Siegel
1986 and Oriani and Sobrero 2008), whereas the second force receives less
attention. Also, competition can a↵ect the impact of market uncertainty. In
the presence of competition, the fear of being preempted can encourage firms
to hasten their investment (Grenadier, 2002). We re-examine the impact of
market uncertainty in a real option game in which firms can learn about the
demand.
The second stream of research considers the impact of investment lags. The
investment lag is also called time-to-build if the lag is deterministic. Majd
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and Pindyck (1987) and Friedl (2002) studied sequential investment prob-
lems with the assumption of endogenous time-to-build. With the assumption
of exogenous time-to-build, Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2003) consid-
ered a duopoly game of investment under market uncertainty and show that
the industries with longer time-to-build are more competitive. Pacheco-De-
Almeida et al. (2008) used the data from petrochemical industry to empiri-
cally support this theoretical result. By assuming the randomness investment
lags and firms have prior belief about market demand, our study finds that
a longer investment lag may or may not induce fiercer competition.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on incentives of voluntary
disclosure. Sometimes, firms are willing to freely reveal more knowledge or
information. The incentives of voluntary disclosure are di↵erent, depending
on who to share with. Firms have an incentive to share financial infor-
mation or product demand information with their investors to mitigate the
agency problem or signal their investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Campbell
et al., 2001). The vertical sharing of information regarding market demand
or production cost along a supply chain aims to eliminate the information
asymmetry among supply chain members and achieve supply chain coordi-
nation (For example, see Chen 1998; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000).
Compare to the extensive literature on sharing information with investors or
supply chain members, the investigation of incentives to share information
among competitors receives much less attention. The prior research suggests
that firms are willing to share demand information for Bertrand competition,
whereas share production cost information for Cournot competition (Gal-Or,
1985; Gal-or, 1986; Vives, 1984). These studies (for example, Gal-Or 1985;
Gal-or 1986; Dong and Orhun 2016; Guo et al. 2014; Vives 1984), however,
are about bilateral information sharing between the competitors. Our study
considers the incentive of unilateral disclose. From this perspective, our work
is more related to the study of Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012) and
Chapter 3. They show that unilateral technological knowledge spillover can
be beneficial for an innovator, because the technological knowledge spillover
can decrease competition pressure. We examine the impact of unilateral
demand information sharing and show that it can also alleviate the compe-
tition.
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4.3 Base Model
We now consider two identical firms indexed as i 2 {1, 2}. Denote firm j to
be the opponent of firm i. Each firm has a one-time opportunity to make
an R&D investment, with cost k to enter a new market. Neither firm knows
the true market demand, and we assume the time averaged market demand
can be either high (µH) or low (µL). Before either of them invests, the firms
receive some public information that can partially reveal the market demand.
For instance, such information can be from public marketing research reports
or demand information of complementary products. We assume that a firm
starts to obtain profits immediately after its investment. We relax this as-
sumption in Section 4.6. Once one firm invests first, the other firm can use
its performance as an additional signal to learn about the market. Although
this additional signal is still imperfect, it provides better quality than the
public signal.
We denote ⌧i to be firm i’s investment time. Without loss of generality,
we assume firm 1 to be the leader and firm 2 to be the follower, i.e. ⌧1  ⌧2.
The strategy profile of the game is given by (⌧1, ⌧2) 2 [0,1] ⇥ [0,1]. We
denote processes X0,X1L, and X iF as follows:
(1) X0 = {X0t : t 2 [0, ⌧2]}: the public information process before the
follower invests.
(2) X1L = {X1Lt : t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2]}: the leader’s cumulative profit before the
follower invests. The follower does not receive any profit before ⌧2.
(3) X iF = {X iFt : t 2 [⌧2,1]}i2{1,2}: firm i’s cumulative profit after the
follower’s investment.
We model X0, X1L, and X iF as Brownian motions that satisfy
dX0t = µdt+  0dW
0
t for t 2 [0, ⌧2]
dX1Lt = µdt+  dW
1
t for t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2]
dX iFt = sµdt+  dW
i
t for t 2 [⌧2,1], i 2 {1, 2},
where s 2 (0, 1] evaluates the negative externality between the two firms’
investments. The parameters  0 and   are the noise levels in the public
signal and profit stream of the first firm. The drift µ > 0 represents the
time-averaged profit per unit time. It can be either µH or µL, but neither
firm knows the true state of µ. The process W 0t , W
1
t , and W
2
t are mutually
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independent Wiener processes that represent white noises. Denote {F t : t  
0} to be the natural filtration with respect to the observable cumulative profit
process of firm 1 and the pre-investment signal process {X0, XL:t   0}. Let p
be the prior probability that µ = µH . Let Vi(p; ⌧1, ⌧2) denote firm i’s expected
cumulative payo↵ that is discounted to time 0, given a strategy profile (⌧1,⌧2)
conditional on p. The objective of each firm is to choose optimal time ⌧i
to maximize Vi(p; ⌧1, ⌧2), given its opponent’s strategy ⌧j. The objective
functions are as follows:
V1(p; ⌧1, ⌧2) = E
p

 ke r⌧1 +
ˆ ⌧2
⌧1
e rtdX1Lt +
ˆ 1
⌧2
e rtdX1Ft
 
, (4.1)
V2(p; ⌧1, ⌧2) = E
p

 ke r⌧2 +
ˆ 1
⌧2
e rtdX2Ft
 
,
where r is the discount rate for both firms.
Let Pt = P [µ = µH | Ft] represent the posterior belief. We obtain the
posterior probability process for the case where neither firm invests and the
case where only the leader invests.
Following steps of Bayes rule (Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006), we have
Pt = E
p0 [1{µ=µH} | Ft]
=
8<:Ep0 [1{µ=µH} | X0t ] for t < ⌧1Ep0 [1{µ=µH} | X0t , X1Lt ] for t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2]
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
h
1 + 1 p0p0 exp{
(X0t µLt)2
2 2t   (X
0
t µH t)2
2 2t
i 1
for t 2 [0, ⌧1)n
1 +
1 p⌧1
p⌧1
exp
h
[X0t X0⌧1 µL(t ⌧1)]2
2 20(t ⌧1) +
[XLt  XL⌧1 µL(t ⌧1)]2
2 2(t ⌧1)
[X0t X0⌧1 µH(t ⌧1)]2
2 20t
  [XLt  XL⌧1 µH(t ⌧1)]22 2t
 1   1
for t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2].
We define the following in order to construct the posterior belief process:
 ˜ =
r
 0 
 0 +  
(4.2)
W˜t =
 2
 20 +  
2
W 0t +
 20
 20 +  
2
W 1t
X˜t =
 2i
 20 +  
2
X0t +
 20
 20 +  
2
XLt .
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The posterior belief process is constructed as
Pt =
8<:
n
1 + 1 p0p0 exp
h
 µH µL
 20
⇣
X0t   µ
H+µL
2 t
⌘io 1
for t 2 [0, ⌧1)n
1 +
1 p⌧1
p⌧1
exp
h
 µH µL ˜2
⇣
X˜t   µH+µL2 t
⌘io 1
for t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2].
Furthermore, Pt is the unique strong solution of the SDE:8<:dPt = Pt(1  Pt)µ
H µL
 0
dWˆ 0t for t 2 [0, ⌧1)
dPt = Pt(1  Pt)µH µL ˜ dWˆt for t 2 [⌧1, ⌧2].
(4.3)
4.3.1 Follower’s Optimal Strategy and Leader’s Best Response
To solve the game and obtain the equilibrium, we first derive the follower’s
optimal strategy. Suppose firm 1 has invested at ⌧1, and the current pos-
terior belief is P⌧1 = p1. Denote ⌧F = ⌧2   ⌧1. Given ⌧1 and p1, Firm 2’s
maximization problem sup⌧2 V2(p1; ⌧1, ⌧2) is equivalent to
sup
⌧F 0
Ep1
h⇣s
r
EP⌧F [µ]  k
⌘
e r⌧F
i
.
Let V F⌧1 (p1) denote the optimal payo↵ that is discounted to time ⌧1 for the
follower. The following lemma establishes V F⌧1 (p1) and the follower’s optimal
strategy at time ⌧1.
Lemma 3 At time ⌧1, the follower’s optimal strategy is to invest at time
⌧2 = ⌧1 + ⌧ ⇤F , where ⌧
⇤
F = inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓F}. Moreover, its optimal payo↵
V F⌧1 (p1) is given by
V F⌧1 (p1) =
8<:
 (p1, 1)
 (✓F , 1)
( srE
✓F [µ]  k); if p1 < ✓F
s
rE
p1 [µ]  k; if p1   ✓F
, (4.4)
where
✓F = (1 +
 1   1
 1 + 1
sµH   kr
kr   sµL )
 1, (4.5)
 (x,  ) = x
 +1
2 (1  x)    12 ,
 1 =
s
1 +
8r ˜2
(µH   µL)2 .
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Now we derive the leader’s best response to the follower’s optimal strategy.
Denote V L⌧1 (p) to be the leader’s payo↵ from an immediate investment when
the follower is expected to invest at time at ⌧ ⇤F and the posterior belief at ⌧1
is p1. It is given by
V L⌧1 (p1) = E
p[
ˆ ⌧⇤F
0
e rtdX1Lt +
ˆ 1
⌧⇤F
e rtdX1Ft   k]
=
8<:1rEp1(µ)  1 sr E✓F (µ)
 (p, 1)
 (✓F , 1)
  k if p < ✓F
s
rE
p(µ)  k if p   ✓F ,
(4.6)
where ✓F ,  1, and  (p,  ) are defined in Lemma 3. Then, given the initial
belief at time zero p, firm 1’s objective function V1(p; ⌧1, ⌧2) in (4.1) can be
expressed as
V1(p; ⌧1, ⌧1 + ⌧
⇤
F ) = E
p
⇥
e r⌧1(V L⌧1 (P⌧1)  k)
⇤
.
Let
V L0 (p) = sup
⌧1 0
V1(p; ⌧1, ⌧1 + ⌧
⇤
F ) (4.7)
be the optimal payo↵ that is discounted to time zero for the leader. Lemma
4 shows the leader’s best response.
Lemma 4 Given the follower’s time of investment ⌧2 = ⌧1+ ⌧ ⇤F , the leader’s
optimal strategy is to invest at ⌧ ⇤1 = inf{t   0 : Pt   ✓L}, where ✓L 2 (0, ✓F )
is the unique root to the following equation
1 +  0   2✓L
2✓L(1  ✓L) (
1
r
E✓L(µ) k) = 1
r
(µH µL) 1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
 (✓L,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)
 0    1
2✓L(1  ✓L) .
(4.8)
Here,  0 =
q
1 + 8r 
2
0
(µH µL)2 .
Moreover, the leader’s optimal payo↵ V L0 (p) is given by
V L0 (p) =
8>>><>>>:
 (p, 0)
 (✓L, 0)
[V L⌧1 (✓L)  k] if p 2 [0, ✓L),
V L⌧1 (p)  k if p0 2 [✓L, ✓F ),
s
rE
p(µ)  k if p0 2 [✓F , 1].
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Given the strategy profile (⌧ ⇤1 , ⌧
⇤
1 + ⌧
⇤
F ), we consequently obtain the fol-
lower’s expected payo↵ V F0 (p) that is discounted to time 0:
V F0 (p) =
8>>><>>>:
 (p, 0)
 (✓L, 0)
[ (✓L, 1) (✓F , 1)(
s
rE
✓F (µ)  k)] if p0 2 [0, ✓L),
 (p, 1)
 (✓F , 1)
( srE
✓F (µ)  k) if p0 2 (✓L, ✓F ),
s
rE
p(µ)  k if p0 2 [✓F , 1].
4.3.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium
In this section, we obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium.
Firstly, we compare V L⌧L(p) and V
F
⌧L
(p) to determine whether the equilibrium
is a preemption equilibrium or a war of attrition equilibrium. If V L⌧L(p) >
V F⌧L(p), then both firms would have an incentive to preempt their opponents
to receive higher payo↵. In contrast, if V L⌧L(p) < V
F
⌧L
(p), then both firms have
an incentive to wait to be the follower. Lemma 5 shows that both of these
two types of equilibrium can exist.
Lemma 5 (1) There exists a unique ✓C 2 (0, ✓F ) at which V L⌧L(p) < V F⌧L(p)
for p 2 [0, ✓C) and V L⌧L(p) > V F⌧L(p) for p 2 (✓C , ✓F ).
(2) The inequality ✓L < ✓C holds if only if
1
r
(µH   µL)   
0
x(✓1,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)

1
r
E✓F (µ)  k
 
< 0. (4.9)
Moreover, the inequality (4.9) holds for su ciently small  1.
Lemma 5 reports the su cient and necessary condition under which both
types of equilibrium can arise for p 2 (✓L, ✓F ). Furthermore, Lemma 5 (2)
indicates that, if the second mover’s signal quality is significantly improved
after the first mover’s investment (su ciently small  ˜), then a war of attrition
equilibrium can arise for p 2 (✓L, ✓F ) due to the second-mover advantage.
For the remainder of the paper, we call the interval [0, ✓C) to be the war of
attrition (WA) region, the interval [✓C , ✓F ) to be the preemption (PE) region.
Now we are in the position to determine pure strategy Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE). In this paper, we adopt the definitions of preemption
policy in Agrawal et al. (2016) as follows: For p < ✓F , if both firms have an
incentive to preempt their opponent, to avoid the situation that firms invest
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concurrently, we assume that once one firm successfully invests earlier than
its opponent with 50% chance, the other firm who loses the game immediately
switches to a follower’s optimal policy that is defined in Lemma 3. Using this
definition of preemption policy and Theorem 1 in Agrawal et al. (2016), we
obtain pure strategy MPE for our game.
Proposition 12 (1) If ✓L   ✓C, there is a pure strategy equilibrium. In the
equilibrium, both firms wait for Pt 2[0, ✓C ]; both firms take the preemption
policy for Pt 2 [✓C , ✓F ), and for Pt 2 [✓F , 1], both firms invest immediately.
(2) If ✓L < ✓C, there are two pure strategy equilibria. In the equilibrium,
for Pt 2 [0, ✓C ], one firm invests at time ⌧ ⇤1 = inf{t   0, Pt   ✓L}, and the
other firm invests at ⌧ ⇤2 . For Pt 2 [✓C , ✓F ], both firms take the preemption
policy, and for Pt 2 [✓F , 1], both firms invest immediately. Here ⌧ ⇤2 = ⌧ ⇤1 +⌧ ⇤F ,
and ⌧ ⇤F = inf{t   0, Pt   ✓F}.
Proposition 12 shows that the characterization of equilibria depends on
the relative magnitudes of ✓L and ✓C . If ✓L > ✓C , the first-mover advan-
tage of monopoly profits always dominates the second-mover advantage of
learning. Then both firms execute the preemption policy when Pt reaches
✓C . On the other hand, if ✓L < ✓C , the second-mover advantage dominates
for Pt 2 (✓L, ✓C) and the first-mover advantage dominates for Pt 2 (✓C , ✓F ).
Hence, the game for Pt 2 (✓C , ✓F ) is exactly the same as in the case of
✓L   ✓C . For Pt 2 (✓L, ✓C), the game becomes a war of attrition game and
there are two pure strategy equilibria: either firm 1 invests as the leader or
firms 2 does. Next we discuss the impact of uncertainty and incentives of
voluntary disclosure based on the equilibrium strategies that are described
in Proposition 12.
4.4 Impact of Market Uncertainty
In this section, we examine the impact of market uncertainty on the leader’s
investment strategy and equilibrium payo↵. Before proceeding, we first define
market uncertainty. We measure market uncertainty by demand variation.
More specifically, we define   2 (0, 1) as market uncertainty, where
  =
µH   µL
µH + µL
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Figure 4.1: The impact of   on ✓F . Here we set µ¯ = 35, k = 200,
r = 0.1, 0 = 50, 1 = 1,s = 0.5.
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so that µH and µL can be expressed as µH = µ
H+µL
2 (1+ ) and µ
L = µ
H+µL
2 (1 
 ). Then for a fixed average µ¯ = (µH + µL)/2 , larger   represents higher
market uncertainty. We also assume µ¯   kr/s. Hence, if there is no market
uncertainty, both firms have incentives to invest.
For the remainder of this paper, we focus on the leader’s case, because
the follower’s investment strategy has been discussed in the literature (eg.
Kwon and Lippman, 2011) that consider decision theoretical models. From
Proposition 12, the equilibrium strategies are characterized by thresholds
✓L, ✓C and ✓F , so we first examine the comparative statics of the thresholds
with respect to the market uncertainty.
Lemma 6 (1) ✓F increases in  .
(2) For su ciently small  0, ✓L increases in  .
In a single decision maker’s case, higher makes uncertainty can a↵ect a
firm’s investment threshold through two forces. Firstly, it can change the
net present value (NPV) of the project. More specifically, given the belief
p about the market demand, for a single decision maker, the NPV of the
project is Ep[µ] = µHp + µL(1   p) = µ¯[1 + (2p   1) ]. Hence, the NPV
can increase or decrease in market uncertainty depending on the value of p.
Secondly, according to the definition in Chapter 1, the rate of learning is
defined as (µH  µL)/ , which is rewritten as 2µ¯ / . The results in Chapter
1 show that the single decision maker’s investment threshold increases as the
rate of learning increases.2 Lemma 6 (1) indicates the net e↵ect of these two
2In Chapter 2, we derive the follower’s investment strategy given the leader has invested.
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Figure 4.2: Impact of   on the Leader’s Value of Waiting: The parameters
for (a): µ¯ = 4; k = 25, r = 0.1, s = 0.5,  1 = 1,  0 = 50. The parameters for
(b): µ¯ = 4; k = 25, r = 0.1, s = 0.5,  1 = 80,  0 = 100
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forces, and shows that higher market uncertainty always increases the single
decision maker’s threshold (✓F ). Figure 4.1 supplements this analysis with a
numerical example.
From Proposition 12, the leader invests either at ✓L or ✓C , depending
on the relative magnitudes of the thresholds. For notational simplicity, let
✓˜ = min{✓L, ✓C} denote the leader’s investment threshold. Lemma 6 indi-
cates that, without the threat of preemption (in the absence of ✓C), higher
market uncertainty increases the leader’s investment threshold ✓˜ = ✓L. Due
to technical complexity, we could not obtain the general analytical results
for the comparative statics of ✓L or ✓C with respect to  . Hence, we provide
numerical examples in Figure 4.2 to get some insights. Figure 4.2 (a) gives
an example in which ✓L is always higher than ✓C , and Figure 4.2 (b) gives
an example in which ✓C is lower than ✓L for low market uncertainty. Both
Figure 4.2 (a) and (b) show that ✓L and ✓C always increase in market un-
certainty. The intuition behind the growing pattern of the threshold is as
follows. Firstly, ✓L increases in   because higher uncertainty increases the
leader’s incentive to wait. Secondly, the threshold ✓C measures the competi-
tion in a preemption game where both firms prefer being the leader,and the
competition for preemption is not fierce if ✓C is high. When   increases, the
improved learning rate benefits the follower more than the leader, then the
competition pressure for preemption is reduced. Consequently, the threshold
This is the same as a single decision maker’s case. Chapter 2 shows that ✓F increases in
the rate of learning  .
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Figure 4.3: Impact of   on expected time-to-first-investment. Here we set
µ¯ = 4, k = 25, r = 0.1,s = 0.5, 0 = 50, 1 = 1, and p = 0.1.
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✓C decreases.
Knowing the comparative statics of ✓˜, we now examine the impact of mar-
ket uncertainty on the leader’s equilibrium strategy. From Proposition 12,
the leader’s strategy is to invests at ⌧ ⇤L = inf{t   0 : Pt   ✓˜}. More specif-
ically, we study the comparative statics of Ep[⌧ ⇤L | ⌧ ⇤L < 1]. Similar to the
analysis in Chapter 2, we obtain
Ep[⌧ ⇤L | ⌧ ⇤L <1] =
4 20
(µH   µL)2 log
 
p
✓˜
1  ✓˜
p
!
=
 20
µ¯2 2
log
 
p
✓˜
1  ✓˜
p
!
,
where p is the prior belief about the market demand. An increase in  
increases both ✓˜ and the rate of learning, so Ep[⌧ ⇤L | ⌧ ⇤L < 1] can either
increase because the leader needs more time to reach a higher threshold,
or decrease because the leader needs less time to acquire the same amount
of information. Figure 4.3 provides an numerical example to show the net
e↵ect of these two forces. From Figure 4.3, we observe that the expected
time-to-first-investment first increases then decreases in market uncertainty.
Next we investigate the leader’s equilibrium payo↵ (ex-ante) V L0 (p). Fig-
ure 4.4 (a) shows that V L0 (p) can either increase or decrease in market uncer-
tainty, depending on the prior belief p. More specifically, for su ciently small
p, V L0 (p) first decreases then increases in market uncertainty. For su ciently
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Figure 4.4: Impact of   on Leader’s Payo↵ V L0 (p). Here we set µ¯ = 4;
k = 25, r = 0.1, s = 0.5,  1 = 1,  0 = 50.
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large p, market uncertainty always increases V L0 (p). This non-monotonic
relationship is also seen in Oriani and Sobrero (2008). They find the same
relationship between market uncertainty and R&D project’s valuation. Their
explanation is that an embedded growth option drives this non-monotonic
relationship. However, there is no growth option in our model, then why
does this U-shape relationship still hold in some situations? To derive the
insights, we decompose V L0 (p) into two parts. One is the leader’s NPV of
the project The NPV at time zero coincides with the leader’s ex-post payo↵
V L⌧1 (p1) in equation (4.6) with p1 = p. The other is the leader’s value of
waiting. We express the value of waiting WL(p) as follows.
WL(p) = V L0 (p)  V L⌧1 (p)
=
8>>><>>>:
 (p, 0)
 (✓˜, 0)
[1rE
✓˜(µ)  1 sr E✓F (µ)  (✓˜, 1) (✓F , 1)   k]
 
h
1
rE
p(µ)  1 sr E✓F (µ))  (p, 1) (✓F , 1)   k
i
if p < ✓˜
0 if p   ✓˜
.(4.10)
We first examine the comparative statics of WL(p) with respect to  . Both
Figure 4.2 (a) and (b) shows that the value of waiting increases in the degree
of market uncertainty. This result supports the conventional view (McDonald
and Siegel 1986; Li et al. 2007; Oriani and Sobrero 2008; Carruth et al. 2000),
and it indicates that the impact of market uncertainty on value of waiting
still holds even in the presence of threats of preemption.
Next, we examine the comparative statics of NPV with respect to  . Figure
4.4 (b) exhibits similar pattern in Figure 4.4 (a): For a fixed p, market uncer-
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tainty can first decrease then increase NPV. This result is from the strategic
interactions between the two firms: Higher market uncertainty improves the
rate of learning, and consequently a↵ects the follower’s time-to-investment.
As we discussed in Chapter 2 and the case for the leader, follower’s time-
to-investment can either increase or decrease in the rate of learning. Due to
the negative externality between the two firms’ investments, the follower’s
time-to-investment ultimately a↵ects the leader’s NPV of the project, i.e.,
earlier investment of the follower decreases the leader’s NPV.
By examining the comparative statics of NPV and the value of waiting
with respect to market uncertainty, we provides a di↵erent explanation from
that of Oriani and Sobrero (2008): in the absence of growth options, a firm’s
ex-ante payo↵ can still have a non-monotonic relationship with market un-
certainty due to the strategic interactions between firms. An implication of
this result suggests that managers need to take the strategic interactions into
account when evaluating R&D projects.
Another implication of the results is about the measurement of market
uncertainty. In the literature, we find that people measure market uncer-
tainty di↵erently. Some work (for example, Avner Bar-Ilan, 1996;Weeds,
1999,Oriani and Sobrero 2008) use the noise in profit streams to measure
the uncertainty, and some use the di↵erence in payo↵s between the best sce-
nario and the worst scenario (for example, Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky
2003). One di↵erence between these two measurements is that the first one
does not a↵ect a firm’s NPV, but the second one does. Moreover, when firms
can use profit streams to learn about a new market’s demand, these two
measurements can a↵ect the rate of learning oppositely. Hence, our results
suggest that managers and researchers need to be careful when they select
the measurement of market uncertainty.
4.5 Incentive of Voluntary Disclosure
In this section, we explore the leader’s incentive to voluntarily disclose market
demand information to its competitor. We show that, because the follower
has an option to wait after the leader’s investment, the leader can be better o↵
through strategically sharing market demand information with the follower.
Furthermore, we show the di↵erence between demand information spillover
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and technological knowledge spillover by comparing the results in this section
with those of Chapter 3.
To examine the impact of voluntary disclosure, we assume that the leader
can change the noise  1 in its profit stream {X1Lt }. For instance, in the ex-
ample of Intel and AMD in Section 4.1, Intel reduced the noise   by publicly
revealing more information about its sales of 80486 microprocessor. Next,
we establish the comparative statics of leader’s ex-post payo↵ V p⌧1(p1) (the
payo↵ after the investment) with respect to  .
Proposition 13 (1) For fixed p1 < ✓F , V L⌧1 (p1) decreases in   for su ciently
small  .
(2) For su ciently large p1 that is close to ✓F , V L⌧1 (p1) increases in   for
su ciently large  .
Proposition 13 asserts the fact that reducing   can increase the leader’s
ex-post payo↵. The intuition is as follows: In our model, the signals are im-
perfect, and the follower has an option to wait after the leader’s investment.
Hence, the leader’s ex-post payo↵ depends on when the follower invests: the
follower’s early investment is detrimental to the leader’s payo↵ because of
the negative externality between firms’ investments. The follower’s time-to-
investment depends on its rate of learning (µH  µL)/ ˜ 3 and value of p1. As
shown in Chapter 2 and Kwon and Lippman (2011), higher learning rate can
either increase or decrease the firm’s time-to-investment due to the trade-o↵
between a higher value of waiting and less time needed to gather enough
information. Hence, the leader can strategically disclosing information (de-
crease  ) to increase the follower’s rate of learning, and furthermore induce
the follower to delay the investment.
Now we examine the leader’s ex-ante payo↵ V L0 (p) (the payo↵ before the
investment). Because the leader’s objective function at time 0 is to maximize
Ep[e r⌧1V L⌧1 (p)], we have the following corollary that shows the impact of
reducing  1 on V L0 (p).
Corollary 1 (1) For fixed p < ✓F , V L0 (p) decreases in  1 for su ciently
small  1.
(2) For su ciently large p that is close to ✓F , V L0 (p) increases in  1 for
su ciently large  1
3From the expression of  ˜ in formula (4.2),  ˜ increases in  .
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Figure 4.5: Impact of  1 on Leader’s ex-post payo↵s
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Now we compare these results with those of Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we
find that an innovative firm can have an incentive to commit to sharing tech-
nological knowledge with its competitor unilaterally. The intuition is that,
by committing sharing technological knowledge before R&D investments, the
innovative firm can induce the follower to delay its investment, and thus re-
duce the competition pressure in R&D stage. However, once the innovative
firm completes its R&D project, it tries to reduce the technological knowledge
spillover as much as possible, because the competitor can utilize the techno-
logical knowledge as a substitute for its e↵ort to reduce the R&D completion
time, and consequently compete with the innovative firm in the product mar-
ket sooner. In other words, sharing technological knowledge unilaterally can
only improve an innovative firm’s ex-ante payo↵, but always diminishes the
firm’s ex-post payo↵. Hence, unilaterally increasing technological knowledge
spillover to competitors is not a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. Like-
wise, this result that increasing technological knowledge spillover only works
ex-ante is found in Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky (2012), which only dis-
cussed ex-ante payo↵s. In contrast, Proposition 13 and Corollary 1 show that
disclosing the demand information can benefit both the leader’s ex-ante and
ex-post payo↵s. This is because the follower may delay its investment even
after the leader’s completion. Hence, increasing demand information spillover
can be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. This di↵erence between de-
mand information spillover and technological knowledge spillover can help to
explain the Intel-AMD examples in Section 1 of this Chapter and in Chapter
3: After its completion of 80486 microprocessor in 1989, Intel still volun-
tarily released market demand information of 80486 in 1991 by news press.
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However, in the 1980s, Intel provided AMD with the access to its intellectual
properties about Intel’s successfully developed microprocessors (8086, 80186,
80286) only because it was required by the technology exchange agreement
between the two firms in 1982. Due to the di↵erent mechanisms of tech-
nological knowledge spillover and demand information spillover, our results
suggest that firms should be careful about the disclosed contents (demand
information or technological knowledge) and the time to disclose when they
consider voluntary disclosure to reduce competition.
4.6 Extended Model: Non-zero Time-to-Completion
In the previous section, we assume that a firm obtains profits immediately
after its investment. However, from a practical perspective, the duration
time of R&D projects can be long and highly uncertain. For example, the
R&D time of a new drug can vary from 10 to 20 years (Dickson and Gagnon,
2009). To incorporate this characteristic, we define time-to-completion Ti > 0
as the duration of firm i’s R&D project. It follows that firm i completes its
R&D project at Ti + ⌧i if it invests at ⌧i. In line with the assumption in
Section 4.3, we still assume firm 1 to be the leader who invests in R&D first.
Because of the uncertain time-to-completion, a firm invests late can complete
its R&D earlier depending on its opponent’s time of investment and time-
to-completion. Hence, in this section, the pre-investment signal and firms’
profit streams become
dX0t = µdt+  0dW
0
t for t 2 [0,maxi2{1,2}(⌧i + Ti)),
dX iLt = µdt+  dW
i
t for t 2 [maxi2{1,2}(⌧i + Ti),mini2{1,2}(⌧i + Ti)),
dX iFt = sµdt+  dW
i
t for t 2 [mini2{1,2}(⌧i + Ti),1), i 2 {1, 2}.
We assume that Ti is an exponential random variable with a rate  i, where
 i represents firm i’s R&D capability that is exogenously given. Higher  i in-
dicates that firm i is expected to need less time to complete its R&D. In this
section, we focus on the case of symmetric firms by assuming  1 =  2 =  .
There are two types of R&D expenses. One is the upfront setup cost k   0
that occurs when a firm initiates its R&D. The other is the variable cost c   0
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per unit time4. We assume that these costs are identical for both firms. We
investigate this extended model and examine the following question:what is
the impact of non-zero time-to-completion on firms’ investment strategies?
By investigating this question, we ultimately find out the relationship be-
tween the length of time-to-completion and fierceness of competition.
4.6.1 Follower’s Optimal Policy
In the spirit of backward induction, we first obtain the follower’s optimal
policy at time t after the leader’s completion. Given that t   ⌧1 + T1, the
follower’s payo↵ from an immediate investment is given by
R¯F (p) = E
p[ 
ˆ T2
0
ce rtdt+
ˆ 1
T2
e rtdX2Ft ] (4.11)
=  c/(r +  ) + [s /r(r +  )]Ep[µ].
For notational simplicity, let kˆ =  k   c/(r +  ), s¯ = s /(r +  ). Moreover,
the quality of firm 2’s signals (i.e., rate of learning) are improved after T1+⌧1,
at which time the leader begins to obtain profits. Hence, firm 2’s objective
is to choose ⌧2 to maximize
Ep
⇥
e r⌧2
 
R¯F (P⌧2)  k
  | F⌧1+T1⇤
= Ep
⇥
e r⌧2
 
s¯
rE
P⌧2 [µ]  k¯  | F⌧1+T1⇤ .
Solving this maximization problem yields that, for t   T1+ ⌧1, the follower’s
optimal policy is to invest at ⌧2 = ⌧1 + T1 + ⌧ˆ 0F , where ⌧ˆ
0
F = inf{t   ⌧1 + T1 :
Pt   ✓¯F}, and
✓¯F =
 
1 +
 1   1
 1 + 1
s¯µH   kˆr
kˆr   s¯µL
! 1
. (4.12)
4Here we assume the variable cost has no dependence on  , because we will study the
firms’ incentive to increasing   by excluding the impact of costs in the future plan.
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Let Vˆ F⌧1+T1(p) = sup⌧2 ⌧1+T1 E
p
⇥
e r⌧2
 
R¯F (P⌧2)  k
  | F⌧1+T1⇤ be the optimal
payo↵ discounted to time ⌧1 + T1 for the follower. It is given by
Vˆ F⌧1+T1(p) =
8<:
 (p, 1)
 (✓¯F , 1)
 
R¯F (✓¯F )  k
 
if p < ✓¯F ,
R¯F (p)  k if p   ✓¯F .
Secondly, we derive the follower’s policy if the current time t 2 [⌧1, ⌧1+T1),
i.e., when the leader is still active in R&D. At time t 2 [⌧1, ⌧1 + T1), the fol-
lower’s objective is to choose ⌧2 to maximize its expected payo↵ Vˆ (p, t; ⌧1, ⌧2)
and obtain the optimal expected payo↵ V¯ Ft (p). Mathematically, V¯
F
t (p) is
expressed as the following:
V¯ Ft (p) = sup
⌧2
Vˆ (p, t; ⌧1, ⌧2)
= sup
⌧2
Ep
h
1{⌧2<T1+⌧1}e
 r⌧2
⇣
R˜F (P⌧2)  k
⌘
(4.13)
+1{⌧2 T1+⌧1}e
 r⌧2  R¯F (P⌧2)  k  | Ft⇤ . (4.14)
Here R¯F (p) is defined in (4.11), and R˜F (p) is the follower’s payo↵ from an
immediate investment before the leader’s completion. It is given by
R˜F (p) = E
p

1{T1<T2}
ˆ 1
T2
e rtdX2Ft dt+ 1{T1 T2}
✓ˆ T1
T2
e rtdX2Lt dt
ˆ 1
T2
e rtdX2Ft dt
◆ 
  c
r +  
=
s˜
r
Ep[µ]  c
r +  
,
where s˜ = [ /(r + 2 )][s /(r +  ) + (r + s )/(r +  )].
We obtain the follower’s optimal policy by solving the optimal stopping
problem in (4.13). It is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Define
⇡ˆFt (p) =

 
r˜ +  
 
 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
(R¯F (✓¯F )  k), (4.15)
where r˜ = r(1    ˜2/ 20). For t 2 [⌧1, ⌧1 + T1), there exists pˆ 2 (0, ✓¯F ) such
that the follower’s optimal policy is to invest at time ⌧¯2 = inf{⌧1  t <
⌧1 + T1 : Pt   pˆ}, where pˆ satisfies ⇡ˆFt (pˆ) = R˜F (pˆ)  k. Moreover, at time t
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, the follower’s optimal payo↵ V¯ Ft (p) is given by
V¯t
F
(p) =
8<:⇡ˆFt (p) if p < pˆ,R˜F (p)  k if p   pˆ. (4.16)
Lemma 7 implies the impact of technological uncertainty on the follower’s
investment strategy. In the presence of random time-to-completion, waiting
has two countervailing e↵ects on the follower’s payo↵s. On the one hand,
waiting benefits the follower because the follower can collect more information
about the market demand. On the other hand, waiting can be detrimental
because the leader is more likely to complete its R&D first. Due to the second
e↵ect, the investment threshold pˆ is smaller than ✓¯F , which is the follower’s
investment threshold in the absence of technological uncertainty (i.e., the
follower definitely completes its R&D late. ).
4.6.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we obtain the leader’s best response given the follower’s opti-
mal policy that is described in Lemma 7, and characterize the pure strategy
equilibrium. As a preliminary step, we compute the leader’s expected payo↵
from an immediate investment.
Given the current posterior belief p, denote the leader’s payo↵ from an im-
mediate investment to be R¯L(p). It satisfies the following di↵erential equa-
tion:
(1 + rdt)R¯L(Pt) =  dt
ˆ T2+⌧2
0
e rsdX1Ls +
ˆ 1
T2+⌧2
e rsdX1Fs
 
+(1   dt)R¯L(Pt+dt)  cdt .
Solving the above di↵erential equation yields that
R¯L(p) =
 
r +  
1
r
Ep[µ]  1  s
r
 
r˜ +  
 
r +  
E ✓¯F [µ]
 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
  c
r +  
,
where r˜ is the same as in equation (4.15). Then the leader’s optimal payo↵
at time 0 is given by Vˆ L0 (p) = sup⌧1 E
p[e r⌧1(R¯L(P⌧1)   k)]. Similar to the
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analysis in Section 4.3, we have the following lemma to characterize the
leader’s best response if the follower’s optimal strategy is ⌧¯2 that is defined
in Lemma 7.
Lemma 8 The leader’s best response to firm 2’s optimal strategy ⌧¯2 is to
invest at ⌧¯1 = inf{t   0 : Pt   ✓¯L}, where ✓¯L 2 (0, pˆ) is the unique root to
the equation
1 +  0   2✓¯L
2✓¯L(1  ✓¯L)
 
R¯L(✓¯L)  k
 
=
 
r +  
1
r
(µH   µL)  1  s
r
 
r˜ +  
 
r +  
(4.17)
E ✓¯F [µ]
 (✓¯L,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
1 +  1   2✓¯L
2✓¯L(1  ✓¯L) .
Given the follower’s optimal policy that is to invest once the posterior belief
reaches pˆ, we obtain the leader’s payo↵ V¯ L⌧1 (p) at the time of its investment
as follows:
V¯ L⌧1 (p) =
8<:R¯L(p)  k if p < pˆ,V¯ F⌧1 (p) if p   pˆ.
For p > pˆ, V¯ L⌧1 (p) is identical to V¯
F
⌧1 (p) that is defined in (4.16), because
two identical firms invest simultaneously. Before deriving the equilibrium,
we compare the leader’s payo↵ V¯ L⌧1 (p) and the follower’s payo↵ V¯
F
⌧1 (p) to
determine the war of attrition region and the preemption region.
Lemma 9 For p 2 [0, pˆ), there exists ✓ˆC 2 (0, pˆ) such that V¯ F⌧1 (p) > V¯ L⌧1 (p)
for p 2 (0, ✓ˆC) and V¯ L⌧1 (p) > V¯ L⌧1 (p) for p 2 (✓ˆC , pˆ).
Similar to Lemma 5, Lemma 9 shows the existence of both war of attrition
and preemption region. Also, there is a simultaneous-move region, which
is the interval [pˆ, 1]. Now we are in the position to characterize the pure
strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 14 (1) If ✓¯L   ✓ˆC, there is a pure strategy equilibrium. In the
equilibrium, both firms wait for Pt 2[0, ✓ˆC ]; both firms take the preemption
policy for Pt 2 [✓ˆC , pˆ), and when Pt 2 [pˆ, 1], both firms invest immediately.
(2) If ✓¯L < ✓ˆC, there are two pure strategy equilibria. In the equilibrium,
for Pt < ✓ˆC, one firm invests at time ⌧¯1, and the other firm invests at ⌧¯2.
For Pt 2 [✓ˆC , pˆ], both firms take the preemption policy, and when Pt 2 [pˆ, 1],
both firms invest immediately.
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At each point of time, whether a firm waits or invests depends on benefit
and cost of waiting. Here, the benefit of postponing an investment is that
firms can collect more information about market uncertainty. The opportu-
nity cost of waiting can be in di↵erent forms. Firstly, waiting reduces the
value of future payo↵s due to time discounting. Secondly, waiting of the
follower reduces its likelihood of leapfrogging the leader to complete R&D
earlier than the leader. Thirdly, if there are no firms on the market, waiting
can cost a firm to lose the chance to preempt. The incentive of preemption
can be either to discourage the opponent’s investment, or to obtain a high
monopoly profit. The trade-o↵ between the benefit and cost of waiting de-
termines the investment thresholds pˆ,✓¯L, and ✓ˆC . In the next section, we
investigate how the length of time-to-completion a↵ects this trade-o↵, and
further a↵ects firms’ investment strategies and the fierceness of competition.
4.6.3 Impact of Time-to-Completion
When a firm wants to enter into a new industry, managers concern about the
industry’s fierceness of competition, because the fiercer competition increases
the di culty to gain competitive advantages to make sustainable profits. In
this section, we investigate the impact of time-to-completion on the fierceness
of competition.
According to the property of Exponential distribution, let T ⇤ = 1/  be
the expected time-to-completion. In our paper, we measure the fierceness
of competition by the number of firms that invest in R&D at time 0. From
Proposition 14, both firms wait for the initial belief p 2 [0,min{✓¯L, ✓ˆC}), firms
invest sequentially for p 2 [min{✓¯L, ✓ˆC}, pˆ), and both firm invest immediately
at time 0 if p 2 [pˆ, 1]. Hence, we call the degree of competition is low for
p 2 [0,min{✓¯L, ✓ˆC}), medium for p 2 [min{✓¯L, ✓ˆC}, pˆ), and high for p 2 [pˆ, 1].
Because we do not have the closed form solution for neither min{✓¯L, ✓ˆC}
or pˆ, we cannot obtain the analytical results for the impact of time-to-
completion on the thresholds. Hence, we illustrate the results through nu-
merical examples in Figure 4.6 to gain some insights. Figure 4.6 (a) shows
the impact of expected time-to-completion upon the degree of competition
for su ciently small duopoly share s, and Figure 4.6 (b) shows the case for
su ciently large s.
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Firstly, we observe that when the initial belief p is su ciently large, higher
T ⇤ increases the degree of competition, regardless of the size of s. This
observation indicates that if the market demand is promising (p is high),
the competition is fiercer for a longer time-to-completion. The intuition
behind it is as follows: When the new market is promising, at least one firm
invests immediately. Whether other firms follow simultaneously or wait for
the resolution of the market uncertainty depends on the value of waiting.
Higher T ⇤ reduces the follower’s value of waiting, because the follower has
to wait longer for better signals and the better signals become available only
after the leader’s completion. Hence, the followers are encouraged to invest
earlier to gain profits sooner. Consequently, the degree of the competition is
high.
For su ciently small p, We observe that a longer time-to-completion can
have di↵erent impacts on the degree of competition depending on the size of
s. If the new market is not promising (p is low), once one firm invests, the
other firm tends to wait for the leader’s completion and invests until its belief
about the market demand is high enough. Then a firm has the incentive to
invest as the leader only when either it is confident that the market demand
is good enough ( Pt   ✓¯L), or it is better to be the leader than to be the
follower. For su ciently small s, the follower’s payo↵ is so small that both
firms have the incentive to preempt each other. Higher T ⇤ even strengthens
such incentives of preemption because now the follower needs more time
to finish its R&D and consequently the leader enjoys the monopoly profit
for a longer period. Therefore, as shown in Figure 4.6 (a), longer time-to-
completion increases the degree of competition. This result is consistent with
Pacheco-De-Almeida et al. (2008). In contrast, di↵erent from Pacheco-De-
Almeida et al. (2008), for su ciently large s, the opportunity cost of waiting
is small, because the time average profits (the drifts in the profit streams)
are similar for two firms. Hence, the firms are encouraged to wait until their
belief of the demand is su ciently high. Ceteris paribus, a firm’s reward from
an immediate investment decreases in T ⇤ due to the time discounting. Hence,
firms increase their investment threshold ✓¯L for higher T ⇤. Consequently, as
suggested in Figure 4.6 (b), longer time-to-completion reduces the degree of
competition.
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Figure 4.6: Impact of T on ✓ˆ: The parameters are µH = 60, µL = 0,
 1 = 1; 0 = 50;k = 110,c = 1, r = 0.1; s = 0.3 for (a) and s = 0.5 for (b).
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4.7 Conclusions
The valuation of R&D projects and deciding R&D investment strategies can
be challenging due to the uncertainties and the strategic interactions be-
tween firms. In this chapter, we develop a game theoretical model by using
real options approach. We mainly provide insights to the managers of firms
that want to invest in R&D on understanding the impact of uncertainty and
managing demand information resources strategically. Our results have four
implications. Firstly, our results suggest practitioners and researchers need to
choose proper measurement of market uncertainty because di↵erent measure-
ments of market uncertainty can have di↵erent impacts on firms’ investment
strategies and payo↵s. Secondly, the results suggest that strategic interac-
tion also needs to be considered when evaluating R&D projects, because the
interactions can a↵ect the net present value of a project. Thirdly, we pro-
vide insights for firms that want to invest in R&D projects by showing the
impact of time-to-completion on the fierceness of competition. Lastly, this
chapter points out the di↵erence between disclosing technological knowledge
and demand information, and our results indicate that the disclosed contents
(demand information or technological knowledge) and the time to disclose
are important when firms consider voluntary disclosure.
In the future, some extensions of the current work can be undertaken. One
possible extension is to examine how firms manage their R&D resources. A
relevant research question can be, if firms control their e↵orts in R&D (such
as the capital or human resources allocated to R&D), does a firm always
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want to put more e↵orts (even the cost of inserting extra e↵orts are small)?
The answer to this question may provide an alternative explanation to the
phenomenon that R&D spending does not necessarily increase profits. For
example, according to the data from Bloomberg, in 2015, Apple Inc. spent
only 3.5% of its revenue, which number is relatively low compared to other
large technology companies, such as Facebook, Qualcomm, and Alphabet
that all spent much more than 10% of their revenues. Another extension
is to continue the study of understanding the impact of market uncertainty.
The current work only discusses the impact of market uncertainty in the
absence of technological uncertainty. In the future, I plan to study how the
presence of technological uncertainty a↵ects the impact of market uncertainty
on firms’ investment strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I study firms’ decision-making regarding the management
of operational resources under uncertainty by allowing the endogenization of
the time-dimension of firms’ decisions. I study two types of problems: (1)
the impacts of uncertainty and (2) how to strategically manage operational
resources.
The impacts of uncertainty have been widely studied in the literature. My
dissertation contributes to this strand of research by examining these impacts
in the context of real options games. Real options game theoretical models
allow my work to investigate the impacts of uncertainties under strategic
interactions and the flexibility of delaying actions. There are two types of
uncertainties discussed in this work: market uncertainty and technological
uncertainty.
Market uncertainty gives firms who want to enter a new market an in-
centive to collect signals to learn about the uncertainty. Such signals can
come from various sources, like market research reports, news press, market
performance from early investors, or sales data of complementary products.
In the presence of learning e↵ects, Chapter 4 shows that market uncertainty
has non-monotonic relationships with both a firm’s investment time and pay-
o↵s. With higher market uncertainty, firms’ rates of learning increase, so the
impact of market uncertainty a↵ects the impact of learning on firms’ strate-
gies. The relationships between firms’ learning and time-to-investment, as
well as between their learning and payo↵s, are illustrated in Chapter 2. Due
to strategic interactions and externalities, in a war of attrition game, an in-
creased rate of learning that tends to benefit the follower may hasten or delay
the first investment (and increase or decrease the leader’s payo↵s), depending
upon the rate of learning and the firms’ initial beliefs that the investment is
profitable.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study R&D investment models under techno-
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logical uncertainty. In the presence of technological uncertainty, a firm that
invests first is not necessarily the firm that completes R&D first. Chapter
3 shows that the presence of technological uncertainty reduces an innovative
firm’s incentive to unilaterally share technological knowledge with competi-
tors, due to the fear of losing the R&D race. Similarly, Chapter 4 shows
longer time-to-completion may or may not result in fiercer competition, de-
pending on the firms’ beliefs about market demand.
Conventional wisdom suggests that possession of resources is critical to at-
taining competitive advantages and sustainable profits. However, in addition
to resources, when time is another dimension of firms’ strategies, providing
resources to competitors can be also beneficial. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
support this view by investigating how to manage demand information re-
sources and technological knowledge resources. More specifically, these two
chapters examine the impacts of technological knowledge and demand infor-
mation spillovers on firms’ payo↵s and find that disclosing a certain amount
of demand information or technological knowledge to competitors can reduce
competition pressure by inducing competitors to delay their investment in
R&D projects. Moreover, Chapter 4 points out the di↵erence between these
two spillovers: only demand information spillover can benefit firms’ ex-post
payo↵s. Hence, the results imply that the timing and contents of disclosure
are also important.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Some Preliminaries for Proposition 1
Here we provide the expressions for the notations used in Proposition 1:
✓F ⌘

1 +
    1
  + 1
· h(1 + ↵F )  kr
kr   `(1 + ↵F )
  1
, (A.1)
  ⌘
s
1 + 8r
 2
(h  `)2 =
s
1 +
8r
 2(h  `)2 , (A.2)
 (x) ⌘ x( +1)/2(1  x)(1  )/2. (A.3)
In particular, the function  (x) is an increasing fundamental solution to the
di↵erential equation A (x) = 0 (see, for example, Kwon and Lippman 2011),
where
A ⌘ 1
2
✓
h  `
 
◆2
p2(1  p)2@2p   r (A.4)
is the r-excessive characteristic operator (Alvarez, 2003) for the process P .
A.2 Proofs of Mathematical Statements
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We first consider the case ⌧2 > 0 to obtain sup⌧2>0 V2(p;T1, T1 + ⌧2),
i.e., the optimal policy under the condition that firm 1 already invested.
We employ Theorem 3(A) of Alvarez (2001) to prove this proposition. For
convenience, we follow the convention of Alvarez (2001) and define g(p) =
(1 + ↵F )m(p)/r   k, which is the follower’s value of investing immediately.
We also define a function ⇧1(p) = g(p)/ (p), where  (p) is defined in (A.3).
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Our goal is to prove that ⌧F = inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓F} is the optimal stopping
time and that the function ⇧1(✓F ) (p) = ⇧F (p) in (2.6) is the optimal value
function. In order to prove it, by virtue of Theorem 3(A) of Alvarez (2001),
we only need to prove that g(·) is non-decreasing, that ⇧1(·) attains a unique
global interior maximum at ✓F , and that ⇧1(·) is non-increasing for p > ✓F .
The derivative of ⇧1(·) is given as follows:
⇧01(p) =
 0(p){(1   )[h(1 + ↵F )  kr] + (1 +  )[`(1 + ↵F )  kr]}
r 2(p)(  + 1  2p) (p  ✓F ) .
Note that   > 1, h(1+↵F ) > kr > `(1+↵F ), and  +1 > 2p for all p 2 (0, 1).
Hence, ⇧01(p) > 0 for p < ✓F and ⇧
0
1(p) < 0 for p > ✓F , and if follows that
⇧1(p) attains its global maximum at ✓F and that ⇧1(p) is decreasing for
p > ✓F . We conclude that ⇧F (p) = sup⌧2>0 V2(p; 0, ⌧2) = V2(p; 0, ⌧F ).
If ⇧S(p) > ⇧F (p), however, then the follower’s optimal policy is to in-
vest immediately at T1 when the leader invests. For p   ✓F , the inequal-
ity ⇧S(p) > ⇧F (p) is always satisfied because ↵S > ↵F . Also, note that
⌧F > 0 a.s. if p < ✓F . Thus, the optimal value function is given by
VF (p) = sup⌧2 0 V2(p; 0, ⌧2) = max{⇧F (p),⇧S(p)}, and the optimal stopping
time is ⌧F if ⇧F (p)   ⇧S(p) and 0 if ⇧S(p) > ⇧F (p).
(ii) Note that ⇧S(✓F ) > ⇧F (✓F ) because ↵S > ↵F . Furthermore, ⇧S(0) <
⇧F (0) because ⇧S(0) = `(1+↵S)/r k < 0 by Assumption 1 while ⇧F (p) > 0
for all p 2 (0, 1). We also note that ⇧S(p) is linear while ⇧F (p) is convex. We
conclude that ⇧S(p) and ⇧F (p) can cross only once in the interval (0, ✓F ).
The statement of the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we consider p < ✓S, in which case the follower’s strategy is to invest
at ⌧F with the threshold ✓F . Consider ⌧✓ = inf{t > 0 : Pt   ✓} for some
✓ 2 (0, 1) and the quantity f(p) = Ep[e r⌧✓m(P⌧✓)]. From the well-known
theory of stopping values (see, for example, Chapter 9 of Oksendal, 2003)
f(·) satisfies Af(p) = 0 for p < ✓ with the boundary condition f(✓) = m(✓).
It follows that Ep[e r⌧✓m(P⌧✓)] =  (p)m(✓)/ (✓) for any p  ✓. Hence, from
(2.4), we obtain (2.11) for p < ✓S. Second, if p   ✓S, then the follower will
also immediately invest at the same time, so both the leader and the follower
expect a payo↵ given by ⇧S(p) in (2.12).
Given the follower’s strategy of investment at ⌧ ⇤ given by (2.8), the leader’s
97
optimal policy is then to invest immediately if V1(p; 0, ⌧ ⇤)   0 and never
invest if V1(p; 0, ⌧ ⇤) < 0. Hence, the leader must compare V1(p; 0, ⌧ ⇤) given
by (2.11) and (2.12) with V1(p;1, ⌧ ⇤) = 0 and choose the maximum of the
two. It follows that (2.10) holds.
Note that ⇧L(p) increases in p because both m(·) and  (·) are increasing
functions. Also, because ⇧L(0) = `/r   k < 0 and ⇧L(✓S) = VF (✓S) > 0, ✓L
defined by (2.13) must satisfy ✓L 2 (0, ✓S]. Thus, VL(p) > 0 if and only if
p > ✓L.
Proof of Proposition 3
This proposition follows from Propositions 1 and 2 which detail the best
responses of the leader and the follower.
(i) In [0, ✓L), the firm that invests first (the leader) expects a negative
payo↵, so none of the players invest.
(ii) In the region [✓L, ✓S), consider the strategy profile (T1, T2) in which firm
1 takes the leader’s role with an investment threshold ✓L and firm 2 takes the
follower’s role with a threshold ✓F . We now prove that this strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium and that it is subgame perfect.
To show that it is a Nash equilibrium, we only need to show that each
firm’s strategy is the best response given the other firm’s strategy. We first
consider firm 1’s best response. Since it is already known that firm 2 will wait
until the probability Pt reaches ✓F before investment, firm 1’s best response
is to invest with the upper threshold of ✓L as was established in Proposition
2.
Now we suppose that firm 1’s strategy is to invest immediately. Then firm
2’s optimal policy (best response) is to wait until Pt reaches the threshold
✓F by virtue of Proposition 1. It follows that (T1, T2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Now we prove that (T1, T2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. After firm
1 invests, firm 2’s optimal policy is a stationary Markov policy, and hence,
(T1, T2) is still a Nash equilibrium. Before firm 1 invests, even if firm 1
(the leader) waits for any length of time, because the prior probability never
changes, (T1, T2) still remains a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the Nash equi-
librium (T1, T2) is subgame perfect because it remains a Nash equilibrium at
any point in time.
Finally, because firms 1 and 2 are symmetric, there exists another subgame
perfect equilibrium (T2, T1) in which firm 2’s threshold is ✓L while firm 1’s
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threshold is ✓F .
(iii) In [✓S, 1], because ⇧S(p)   ⇧F (p) > 0, both firms invest immediately.
Proof of Lemma 1
Define the following function
f(p) =
m(p)
r
  k +  (p)
 (✓F )

(↵L   1  ↵F )m(✓F )
r
+ k
 
,
so that f(p) = ⇧L(p) ⇧F (p) for p < ✓S. (The function f(·) is defined above
for any value of p, however.) Note that f(0) = `/r   k < 0, f(✓L) < 0
(because VL(✓L) = 0 and VF (p) > 0 for all p), but limp!✓S f(p) may or may
not be positive.
If (↵L   1   ↵F )m(✓F )r + k   0, then f(·) is a strictly increasing convex
function. Hence, even if limp!✓S f(p) > 0, there exist ✓c 2 (✓L, ✓S) such that
f(p) > 0 if and only if p 2 (✓c, ✓S).
If (↵L 1 ↵F )m(✓F )r +k < 0, then f(·) is a concave function. Then, using
the fact that V 0(✓F ) = (↵F + 1)m0(✓F )/r =
 0(✓F )
 (✓F )
h
(1 + ↵F )
m(✓F )
r   k
i
, we
obtain
f 0(✓F ) =
m0(✓F )
r
+
 0(✓F )
 (✓F )

(↵L   1  ↵F )m(✓F )
r
+ k
 
=
m0(✓F )
r
(↵L   ↵F )(1 + ↵F ) + k↵F
(1 + ↵F )m(✓F )/r   k .
Suppose that f 0(✓F )   0. From the concavity of f(·), we deduce that
f 0(p) > 0 for all p 2 (0, ✓S). Thus, even if limp!✓S f(p) > 0, there exist
✓c 2 (✓L, ✓S) such that f(p) > 0 if and only if p 2 (✓c, ✓S). Now suppose
that f 0(✓F ) < 0. We also know that f 0(0) > 0, f(✓L) < 0, and f(✓F ) =
(↵L   ↵F )m(✓F )/r   0, so f(p) crosses zero (from negative to positive) only
once in the interval (✓L, ✓F ), and at most once in the interval (✓L, ✓S) because
✓S  ✓F . Thus, there exists ✓c 2 (✓L, ✓S] such that f(p) > 0 if and only if
p 2 (✓c, ✓S).
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) The proof is based on the analytical results from Hendricks et al. (1988).
In order to utilize Hendricks et al.’s results on the war of attrition for our
problem, it is necessary to make a change of variable z = t/(t + 1) so that
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z 2 [0, 1] where z = 1 is understood as the limit t!1. We also define the
following: L(z) ⌘ ⇧L(p) exp
  r z1 z , F (z) ⌘ VF (p) exp   r z1 z , S(z) ⌘
⇧S(p) exp
  r z1 z , and I(z1, z2) ⌘ exp ´ z2z1 dL(z)F (z) L(z) . Here L(·) and F (·) are
the discounted payo↵s to the leader and the follower respectively, and S(·) is
the discounted payo↵ of simultaneous entry.
First, we note that L(·), F (·), and S(·) are continuous on [0, 1]. Second,
by definition of WA region, VF (p) > ⇧S(p) and VF (p) > VL(p) for p within
WA. We also note that L(z) is strictly decreasing because ⇧L(p) > 0 for
p > ✓L and exp[ rz/(1   z)] is strictly decreasing in z. Therefore, all the
assumptions made by Hendricks et al. (1988) are satisfied here.
Now we check the conditions for a Nash equilibrium. Theorem 2 of Hen-
dricks et al. (1988) stipulates the necessary and su cient condition for the
existence of equilibrium with q(i)p (0) < 1. From the definition of I(z1, z2) given
by Hendricks et al. (1988), we have I(z1, z2) = exp[ 
´ z2
z1
(1  z) 2/⌧¯M(p)dz]
where ⌧¯M(p) is given in (2.17). We note that I(0, 0) = 1 and that I(z, 1) = 0
so that I(1, 1) ⌘ limz"1 I(z, 1) = 0. Thus, our model satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 2 of Hendricks et al. (1988), and it allows for an equilibrium.
Next, Theorem 3 of Hendricks et al. (1988) provides the necessary and
su cient conditions for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium. The theorem
essentially states that, if L(z) > S(1) = 0 for any z < 0, which is satisfied
by our model, then the only possible form of equilibrium strategy profile is
one in which (q(1)p (0), q
(2)
p (0)) 2 [0, 1) ⇥ [0, 1) and q(1)p (0)q(2)p (0) = 0 and G(i)p
is exactly given by (2.16).
Then we show that the Nash equilibrium we obtained is subgame perfect.
We only need to prove that at any time s > 0, the conditional probabil-
ity distributions (conditional on the fact that neither firm has invested yet
by time s) constitute a Nash equilibrium. Let G(i)p (t|s) be the conditional
distribution for time t > s. Then
G(i)p (t|s) = 1 
1 G(i)p (t)
1 G(i)p (s)
= 1  exp

  t  s
⌧¯M(p)
 
,
which reduces to G(i)p (t  s) when q(i)p (0) = 0. Therefore, the strategy profile
(G(1)p (t|s), G(2)p (t|s)) is a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that the equilibria
we obtained in the proposition are subgame perfect.
(ii) First, we obtain (2.15) from when q(i) = 0 and q(j)(0) > 0 where
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G(i)p and G
(j)
p are given by (2.16). We also obtain (2.15) when q(i) > 0 and
q(j)(0) = 0. (Note that ⇧L(p) = VL(p) for p   ✓L.)
Second, suppose that q(i)p (0) = P({Tˆi = 0})   0 and q(j)p (0) = 0. Then
E[min{Tˆi, Tˆj}] = E[min{Tˆi, Tˆj}|Tˆi > 0]P({Tˆi > 0}) = ⌧¯M(p)
2
[1  q(i)p (0)] ,
because E[min{Tˆi, Tˆj}|Tˆi > 0] = E[min{Tˆi, Tˆj}] = ⌧¯M(p)/2 from the fact
that Tˆi and Tˆj are exponentially distributed. In general, because q
(i)
p (0)q
(j)
p (0) =
0, equation (2.19) holds.
Proof of Lemma 2
As a preliminary step, we study Ep[⌧✓ | ⌧✓ < 1] where ⌧✓ = inf{t > 0 :
Pt   ✓} for some fixed value of ✓. Note that for any r > 0, we can express
1{⌧✓<1} = 1{⌧✓<1} + e
 r⌧✓1{⌧✓=1}. Hence, we can express
P(⌧✓ <1) = Ep(1{⌧✓<1}) = Ep[1{⌧✓<1} + e r⌧✓1{⌧✓=1}]
= Ep(lim
r!0
e r⌧✓) = lim
r!0
Ep(e r⌧✓) ,
where the last equality is due to the bounded convergence theorem. From
(2.9), we have P(⌧✓ <1) = limr!0  (p)/ (✓) = p/✓. Similarly, we obtain
Ep[⌧✓1{⌧✓<1}] = E
p
n
lim
r!0
[⌧✓e
 r⌧✓1{⌧✓<1} + ⌧✓e
 r⌧✓1{⌧✓=1}]
o
,
= Ep

  lim
r!0
d(e r⌧✓)
dr
 
= lim
r!0
Ep

d(e r⌧✓)
dr
 
where the last inequality is due to the bounded convergence theorem. Inter-
preting d(e rt)/dr = limr0!r(e r
0t e rt)/(r0 r), we can express Ep
h
d(e r⌧✓ )
dr
i
=
dEp[e r⌧✓ ]/dr from the bounded convergence theorem, which allows us to ex-
change the order of the limit r0 ! r and the expectation Ep[·]. Thus,
Ep[⌧✓1{⌧✓<1}] =   limr!0
dEp[e r⌧✓ ]
dr
=   lim
r!0
d[ (p)/ (✓)]
dr
=
p
✓
log
✓
✓
p
1  p
1  ✓
◆
4 2
(h  `)2 .
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From the Bayes’ rule, we finally obtain
Ep[⌧✓ | ⌧✓ <1] = E
p[⌧✓1{⌧✓<1}]
P(⌧✓ <1) = log
✓
✓
p
1  p
1  ✓
◆
4 2
(h  `)2 . (A.5)
It follows that Ep[⌧F |⌧F < 1] is given by the right-hand-side of (A.5) with
✓ replaced by ✓F .
Proof of Theorem 1
From the equality  2/(h `)2 = ( 2 1)/(8r), we can express Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1]
as a function of   as follows:
f( , p) = log
✓
✓F
1  ✓F ·
1  p
p
◆
 2   1
2r
,
where ✓F has   dependence as in (A.1). From the expression of ✓F in (A.1),
the partial derivative of f( , p) with respect to   can be expressed as follows:
f1( , p) ⌘ @f( , p)
@ 
(A.6)
=
 2   1
2r✓F (1  ✓F )
d✓F
d 
+
 
r
log
✓
✓F
1  ✓F ·
1  p
p
◆
=  1
r
+
 
r
log
✓
✓F
1  ✓F ·
1  p
p
◆
,
where d✓F/d  is given by
d
d 
✓F =
 2✓2F [(1 + ↵F )h  kr]
(  + 1)2[kr   (1 + ↵F )`] < 0 .
To prove the theorem, we need to determine the sign of f1( , p). Because  
decreases in  , if f1( , p) > 0, then Ep[⌧F | ⌧F <1] decreases in  , and vice
versa.
We consider the following:
@(r  1f1( , p))
@ 
=
1
 2
+
✓
1
✓F
+
1
1  ✓F
◆
d✓F
d 
=    
2 + 1
( 2   1) 2 < 0 .
Furthermore, for a given p 2 (0, 1), lim !1 f1( , p) > 1 because lim !1 ✓F =
1. Hence, f1( , p) crosses zero (from positive to negative) at most once as  
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increases. If p > lim !1 ✓F = ✓0, then ✓F eventually coincides with p at a
su ciently large value of  , at which point f1( , p) =  r 1 < 0. Therefore,
if p > lim !1 ✓F , then f1( , p) crosses zero exactly once as   increases from
1 to 1.
If, on the other hand, p < ✓0, then lim !1 f1( , p) > 0 because the log-
arithmic term is positive, so f1( , p) never crosses zero as   increases. It
follows that f1( , p) > 0 for all p < ✓0.
Lastly, note that f1( , p) is strictly decreasing in p and that limp!0 f1( , p)>
0 and f1( , ✓F ) < 0. Thus, f1( , p) crosses zero exactly once as p increases
from 0 to ✓F .
Proof of Theorem 2
As a preliminary step, we obtain the comparative statics of ⇧L(p) with re-
spect to   when (p,  ) 2W . After some algebra, d⇧L(p)/d  can be expressed
as follows :
d⇧L(p)
d 
=
d 
d 
· d⇧L(p)
d 
=
d 
d 
· ↵Lm(✓F ( )) (p)
r (✓F ( ))
· g(✓F ( )) ,(A.7)
where g(x) ⌘ m(✓0)
2✓0(1  ✓0) ·
x  ✓0
m(x)
  1
2
log
x(1  p)
(1  x)p .
Here we used the fact that   = 1 + 2✓0(1   ✓F )/(✓F   ✓0) and expressed
all the  -dependencies in terms of ✓F ( ). Because it is already established
that d /d  < 0 and m(✓F ) > 0, the sign of d⇧L(p)/d  depends on the
signs of g(✓F ( )) and ↵L. Note that ✓F ( ) is strictly increasing in   by
Proposition 2 of Kwon and Lippman (2011) and that lim !0 ✓F ( ) = ✓0 and
lim !1 ✓F ( ) = 1.
As a preliminary step, we consider p > ✓0, in which case the possible value
of   is within ( 
p
,1) for some  
p
> 0, and the possible values of ✓F ( )
are within the interval (✓F ( p), 1) where ✓F ( p)   ✓c( p) = p. For now,
we extend the domain of the function g(·) to the interval [p, 1) and establish
that this extended function g(·) crosses zero exactly once as x increases within
the interval [p, 1). g(·) does cross zero because limx!1 g(x) < 0 and g(p) > 0
because p > ✓0. We note that dg(x)/dx = g1(x)/[2m(x)2✓0(1   ✓0)x(1  
x)],where g1(x) = m(✓0)2x(1   x)   m(x)2✓0(1   ✓0). Note that g1(·) is
strictly concave quadratic function, and g1(x) = 0 yields two roots: x1 = ✓0
and x2 = (1   ✓0)`2/[✓0h2 + (1   ✓0)`2] < 1. The first root x1 is outside the
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interval [p, 1) because p > ✓0, so we focus on the location of the second root
x2.
Suppose that x2  p. Then g1(x) < 0 for x 2 [p, 1), and hence, g(·) strictly
decreases in the interval [p, 1). It follows that g(·) changes sign only once.
Suppose that p < x2. Then g1(x) > 0 for x < x2 and g1(x) < 0 for x > x2,
so g(·) is strictly increasing in the interval [p, x2) and strictly decreasing in
(x2, 1). From the observation g(p) > 0 and limx!1 g(x) < 0, it follows that
g(x) changes sign only once in the interval [p, 1) as x increases.
Now we restrict the domain of g(·) to (✓F ( p), 1). By virtue of the anal-
ysis above, there is ✓ˆ 2 [✓F ( p), 1) such that g(x) changes sign at ✓ˆ as x
increases within the domain (✓F ( p), 1). (If g(·) does not change sign any-
where within (✓F ( p), 1), then ✓ˆ = ✓F ( p).) Thus, d⇧L(p)/d  changes sign
at some  ˆM(p) 2 [ p,1) as   increases within the domain {  : (p,  ) 2W}.
Note also that VM(p) = ⇧L(p) within the WA region.
Next, we note that the sign of lim !1 d⇧L(p)/d  coincides with the sign
of ↵L because d /d  < 0 and limx!1 g(x) < 0. Thus, the statements of the
theorem follow regarding the comparative statics of VM(p) with respect to  
for p > ✓0.
We also note that g(x) is strictly increasing in p, so the sign of g(·) can
change at most once as p increases from ✓L( ) to ✓c( ) for a fixed  . If the
sign change happens within (✓L( ), ✓c( )), then d⇧L(p)/d  in (A.7) changes
from positive to negative as p increases if ↵L > 0, and from negative to
positive as p increases if ↵L < 0.
Lastly, consider p < ✓0. In the limit x # ✓0 (or in the small-  limit) and
in the limit x " 1 (or in the large-  limit), g(x) is negative. Thus, VM(p)
increases (decreases) in   for small or large values of   if ↵L is positive
(negative).
Proof of Theorem 3
As the first step, we obtain an analytical expression for the determinant of
the sign of d⌧¯M(p)/d . From (2.17), we obtain
d⌧¯M(p)
d 
=
1
r⇧2L(p)

⇧L(p)
d
d 
VF (p)  VF (p) d
d 
⇧L(p)
 
.
104
Here dVF (p)/d  is given by
dVF (p)
d 
=

1
r
(1 + ↵F )m(✓F )  k
 
 (p)
 (✓F )
1
2
ln
✓
p
1  p
1  ✓F
✓F
◆
< 0 ,
so we only need to compute d⇧L(p)/d . From the expression (2.11) and the
equality 
1
r
(1 + ↵F )m(✓F )  k
 
 0(✓F )
 (✓F )
=
1
r
(1 + ↵F )m
0(✓F ) , (A.8)
which is derived from the continuous di↵erentiability of VF (p) at p = ✓F , we
obtain
d
d 
⇧L(p) =
↵L
r
 (p)
 (✓F )

 d✓F
d 
·  
0(✓F )kr
 (✓F )(1 + ↵F )
+
m(✓F )
2
log
✓
p
1  p ·
1  ✓F
✓F
◆ 
.
for p < ✓S. Then it follows that, for p < ✓S,
⇧L(p)
d
d 
VF (p)  VF (p) d
d 
⇧L(p)
=
VF (p)
r

1
2
(m(p)  kr) log
✓
p
1  p ·
1  ✓F
✓F
◆
 
2↵Lkr✓2F ✓0
(1 + ↵F )(  + 1)2
·  
0(✓F ) (p)
 2(✓F )
 
.
Once we substitute   = 1 + 2✓0(1  ✓F )/(✓F   ✓0), which is an equality that
can be verified from the definition of ✓F and ✓0, we conclude that ⌧¯M(p)
increases (decreases) in   if and only if
1
2
(m(p)  kr) log
✓
p
1  p ·
1  ✓F
✓F
◆
  ↵Lkr✓0(✓F   ✓0)
2
2(1 + ↵F )(1  ✓0)2 ·
 0(✓F ) (p)
 2(✓F )
,
(A.9)
is negative (positive).
Let us write (A.9) as A(p) + B(p) where
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A(p) =
1
2
(m(p)  kr) log
✓
p
1  p ·
1  ✓F
✓F
◆
,
B(p) =   ↵Lkr✓0(✓F   ✓0)
2
2(1 + ↵F )(1  ✓0)2 ·
 0(✓F ) (p)
 2(✓F )
.
(i) Suppose ↵L > 0. Then B(p) < 0 for all p, but the sign of A(p) depends
on the sign of m(p)  kr. (The logarithmic term is always negative because
p < ✓F .) Specifically, for su ciently high p, either m(p) > kr or p = ✓F is
satisfied, so A(p)  0. Thus, for su ciently high p, (A.9) is negative.
Now consider the limit   ! 1. From the expression of (A.1) and (A.3),
 0(✓F ) (p)/ 2(✓F ) converges to a finite value in the limit   ! 1 (  ! 1),
so lim !1 |B(p)| < 1. On the other hand, lim !1 ln[(1   ✓F )/✓F ] =  1
because lim !1 ✓F = 1. Thus, lim !1A(p) + B(p) > 0 if m(p)   kr < 0
and lim !1A(p) + B(p) < 0 if m(p)   kr > 0. From (2.11), we find that
m(✓L)   kr =  ↵Lm(✓F ) (✓L)r (✓F ) < 0. Because m(·) is strictly increasing, we
conclude that m(p)  kr < 0 for su ciently low p that satisfies p > ✓L.
(ii) Suppose ↵L < 0. From (2.11), we find that m(✓L) kr =  ↵Lm(✓F ) (✓L)r (✓F )
is positive, so m(p) kr > 0 for all p > ✓L. By an analogous argument above,
we conclude that A(p) + B(p) < 0 for su ciently large  .
Proof of Proposition 5
We consider the intervals I1 = (✓L, ✓F ) and I2 = [✓F , 1) separately below.
(We define I1 = ; in case ✓L > ✓F .
(i) We first study the interval I1. First, we prove that ⇧F (p) > ⇧S(p) for
all p  ✓F . By 2.6 and 2.7 and the definition ↵S = (↵L + ↵F )/2  ↵F , we
can derive
⇧S(p) =
1
r
(1 + ↵S)m(p)  k < 1
r
(1 + ↵F )m(p)  k  ⇧F (p)
for all p  ✓F . Here the second inequality holds because ⇧F (·) is convex,
m(·) is linear, and ⇧0F (✓F ) = (1+↵F )m(✓F )/r. It follows that the SM region
does not exist within (0, ✓F ).
Second, we prove that VF (p)   VL(p) for all p  ✓F . Because ↵L < 0, we
have ⇧L(p)  m(p)/r   k  (1 + ↵F )m(p)/r   k  VF (p) for all p  ✓F .
Since VF (p) > 0 for all p, it follows that VF (p)   max{⇧L(p), 0} = VL(p).
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(ii) Next, we consider the interval I2 = [✓F , 1). In this interval, if the
leader invests first, then the follower can choose to invest an infinitesimal
time later to be the follower. Thus, VF (p) =
1
r (1+↵F )m(p)  k and VL(p) =
1
r (1 + ↵L)m(p)  k. Because ↵L < ↵F , we have VF (p) > VL(p).
Proof of Theorem 4
We use the same notation employed in the proof of Theorem 3. Since ⌧¯M(p)
has no dependence on   for p 2 (✓F , 1), we focus on the interval (✓L, ✓F ) in
case ✓L < ✓F .
For p su ciently close to ✓F and for any fixed value of  , A(p) is negligible
compared to B(p). Since B(p) > 0 for ↵L < 0, we have A(p) + B(p) > 0 in
the limit p! ✓F , which implies that ⌧¯M(p) decreases with   for p su ciently
close to ✓F .
Let us now consider a fixed p < ✓F and for su ciently large values of  .
By the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 3(ii), m(p)   kr > 0
for all p > ✓L, so we have A(p) < 0. Furthermore, in the limit   ! 1,
|A(p)| > |B(p)| by the argument used in the proof of Theorem 3(i). It
follows that A(p) + B(p) < 0 for a fixed p < ✓F and for su ciently large
values of  . Thus, we conclude that ⌧¯M(p) increases with   when p is not
too close to ✓F and for su ciently large values of  .
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 6
Because we only consider pure strategy equilibrium, we set min{T 01 , T 02 } = 0.
By the distributions of completion times T1and T2 before and after ⌧I , and
by (3.2), (3.3) and (3.5), we obtain the expressions for payo↵s as functions
of ( i, j), where Wi(s), Wj(s), Ui(s) and Uj(s) are given by (3.8) and (3.9):
V Ci ( i, j; s; s) = Ui(s)
 i
 i +  j + r
+Wi(s)
 j
 i +  j + r
(B.1)
  ki( i)
2
 i +  j + r
  c;
V ILi ( i, j; s; s) =  
ki( i)2
 i + r
+ Ui(s)
 i
r +  i
  c ; (B.2)
V IFj ( i, j; s; s) = (Wj(s)  c)
 i
r +  i
. (B.3)
(i) In a concurrent pure strategy equilibrium, we obtain the expression of
 Ci as in (3.10) by solving the first order condition dV
C
i ( i, j; s, s)/d i =
0 for i = 1, 2.
(ii) In an imitative pure strategy equilibrium in which T 0i < T
0
j , firm j
invests at time Ti. Firm i’s best response can be obtained by solving the first
order condition dV ILi ( i, j; s; s)/d i = 0. Then we obtain  
IL
i as (3.12) that
maximizes V ILi ( i, j; s, s).
Proof of Propositions 7
Note that firms are symmetric, we only need obtain one firm’s best response
given the other firm’s strategy. First as a preliminary result, we need to
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prove that 2 Ci <  
IL
i , 8s 2 [1,1).
2 Ci =  
1
3k
(2kr   U(s) +W (s)) +
r
(2kr   U(s) +W (s))2
9k2
+
4rU(s)
3k
>   1
3k
(2kr   U(s) +W (s)) +
r
(2kr   U(s) +W (s))2
9k2
+
rU(s)
k
>  r +
r
r2 +
rU(s)
k
=  ILi ,
where we use (3.10). The last inequality is from the fact that
(2kr   U(s) +W (s)) /3k < r,
which is due to U(s) W (s) > 0, and the fact that the function  x+px2 + y
is a decreasing function of x whenever y is positive. The fact that U(s) >
W (s) is apparent from the expressions of (3.8) and (3.9).
Given that firm j initiates at time 0, firm i receives V Ci (s, s) if it chooses
a concurrent strategy, and V IFi (s, s) if it chooses to initiate its R&D at time
⌧I . Hence we only need to compare V Ci (s, s) and V
IF
i (s, s) to obtain firm i’s
best response. In the limit c! 0, we have
V Ci (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) (B.4)
=
 Ci
2 Ci + r
[U(s) +W (s)  k Ci ] 
 ILj
 ILj + r
W (s)
>
 Ci
2 Ci + r
[U(s) W (s)  k C ]
Now we investigate the inequality (B.4) in the limits of very small s and
very large s. In the limit s ! 1,  Ci /(2 Ci + r) converges to a fixed positive
number from (3.10), and we obtain
lim
s!1
U(s) W (s)  k Ci =
1
3
kr +
5
6
(U(1) W (1)) (B.5)
 
(
1
3
kr +
5
6
(U(1) W (1))
 2
+ f1
) 1
2
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where
f1 =
rkU(1)
3
+

1
3
kr   U(1) W (1)
6
 2
 

1
3
kr +
5
6
(U(1) W (1))
 2
.
From (B.5), if f1 < 0, then we obtain lims!1 U(s) W (s)  k Ci > 0. From
equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9), and the fact that ⇡10 > ⇡11, we obtain
f1 <  2k2µ2j(r2 + rµj + µ2j)   k(r2 + 3µ2j)⇡10   2⇡210 < 0. The inequality is
from the fact that µj,k,r,k and ⇡10 are non-negative. Therefore lims!1 U(s) 
W (s)  k Ci > 0 and lims!1 V Ci (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) > 0.
Next we investigate the other limit. From (3.11) and (3.14), we obtain
lim
s!1
V Ci (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) =
⇡11(2 Ci    ILj1)  k( Ci1)2( ILj1 + r)
(2 Ci1 + r)( 
IL
j1 + r)
,
where  Ci1 = lims!1  
C
i and  
IL
i1 = lims!1  
IL
i . Because both  
C
i1 and  
IL
j1
are non-negative, the sign of lims!1 V Ci (s, s) V IFi (s, s) coincides with the
sign of the following expression
⇡11(2 
C
i1    ILj1)  k( Ci1)2( ILj1 + r). (B.6)
Below we investigate the sign of (B.6). First we prove that (B.6) decreases
in  Ci1 and  
IL
j1. Then the sign of (B.6) is determined by the relative sizes of
k and ⇡11/8r2.
First we establish  Ci1   ⇡11/[k( ILj1+r)]. Suppose  Ci1 < ⇡11/[k( ILj1+r)].
Because  Ci >  
IL
j /2,8s, which we have shown at the beginning of this proof,
we have  ILj1/2  ⇡11/[k( ILj1 + r)], which can be reexpressed as
 ILj1    
r
2
+
r
r2
4
+
2⇡11
k
>  r +
r
r2 +
⇡11
k
.
The second strict inequality is because  x +px2 + y decreases in x and
2⇡11/k > ⇡11/k. The inequality  ILj1 >  r +
p
r2 + ⇡11/k contradicts the
fact that  ILj1 =  r+
p
r2 + ⇡11/k from the expression of (3.12). Therefore,
we obtain  Ci1   ⇡11/[k( ILj1 + r)].
Then we prove that (B.6) decreases in  Ci1 and  
IL
j1. Define f2(x) =
⇡11(2x    ILj1)   kx2( ILj1 + r). The function f2(x) decreases in x if x >
⇡11/[k( ILj1+r)]. Because of the inequality  
C
i1   ⇡11/[k( ILj1+r)], ⇡11(2 Ci1 
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 ILj1) k( Ci1)2( ILj1+r) decreases in  Ci1. Also, ⇡11(2 Ci1  ILj1) k( Ci1)2( ILj1
+r) decreases in  ILj1.
Now we consider the two regimes k   ⇡11/8r2 and k < ⇡11/8r2. By
(3.10) and (3.12), if k   ⇡11/8r2, we obtain  Ci1  4r/3,  ILj  2r, and
⇡11(2 Ci   ILj1) k( Ci1)2( ILj1+r)   0, which proves Proposition 7. Similarly,
if k < ⇡11/8r2, we obtain  Ci1 > 4r/3 and  
IL
j > 2r. As a result, ⇡11(2 
C
i  
 ILj1)  k( Ci1)2( ILj1 + r) < 0.
It remains to prove V ILi (s, s) < V
IF
i (s, s) whenever s 2 {s : V Ci (s, s) <
V IFi (s, s)} in order to complete the proof of Proposition 7. Note that
V ILi (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) = (U(s) W (s)  k ILi )
 ILi
 ILi + r
.
Hence it su ces to prove that U(s) W (s)  k ILi < 0 whenever V Ci (s, s) <
V IFi (s, s).
Claim:  ILi >  
C
i when s 2 {s : V Ci (s, s) < V IFi (s, s)}.
Proof of the claim: Assume  ILi <  
C
i . Then 8s 2 [1,1),
V Ci (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) =
 Ci
2 Ci + r
[U(s) +W (s)  k C ]   
IL
i
 ILi + r
W (s)
>
 Ci
2 Ci + r
[U(s) +W (s)  k C ]   
C
i
 Ci + r
W (s)
=
 Ci
(2 Ci + r)( 
C
i + r)
g( Ci ),
where g(x) =  kx2 + x(U(s) W (s)  kr) + rU(s). The concave quadratic
equation g(x) = 0 has a positive root
x0 =  1
2
r +
U(s) W (s)
2k
) +
s✓
1
2
r   U(s) W (s)
2k
◆2
+
rU(s)
k
.
It follows that g(x) > 0 for x 2 [0, x0). After some algebra, it is straight
forward to verify the following:
 Ci =  
1
3
r +
U(s) W (s)
6k
+
s✓
1
3
r   U(s) W (s)
6k
◆2
+
rU(s)
3k
<  (1
2
r   U(s) W (s)
2k
) +
r
(
1
2
r   U(s) W (s)
2k
)2 +
rU(s)
k
= x0.
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Therefore, g( Ci ) > 0 and V
C
i (s, s) V IFi (s, s) > 0, which contradicts the fact
that s 2 {s : V Ci (s, s) < V IFi (s, s)}, and hence we conclude that  ILi >  Ci .
From the inequalities  ILi >  
C
i ,  
IL
i < 2 
C
i and V
C
i (s, s) < V
F
i (s, s), we
obtain
 Ci
2 Ci + r
[U(s) +W (s)  k Ci ] <
 ILi
 ILi + r
W (s) <
2 Ci
2 Ci + r
W (s),
from which we obtain U(s)  W (s) < k Ci < k ILi . Hence we prove Propo-
sition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8
The proofs of part (1) and (2) are a straightforward modification of the proof
of Proposition 4 in Kwon et al. (2015).
Proof of Proposition 9
Case (II) is identical to the symmetric case, so the proof of 7 directly applies
here. Hence we only need to prove case (I).
The payo↵ functions are given by the same expressions as in (B.1), (B.2),
and (B.3). In a concurrent pure strategy equilibrium, we obtain equations
(3.16)-(3.18) from the first order conditions dV Ci ( i, j; s, s)/d i = 0.
Below we prove that there exists a unique pair of ( 1, 2) that satisfies
(3.16)-(3.18). For notational simplicity, we define
q(x) =
p
(r + x)2 + x[U2(s) W2(s)]/k2 + rU(s)/k2 .
From (3.16)-(3.18), we find that  C1 is given as the unique nonnegative solu-
tion to f(x) = 0, where
f(x) = x2   2xq(x) + (U1(s) W1(s)
k1
)(q(x)  r   x) + r
k1
U1(s) (B.7)
and  C2 is given by
 C2 =  r    C1 +
s
(r +  C1 )
2 + ( C1 )
U2(s) W2(s)
k2
+
r
k2
U2(s).
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Notice that f(0) = [(U1(s) W1(s))/k1](
p
r2 + rU2(s)/k2 r)+rU1(s)/k1 >
0. In the large x limit, f(x) =  1. By the continuity of f(x), there must
exist at least one positive root.
Also, we obtain f”(x) < 0. Therefore f(x) crosses 0 only once, and there
is a unique pair of ( C1 ,  
C
2 ) that satisfies the simultaneous equations (3.16)-
(3.18).
Proof of Proposition 10
(I)(a) From (3.16)-(3.18),
 Ci +  
C
j =  r +
s
(r +  Cj )
2 +  Cj
Ui(s) Wi(s)
ki
+
rUi(s)
ki
>  r +
s
r2 +
rUi(s)
ki
=  ILi ,
where the inequality is because of  Cj   0 and Ui(s) > Wi(s). Hence, by (3.2)
and (3.5), and from the inequality  Ci +  
C
j >  
IL
i , we obtain the inequality
V Ci (s, s)  V IFi (s, s) > [ Ci /( Ci +  Cj + r)](Ui(s) Wi(s)  ki Ci ) in the limit
c ! 0. Then it su ces to show that Ui(s)  Wi(s)   ki Ci is nonnegative
in the limit s ! 1. Note that if lims!1  Ci < (Ui(1)  Wi(1))/2ki, we have
lims!1 Ui(s)  Wi(s)   ki Ci > (Ui(1)  Wi(1))/2 > 0. Then it remains to
prove that lims!1  Ci < (Ui(1) Wi(1))/2ki always holds true.
As a preliminary step, we show that rWi(s)/ki  (Ui(s) Wi(s))2/4k2i < 0
for i = 1, 2, when s! 1. By (3.8) and (3.9), we obtain
rWi(s)
ki
  (Ui(s) Wi(s))
2
4k2i
=
(⇡10   ⇡11)
4k2i (kjr
2 + ⇡11)
. [ kj(⇡10   ⇡11)
+4
q
kj (kjr2 + ⇡11)
⇣
kir  
p
ki (kir2 + ⇡11)
⌘ 
.
The right hand side of the above equation is negative because ⇡10 > ⇡11 and
kir <
p
ki (kir2 + ⇡11).
From (3.16)-(3.18), we obtain
 Ci +  
C
j + r =
s✓
r +  Cj +
Ui(s) Wi(s)
2ki
◆2
+
rWi(s)
ki
  (Ui(s) Wi(s))
2
4k2i
.
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Because of the inequality rWi(s)/ki   (Ui(s)  Wi(s))2/4k2i < 0, we obtain
lims!1  Ci < (Ui(1) Wi(1))/2ki.
(I)(b) When q ! 1, we obtain
 C1 =  
C +O(q   1) , (B.8)
 C2 =  
C +O(q   1) ,
µ2 =  r +
r
r2 +
U(s)
k
+O(q   1) ,
where  C is identical to the right hand side of (3.10). Because the game
reduces to the symmetric case in the limit q ! 1, the proof is complete by
virtue of Proposition 7.
(II) In the simultaneous limit c! 0 and q ! 1, Proposition 10 applies. It
follows that V IFi (s, s) > V
IL
i (s, s) and V
IF
i (s, s) > V
C
i (s, s) in this limit.
(III) Below we prove that V IL1 (s, s) > V
IF
1 (s, s) and
V IF2 (s, s) > max{V IL2 (s, s), V C2 (s, s)}
are satisfied, thereby showing that the game belongs to the imitative regime.
In the limit q ! 0, we solve the system of equations (3.16)-(3.18), and
obtain
 C1 =
A2p
q
+ A0 +O(pq) ;  C2 = B0 +B1
p
q +O(q)
where
u˜2 =
"
(⇡10   ⇡11)
r
k
⇡11
#
/s
w˜1 =
2
s
p
k⇡11
B0 =
1
2k
[
⇡11
r
 W (s)] (B.9)
A2 =
r
B0
k
[U(s)  ⇡11
r
] + r
U(s)
k
B1 =
1
2A2
(
A2u˜2
k
+
⇡11
r
  2rB0   B20) (B.10)
A0 =  B0   r + 1
2A2k
[B0w˜1 +B1(U(s)  ⇡11
r
)]
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Then we obtain
V C1 (s, s) = UC +
✓
B0⇡11
A2r
  U(s)(B0 + r)
A2
  A2k
◆p
q +O(q)(B.11)
V C2 (s, s) = WC + [ B20k +B0⇡11/r  W (s)(B0 + r)] (B.12)p
qA 12 +O(q) (B.13)
V IL1 (s, s) = UC   2
p
krU(s)
p
q + 2krq +O(q 32 ) (B.14)
V IF2 (s, s) = WC +
s
kr
U(s)

2kr
s2
✓
⇡10/r   U(s)
U(s)  ⇡11/r
◆
(B.15)
+c  ⇡11
r
ip
q +O(q 32 )
V IF1 (s, s) = (
⇡11
r
  c)
 
1  krp
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
!
+O(q 12 ) (B.16)
V IL2 (s, s) =
 
1  krp
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
!h⇡11
r
+ kr (B.17)
 
p
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
i
  c+O(q 12 ).
where UC = U(s)  c and WC = W (s)  c.
Hence, we prove V IF2 (s, s) > V
C
2 (s, s), V
IF
2 (s, s) > V
IL
2 (s, s), and V
IL
1 (s, s) >
V IF1 (s, s) in the large s limit.
(i) We obtain V C2 (s, s)  V IF2 (s, s) = g1(s)pq +O(q), where
g1(s) =  B
2
0k
A2
+W (s)
 s
rk
U(s)
  B0 + r
A2
!
+
B0⇡11
A2r
  c
s
rk
U(s)
.
Taking the limit s!1 yields lims!1 g1(s) =  cr
p
k/⇡11 < 0. As a result,
V IF2 (s, s) > V
C
2 (s, s) in the large s limit.
(ii) We obtain
V IL2 (s, s)  V IF2 (s, s) = 2kr(s2   1)/s2   2m+
p
k(kr2 + ⇡11)/s2 +O(pq).
In the large s limit, the leading order term is 2kr   2pk2r2 + k⇡11 < 0, so
V IF2 (s, s) > V
IL
2 (s, s).
(iii) We obtain
V IF1 (s, s) V IL1 (s, s) = ⇡11/r U(s) kr(⇡11/r  c)/
p
k2r2 + k⇡11+O(pq).
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In the large s limit, the leading order term is negative because c < ⇡11/r
that is from c < Wi(1), and lims!1 U(s) = ⇡11/r. Therefore V IL1 (s, s) >
V IF1 (s, s).
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof is a straightforward modification of the proof of Proposition 4 in
Kwon et al. (2015).
Proof of Theorem 5
(I)(a) If q is su ciently close to 1, from the expansion of e↵ort level  Ci
in (B.8), firm i’s payo↵ in the concurrent regime in the asymmetric case is
exactly the same as in the symmetric case except for the sub-leading order
terms O(1   q). Therefore, we only need to obtain the comparative statics
of V Ci (s, s) with respect to s to prove the theorem.
In the large s limit, the derivative dV Ci (s, s)/ds is given by
d
ds
V Ci (s, s) =
va
vb
✓
1
s
◆2
+O(s 3),
where va = 2k3/2(⇡10   2⇡11)g2, g2 = k3/2r3   (kr2 + 12⇡11)
p
kr2 + 3⇡11, and
vb = 3
p
⇡11(kr2 + 3⇡11)[kr + 2
p
k(kr2 + 3⇡11)]2. Here, it is straightforward
to confirm that g2 < 0 and vb > 0. If ⇡10 is su ciently large, we have va > 0.
Then V Ci (s, s) decreases in s. In contrast, when ⇡10 is su ciently small,
⇡10 < 2⇡11, then va < 0 and V Ci (s, s) increases in s.
Now we examine the sign of dV Ci (s, s)/ds in the small s limit. We note
that
d
ds
V Ci (s, s)
=  C(2 C + r)
d
ds
(U(s) +W (s)) + [k( C)2    C(U(s) W (s))
+rW (s)]
d C
ds
.
For notational simplicity, we denote f1 = d(U(s) +W (s))/ds, f2 = d C/ds,
f3 = k( C)2    C(U(s) W (s)) + rW (s), and f4 =  C(2 C + r). Then the
derivative dV Ci (s, s)/ds can be expressed as f1f4 + f2f3. Next, we expand
fi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 with respect to s in the small s limit. In the limit ⇡10 ! ⇡11,
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we have f4 > 0. We also obtain lim⇡10!⇡11 f1 = 2
p
k/(kr2 + ⇡11)(
p
kr2 + ⇡11 p
kr2)2 +O(s  1), lim⇡10!⇡11 f3 = O(s  1), and
lim
⇡10!⇡11
f2 =
p
k(4kr3 + 3⇡11r) +
p
kr2 + ⇡11(⇡11 + 4kr2)p
kr2 + ⇡11
⇣
2
p
kr2 + ⇡11  
p
kr2
⌘ +O(s  1) .
Hence, f1f4+ f2f3 > 0, i.e., dV Ci (s, s)/ds > 0 for ⇡10 su ciently close to ⇡11.
For su ciently large ⇡10, we obtain lim⇡10!1 dV
C
i (s, s)/ds =  1+O(s 1),
i.e., dV Ci (s, s)/ds < 0 for su ciently large ⇡10.
(I)(b) If q = 1, V IFi (s, s) is given by (B.3). In the large s limit, the
derivative of the leading order term in the expansion of V IFi (s, s) with respect
to 1  q is given by
d[ ILj (W (s)  c)/( ILj + r)]
ds
= ⌘1
1
s2
+O(s 3),
where ⌘1 = kr
cr(⇡10   ⇡11)  ⇡114kr2 + (⇡10 + 3⇡11)
2
p
⇡11 (kr2 + ⇡11)
3/2
 2
p
k⇡11.
If ⇡10 is su ciently large, then ⌘1 < 0 because of c ⇡11/r < 0, which is from
the fact that c < Wi(1) < ⇡11/r. Hence, V IFi (s, s) decreases in s. If ⇡10 is
su ciently close to ⇡11, then ⌘1 > 0, and therefore, V IFi (s, s) increases in s.
For s su ciently close to 1, we obtain
d[ ILj (W (s)  c)/( ILj + r)]
ds
= ⌘2 +O(s  1),
where
⌘2 =
 r +pr2 + rU(1)/kp
r2 + rU(1)/k
"
 4kr +
r
k
kr2 + ⇡11
(2⇡11 + 4kr
2)
#
+(W (1)  c)

kr1/2⇡11( ⇡10 + ⇡11)
2[(kr + U(1))(kr2 + ⇡11)]3/2
 
.
In the limit ⇡10 ! ⇡11, we obtain
⌘2 ! [ 4k2r3   3kr⇡11 + (4kr2 + ⇡11)
p
k(kr2 + ⇡11)]/(kr
2 + ⇡11) > 0.
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In the limit ⇡10 !1, we obtain
⌘2 ! [ 4k2r3   4kr⇡11 + (4kr2 + 2⇡11)
p
k(kr2 + ⇡11)]/(kr
2 + ⇡11) > 0
. Hence, dV IFi (s, s)/ds > 0 in the small s limit when ⇡10 is either su ciently
large or su ciently close to ⇡11.
From the expression of V ILi (s, s) given by (B.2), we obtain the comparative
statics of V ILi (s, s) with respect to s.
d
ds
✓
 k( 
IL
i )
2
 ILi + r
+ Ui(s)
 ILi
r +  ILi
  c
◆
=
@
@ ILi
✓
 k( 
IL
i )
2
 ILi + r
+ Ui(s)
 ILi
r +  ILi
  c
◆
d ILi
ds
+
@
@Ui(s)
✓
 k( 
IL
i )
2
 ILi + r
+ Ui(s)
 ILi
r +  ILi
  c
◆
dUi(s)
ds
=
 ILi
r +  ILi
dUi(s)
ds
. (B.18)
The second equality holds due to the envelope theorem because V ILi (s, s) is
an optimal function with respect to  ILi . From the fact that Ui(s) decreases
in s, which can be checked from the expression of Ui(s) in (3.9), we find that
(B.18) is negative.
(II.a) and (II.b) From the expressions in (B.11)-(B.17), Both V C1 (s, s) and
V IL1 (s, s) decrease in s because U(s) decreases in s, and, both V
C
2 (s, s) and
V IF2 (s, s) increase in s because W (s) increases in s.
Proof of Theorem 6
(I) First, we prove V IFi (s
⇤, s⇤)  V Ci (s⇤, s⇤). By the definition of s⇤, V IFj (s⇤, s⇤) =
V Cj (s
⇤, s⇤) for at least one of the firms labeled as j 2 {1, 2}. For the other
firm i, if q = 1, V IFi (s
⇤, s⇤) = V Ci (s
⇤, s⇤). If q < 1, suppose V IF1 (s
⇤, s⇤) >
V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤). Then because of the continuity of V IF1 (s, s) and V
C
1 (s, s) with
respect to s, we obtain V IF1 (s
⇤  4s, s⇤  4s) > V C1 (s⇤  4s, s⇤  4s) for
su ciently small 4s > 0. This contradicts the fact that the game belongs
to the concurrent regime when s < s⇤. Therefore V IF1 (s
⇤, s⇤)  V C1 (s⇤, s⇤).
If q is su ciently close to 1, it su ces to compare the leading order terms
in the expansions of V Ci (s
⇤, s⇤) and V ILi (s
⇤, s⇤) with respect to 1   q. Or
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equivalently, we compare V Ci (s
⇤, s⇤) given by 3.11 and V ILi (s
⇤, s⇤) given by
(3.13) in symmetric cases.
By the definition of s⇤, we have V IFj (s
⇤, s⇤) = V Cj (s
⇤, s⇤). Also, due to the
su ciently low degree of asymmetry (i.e., q ! 1), V Cj (s⇤, s⇤) = V Ci (s⇤, s⇤).
Hence, it remains to show that V IFj (s
⇤, s⇤) > V ILi (s
⇤, s⇤), i.e.,
(U(s⇤) W (s⇤))  
IL
i
r +  ILi
<
k( ILi )
2
r +  ILi
+
cr
 ILi + r
. (B.19)
We have proved that U(s⇤)  W (s⇤) < k ILi in the proof of Proposition 7.
Therefore, the inequality (B.19) holds.
(II) To prove Theorem 6 (II) we only need to prove V IL1 (s
⇤, s⇤) > V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤)
whenever V IF2 (s
⇤, s⇤) = V C2 (s
⇤, s⇤). In order for the equality V IF2 (s
⇤, s⇤) =
V C2 (s
⇤, s⇤) to hold, the following condition has to be satisfied by virtue of
(B.11)-(B.17) when q is su ciently small.
 B20k +B0⇡11/r  W (s)(B0 + r)
A2
=
s
kr
U(s)

2kr
s2
✓
⇡10/r   U(s)
U(s)  ⇡11/r
◆
+ c  ⇡11
r
 
,
(B.20)
where B0, A2 are defined in (B.9). Now we obtain the sign of V IL1 (s
⇤, s⇤)  
V C1 (s
⇤, s⇤). From the expressions in (B.11)-(B.17), we obtain
V IL1 (s
⇤, s⇤)  V C1 (s⇤, s⇤) =
p
q

 2
p
krU(s⇤) + A2k +
U(s⇤)
A2
(B0 + r)
 B0⇡11
A2r
 
+O(q)
=
(
 2
p
krU(s⇤)  B
2
0k
A2
+ A2k +
s
kr
U(s⇤)
2kr
(s⇤)2
✓
⇡10/r   U(s⇤)
U(s⇤)  ⇡11/r
◆
+ c  ⇡11
r
  p
q +O(q).
The second equality is from (B.20). Hence, in order to prove V IL1 ( 
IL
1 ,  
IF
2 ; s
⇤, s⇤)
 V C1 ( C1 ,  C2 ; s⇤, s⇤) is positive, it su ces to prove that the coe cient of pq
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is positive. We note that
 2
p
krU(s⇤)  A 12 B20k + A2k +
s
kr
U(s⇤)

2kr
(s⇤)2✓
⇡10/r   U(s⇤)
U(s⇤)  ⇡11/r
◆
+ c  ⇡11
r
 
   2
p
krU(s⇤)  B
2
0k
A2
+ A2k +
p
krU(s⇤)

2kr
s2U(s⇤)✓
⇡10/r   U(s⇤)
U(s⇤)  ⇡11/r
◆
  ⇡11
rU(s⇤)
 
=
fLC1 (s
⇤)
A2
.
Here fLC1 (s) = fA(s) + A2
p
krU(s)fB(s) wherefA(s) = (A20   B20)k and
fB(s) = 2kr
⇡10/r   U(s)
(U(s)  ⇡11/r)s2U(s)  
⇡11
rU(s)
  2 .
Because of lims!1 fLC1 (s) = 0, if we prove that f
LC
1 (s) decreases in s, then
we prove fLC1 (s
⇤) > 0.
Now we prove that both fA(s) and A2
p
krU(s)fB(s) decrease in s. By the
definition of A2 in (B.9) we have fA(s) =  B20+B0(U(s) ⇡11/r)/k+rU(s)/k.
Define f˜A(b) =  b2+b(U(s) ⇡11/r)/k+rU(s)/k in such a way that f˜A(B0) =
fA(s). The function f˜A(b) increases in b if b < (U(s)   ⇡11/r)/2k. It can
be verified that B0 = (⇡11/r   W (s))/2k < (U(s)   ⇡11/r)/2k from the
definition of B0 in (B.17) and definitions of U(s) and W (s) in (3.8) and
(3.9). Therefore, @f˜A(b)/@b > 0 at x = B0. Moreover, we define fˆA(u) =
 B20 + B0(u  ⇡11/r)/k + ru/k such that fˆA(U(s)) = fA(s). The derivative
@fˆa(u)/@u is positive because B0 is positive. Furthermore, B0 decreases in
s because W (s) increases in s, and U(s) decreases in s. Hence, we have
dfA(s)/ds = (@f˜A(b)/@b) |b=B0 (dB0/ds) + (@fˆa(u)/@u) |u=U(s) (dU(s)/ds) <
0.
Next we prove that A2
p
krU(s)fB(s) decreases in s. We have shown that
U(s) decreases in s, and dA2/ds = (@A2/@B0)(dB0/ds) < 0 due to the facts
that @A2/@B0 > 0 and dB0/ds < 0. Therefore, we only need to prove that
fB(s) decreases in s. Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to
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s yields that dfB(s)/ds is given by
 kr2fg
s3
q
k(kr2 + s2⇡11)[kr(⇡10   ⇡11) + ⇡11
p
k(kr2 + s2⇡11))]2
, (B.21)
where
fg ⌘ ⇡10
h
2r
p
k(kr2 + s2⇡11)  (2kr2 + s2⇡11)2
i
+⇡11
h
(s2⇡11)
2   2(
p
kr2(kr2 + s2⇡11)  kr2)2
i
.
After some algebra, we can show the following:
(s2⇡11)
2   2(
p
kr2(kr2 + s2⇡11)  kr2)2 > 1
4
(s2⇡11)
2 > 0 ,
so we conclude that fg > 0. Therefore, the derivate in (B.21) is negative,
and fB(s) decreases in s.
Proof for Theorem 7
(I) If q su ciently is close to 1, from the expressions for e↵ort level  Ci in
(B.8), the payo↵ is given by the payo↵ in the symmetric case (q = 1) plus a
sub-leading order term O(1  q).
(a) We only need to compare V Ci (s, s) in (3.11) and V
C
i (s + ✏, s), where
V Ci (s+ ✏, s) can be obtained from (3.2):
V C1 (s+ ✏, s) =
 ˆC1
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
U(s+ ✏) +
 ˆC2
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
W (s) (B.22)
  k( ˆ
C
1 )
2
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
;
V C2 (s+ ✏, s) =
 ˆC2
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
U(s) +
 ˆC1
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
W (s+ ✏) (B.23)
  k( ˆ
C
2 )
2
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r
.
Here, in equilibrium,  ˆCi is chosen by firm i to maximize V
C
i (s + ✏, s) given
firm j’s e↵ort level  ˆj. Following the proof of Proposition 9, the pair of e↵ort
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levels (ˆ 
C
1 ,  ˆ
C
2 ) is the unique solution of the following system of equations:
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r =
r
( ˆC2 + r)
2 + ( ˆC2 )
U(s+ ✏) W (s)
k
+
r
k
U(s+ ✏)
 ˆC1 +  ˆ
C
2 + r =
r
(r +  ˆC1 )
2 + ( ˆC1 )
U(s) W (s+ ✏)
k
+
r
k
U(s)
 ˆC1   0 ,  ˆC1   0 .
Now we expand  ˆCi and V
C
i (s+ ✏, s) in (B.22) with respect to ✏:
 ˆC1 =  ˆ+ v1✏+O(✏2)
 ˆC2 =  ˆ+ v2✏+O(✏2)
V C1 (s+ ✏, s) = V
C
1 (s, s) 
1
(2 ˆ+ r)2
gA
gB
✏+O(✏2).
Here,  ˆ is exactly the same as  Ci in (3.10), and
v1 =
2ku˜1(r +  ˆ)(r + 2 ˆ)  w˜2 ˆ(2k ˆ  U(s) +W (s))
4k2( ˆ+ r)(3 ˆ+ r) + 4k ˆ(U(s) W (s))  (U(s) W (s))2
v2 =
u˜1(r +  ˆ)(2k ˆ  U(s) +W (s))  2˜w2k ˆ(r + 2 ˆ)
4k2( ˆ+ r)(3 ˆ+ r) + 4k ˆ(U(s) W (s))  (U(s) W (s))2
gB = [2k( ˆ+ r) + U(s) W (s)][2k(3 ˆ+ r)  (U(s) W (s))],
gA =  gB
n
 ˆ
h
(v1   v2)(U(s) W (s)  k ˆ) + (w˜2   u˜1)(2 ˆ+ r)
 2kv1(r +  ˆ)
i
+ r(v1U(s) + v2W (s))
o
,
where
u˜1 = [s⇡11(⇡10   ⇡11)/(kr2 + s2⇡11)]
p
k/(kr2 + s2⇡11)
,
w˜2 = (2rW (s)/s)
p
k/(kr2 + s2⇡11).
In order to prove the theorem, it su ces to prove that gA/gB > 0. In the
limit ⇡10 !1, we have gA/gB !1.
Now we examine the sign of gA/gB in the limit ⇡10 ! ⇡11. In this limit, we
find that gB converges to a positive finite number because of the inequality
2k(3 ˆ+ r) > (U(s) W (s)) which follows from the definition of  ˆ in (3.10).
Note that lim⇡10!⇡11 u˜1 ! 0, and  ˆ, U(s), W (s) and w˜2 all converge to
positive finite numbers. Therefore, gA reduces to gA = w˜2 ˆg˜A in the limit
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⇡10 ! ⇡11, where
g˜A =  (r +  ˆ)
⇥
(U(s) W (s))2 + 2krW (s)⇤+ (U(s) W (s))
(6kr ˆ  rW (s) + 9k ˆ2)  k ˆ2(6r + 10 ˆ) .
Now we will show gA > 0 by proving g˜A > 0, because w˜2 and  ⇤ are positive
by their definitions. We reexpress g˜A as g˜A(U,W ) by replacing U(s) by U
and W (s) by W . We obtain the su cient condition for g˜A(U,W ) > 0 is
k > (U   W )2/4rW . By definitions of U(s) in (3.9)and W (s) in (3.8),
we obtain k > (U(s)   W (s))2/4rW (s) 8s. The su cient condition for
g˜A(U,W ) > 0 is automatically satisfied when U = U(s) and W = W (s).
Hence, we obtain gA > 0 and gA/gB > 0 in the limit ⇡10 ! ⇡11.
(b) If firm 1 is the leader, let ( ˆIL1 ,  ˆ
IF
2 ) be the equilibrium e↵ort level
before the first innovation Then by definition of V ILi (s, s) in (3.13) and  
IL
1
in (3.19), we have
V ILi (s, s) = U(s)
 IL1
 IL1 + r
  k( 
IL
1 )
2
 IL1 + r
  c   U(s)  ˆ
IL
1
 ˆIL1 + r
  k( ˆ
IL
1 )
2
 ˆIL1 + r
  c
> U(s+ ✏)
 ˆIL1
 ˆIL1 + r
  k( ˆ
IL
1 )
2
 ˆIL1 + r
  c = V ILi (s+ ✏, s).
Here, the first inequality is because of the optimality of  IL1 , and the second
inequality is from the fact that U(s) decreases in s.
If firm 1 is the follower, the spillover from firm 1 to firm 2 never occurs,
so the value functions has no dependence on ✏. Hence, V IF1 (s + ✏, s) is the
same as V IF1 (s, s).
(c) In the proof of part (a), we have obtained V Ci (s+✏, s) = V
C
i (s, s)+O(✏).
We also obtain V ILi (s + ✏, s) = V
IL
i (s, s) +O(✏) by expanding V ILi (s + ✏, s)
with respect to ✏. By Theorem 6, we know that V Ci (s
⇤, s⇤) > V ILi (s
⇤, s⇤).
Therefore, V Ci (s
⇤ + ✏, s⇤) > V ILi (s
⇤, s⇤).
(II) In the small q limit, we obtain the expansions of V Ci (s+ ✏, s), V
IL
i (s+
✏, s) and V IFi (s+ ✏, s) with respect to q as follows:
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V C1 (s+ ✏, s) = U(s+ ✏)  c+
 
Bˆ0⇡11
Aˆ2r
  U(s+ ✏)(Bˆ0 + r)
Aˆ2
  Aˆ2k
!
p
q
+O(q)
V C2 (s+ ✏, s) = W (s+ ✏)  c+
p
qAˆ 12 [ Bˆ20k + Bˆ0⇡11/r
 W (s+ ✏)(Bˆ0 + r)] +O(q)
V IL1 (s+ ✏, s) = U(s+ ✏)  c  2
p
krU(s+ ✏)
p
q + 2krq +O(q 32 )
V IF2 (s+ ✏, s) = W (s+ ✏)  c+
s
kr
U(s+ ✏)
p
q

2kr
(s+ ✏)2✓
⇡10/r   U(s+ ✏)
U(s+ ✏)  ⇡11/r
◆
+ c  ⇡11
r
 
+O(q 32 )
V IF1 (s+ ✏, s) = (
⇡11
r
  c)
 
1  krp
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
!
+O(q 12 )
V IL2 (s+ ✏, s) =
 
1  krp
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
!h⇡11
r
+ kr  
p
k(kr2 + ⇡11)
i
 c+O(q 12 ),
where
Bˆ0 = (⇡11/r  W (s+ ✏))/2k
Aˆ2 =
q
Bˆ0(U(s+ ✏)  ⇡11/r)/k + rU(s+ ✏)/k
uˆ2 =
h
(⇡10   ⇡11)
p
k/⇡11
i
/(s+ ✏)
wˆ1 = 2
p
k⇡11/(s+ ✏).
Therefore, for su ciently small ✏, the proofs of Theorem 5 (II) and Theorem
6 (II) carries over into the proof of Theorem 7 (II).
Proof of Theorem 8
(i) By virtue of Proposition 10, the game belongs to the war of attrition
regime. From the definition of P (T 02 < T
0
1 | min{T 01 , T 02 } > 0), it su ces to
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prove ⌧M2 < ⌧
M
1 . First, we obtain the following:
V IL1 (s, s) =  c 
k( 0)2
r +  0
+
 0U(s)
r +  0
+ p1(1  q) +O((1  q)2)
V IL2 (s, s) =  c 
k( 0)2
r +  0
+
 0U(s)
r +  0
+ p2(1  q) +O((1  q)2)
V IF1 (s, s) =
 0
r +  0
(W (s)  c) + q1(1  q) +O((1  q)2)
V IF2 (s, s) =
 0
r +  0
(W (s)  c) + q2(1  q) +O((1  q)2),
where  0 =  r +
p
r2 + rU(s)/k, and
p1 =
k 20(r +  0) + l1( k 20 + rU(s)  2k 0)
(r +  0)2
p2 =
 0(k 0 + u˜2)(r +  0) + l2( k 20 + rU(s)  2k 0)
(r +  0)2
q1 =
l2r(W (s)  c) + w˜1 0(r +  0)
(r +  0)2
q2 =
l1r(W (s)  c)
(r +  0)2
l1 =
rU(s)
2
p
k(r +  0)
l2 =
ru˜2
2
p
k(r +  0)
u˜2 =  1
2
s2⇡11
k
(U(s)  ⇡11/r)3
(⇡10   ⇡11)2
w˜1 =  2kr
s2
+
(2kr2 + s2⇡11)(U(s)  ⇡11/r)
s2(⇡10   ⇡11) .
Here U(s),W (s) are given in (3.9) and (3.8).From the expressions in (3.20),
in order to prove ⌧M1 > ⌧
M
2 , it su ces to prove
V IF2 (s, s)/V
IL
2 (s, s) > V
IF
1 (s, s)/V
IL
1 (s, s),
or equivalently,
 0
r +  0
(W (s)  c)
 
(p1   p2) 

 c  k( 0)
2
r +  0
+
 0U(s)
r +  0
 
(q1   q2) > 0
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Taking the limit of the left hand side of the above inequality gives
lim
s!1

 0
r +  0
(W (s)  c)
 
(p1   p2)  (q1   q2) (B.24)
 c  k( 0)
2
r +  0
+
 0U(s)
r +  0
 
=
p
k⇡11(cr   ⇡11) /[2r(kr2 + ⇡11)2],
where   =
p
k(k + ⇡11)(cr   2kr2   ⇡11) + 2k2r3 + 2kr⇡11. The inequality
c < W (1) gives
  <
p
k(k + ⇡11)(W (1)r   2kr2   ⇡11) + 2k2r3 + 2kr⇡11 = 0 .
Moreover, the inequality c < ⇡11/r holds because of the fact c < W (1) <
lims!1W (s) = ⇡11/r. Hence the expression (B.24) is positive, which proves
⌧M2 < ⌧
M
1 and furthermore proves Theorem (8) (I).
(ii) By virtue of Proposition 10, the game belongs to the imitative regime,
in which firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. Hence, T 02 > T
0
1 = 0.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof of Lemma 4
Following the standard steps of solving optimal stopping problem, we derive
that ✓L is the solution to (4.8) by applying smooth pasting condition and
value matching condition. Now we only need to prove the equation (4.8)
only has a unique solution in (0, ✓F ).
First of all, we prove that the leader never chooses ✓L 2 [✓F , 1]. Suppose the
leader chooses ✓L 2 [✓F , 1], then R1(p) = sEp(µ)/r from expression in (4.6).
We solve the optimal stopping problem and obtain a candidate of V L0 (p)
as [sEp(µ)/r   k][ (p,  0)/ (✓L,  0)] by applying value matching condition.
Taking the first derivative of this candidate of V L0 (p) yields that
R01(✓L) 
 0(✓L,  0)
 (✓L,  0)
(R1(p)  k) = s
r
(µH   µL)  1 +  0   2✓L
2✓L(1  ✓L) (C.1)
(
s
r
E✓L(µ)  k)
When ✓L ! 1, the expression (C.1) goes to  1. When ✓L ! ✓F , due
to  0 >  1, we have R01(✓L)   [R1(✓L)   k] 0x(✓L,  0)/ (✓L,  0) < s(µH  
µL)/r   [sE✓F (µ)/r   k][(1 +  0   2✓F )/2✓F (1   ✓F )] < s(µH   µL)/r  
[sE✓F (µ)/r   k][(1 +  1   2✓F )/2✓F (1   ✓F )] = 0. Moreover, the expression
s(µH   µL)/r   [(1 +  0   2x)/2x(1  x)][Ex(µ)  k] decreases in x. Hence,
R01(x)  (R1(x) k1) 0x(x,  0)[ (x,  0)] 1 < 0, 8x 2 [✓F , 1]. We conclude that
the optimal ✓L cannot lie in [✓F , 1].
Secondly we prove that there exist a unique ✓L 2 (0, ✓F ) satisfies (4.8).
Given ✓L 2 [0, ✓F ), R1(x) = Ex(µ)/r   [(1   s)/r]E✓F (µ) (x,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)
from (4.6). Solving the optimal stopping problem and applying value match-
ing condition yields the candidate of V L0 (p) to be
{Ep(µ)/r   [(1  s)/r]E✓F (µ) (x,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)  k} (x,  0)/ (✓L,  0) .
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Define
f(x) =
 0(x,  0)
 (x,  0)
(R1(x)  k) R01(x)
=  1
r
(µH   µL) + 1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
 (x,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)
1 +  1   2x
2x(1  x)
+
1 +  0   2x
2x(1  x)
✓
1
r
Ex(µ)  1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
 (x,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)
  k
◆
.
When x! 0, the expression f(0) = limx!0(Ex(µ)/r k)(1+ 0 2x)/[2x(1 
x)]+[(1 s)/r]E✓F (µ)[ (x,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)]( 1  0)/[2x(1 x)] (µH µL)/r <
0, due to the fact that µL/r < k and limx!0  (x,  1)/2x(1  x) ! 0. When
x! ✓F , the expression
f(✓F ) =
⇣s
r
E✓F (µ)  k
⌘ 1 +  0   2x
2x(1  x)  
1
r
(µH   µL) + 1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
1 +  1   2x
2x(1  x)
>
⇣s
r
E✓F (µ)  k
⌘ 1 +  1   2x
2x(1  x)  
1
r
(µH   µL) + 1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
1 +  1   2x
2x(1  x)
= 0 .
By some algebra, we find that the sign of f(x) is the same as the sign of
f˜(x), where
f˜(x) = (1 +  0)(
1
r
µL   k) + x[(1 +  0)1
r
(µH   µL)  2(1
r
µH   k)]
  (x,  1)( 1    0)1  s
r
E✓F (µ)
1
 (✓F ,  1)
.
The function f˜(x) is concave in x because f˜”(x) < 0. Furthermore, we have
f˜(0) < 0, and f˜(✓F ) > 0, because f(0) > 0 and f(✓F ) > 0. Therefore, f˜(x)
only crosses 0 once, and consequently f(x) only crosses 0 once. Thus, ✓L is
the only root for x 2 (0, ✓F ).
Proof of Lemma 5
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From expression of V L⌧L(p) in (4.6) and V
F
⌧L
(p) in (4.4) for p < ✓F , we define
⌫(x) = V L⌧L(x)  V F⌧L(x)
=
1
r
Ex(µ)  [ (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)]E✓F (µ)1
r
  k(1   (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)) .
The second derivative ⌫”(x) =  x”(x,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)( E✓F (µ)/r+k) < 0 due
to the fact that E✓F (µ)/r > k and  (x,  1) is a convex function of x. Hence,
⌫(x) is a concave function. Moreover, because v(0) = 1rµ
L   k < 0 and
⌫(✓F ) = 0, it is su cient to show that ⌫(x) first increases then decreases in
x in order to prove that ⌫(x) crosses 0 only once. Hence next we prove that
v0(x) first is positive then is negative for x varies from 0 to ✓F . The derivative
v0(0) = 1r (µ
H   µL) > 0, and
⌫ 0(✓F ) = (µH   µL)/r +  0x(✓F ,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)[k   E✓F (µ)/r]
<
1
r
(µH   µ)L + [ 0x(✓F ,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)][k/s  E✓F (µ)/r]
= 0 .
Furthermore, because v00(x) < 0, the derivative v0(x) first is positive then is
negative. Therefore, ⌫(x) only crosses 0 once. In other words, there exists a
unique ✓C such that V F⌧L(p) > V
L
⌧L
(p) for p 2 (0, ✓C) and V F⌧L(p) < V L⌧L(p) for
p 2 (✓C , ✓F ).
Secondly, we prove the condition for ✓L < ✓C . From the definition of ✓C ,
the inequality V F⌧L(✓L) > V
L
⌧L
(✓L) holds if only if ✓L < ✓C . Consider ⌫(✓L) =
V L⌧L(✓L)   V F⌧L(✓L) = E✓L(µ)/r   [(1   s)/r]E✓F (µ) (✓L,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)   k  
[ (✓L,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)][sE✓F (µ)/r   k]. Using the expression of ✓L in (4.8),
we rewrite ⌫(✓L) to be [ (✓L,  1)/ 0(✓L,  1)][(µH   µL)/r   (E✓F (µ)/r   k)
 0(✓L,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)]. Because  (✓L,  1)/ 0(✓L,  1) is positive, the inequality
V L⌧L(✓L)  V F⌧L(✓L) < 0 holds if (4.9) holds.
Lastly we prove the case of su ciently small  1. For  1 ! 1, the left hand
side of (4.9) goes to  1, because  (✓F ,  1) ! 1,  0(✓L,  1) is positive and
finite, and (E✓F (µ)/r   k) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6
Define f2( ) = ✓
 1
F   1 = [( 1   1)/( 1 + 1)][(sµH   kr)/(kr   µL)], so that
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the sign of d✓F/d  is opposite to the sign of df2( )/d , where
df2( )/d  = 2f2( )[
1
 21   1
d 1
d 
+
(µ¯  kr/s)
(µ¯  kr/s)2    2 ]
= 2f2( )

  1
 1 
+
(µ¯  kr/s)
(µ¯  kr/s)2    2
 
.
Here (µ¯ kr/s)2  2 = (µ¯ kr/s+ )(µ¯ kr  ) = (µH kr/s)(µL kr/s) < 0.
Because µ¯  kr/s   0, we have df2( )/d  < 0 and d✓F/d  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 13
No matter ✓L < ✓C or not, the leader’s ex-post payo↵ is always given by
V L⌧1 (p) = E
p(µ)/r   [(1  s)/r]E✓F (µ)[ (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)]  k
for p < ✓F , and V L⌧1 (p) = sE
p(µ)/r when p > ✓F .
We first discuss the case when p < ✓F . From the expression of V L⌧1 (p),
only the term [(1   s)/r]E✓F (µ)[ (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)] has  1-dependence. Let
f2( 1) = [(1 s)/r]E✓F (µ)[ (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)]. Due to the fact that d 1/d 1 >
0, the sign of dV L⌧1 (p)/d 1 is opposite of the sign of df( 1)/d 1 . The derivative
df2( 1)/d 1 is given by
@f2( 1)
@ 1
+
@f2( 1)
@✓F
d✓F
d 1
=
 (p,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)
⇢
2✓2F
(1 +  1)2
sµH   kr
kr   sµL  
⇥
(µH   µL)
+E✓F (µ)
1 +  1   2✓F
2✓F (1  ✓F )
 
+
1
2
E✓F (µ)
ln(
p
1  p
1  ✓F
✓F
)
 
=
⇢
✓F
1  ✓F
sµH   kr
kr   sµL
(1 +  1)E✓F (µ)  2✓FµH
(1 +  1)2
+
1
2
ln(
p
1  p
1  ✓F
✓F
)E✓F (µ)
 
 (p,  1)
 (✓F ,  1)
.
Because  (p,  1) > 0,8p 2 (0, 1), the sign of df2( 1)/d 1 depends on the
sign of the sum in the curly brackets. (1) For any fixed p, if  1 ! 0, then  1 !
1, ✓F ! 1, and ln ✓F/(1   ✓F ) ⇠ o(( 1   1) 1). Hence the sum in the curly
brackets goes to1, the derivative df2( 1)/d 1 > 0, and dV L⌧1 (p)/d 1 < 0. (2)
If p! ✓F and  1 !1, E✓F (µ)/( 1 1) 2✓FµH/[( 1+1)( 1 1)]! 0, while
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ln[p(1  ✓F )/(1  p)✓F ]E✓F (µ)/2 < 0. Hence the sum in the curly brackets is
negative, and thus df2( 1)/d 1 < 0 and dV L⌧1 (p)/d 1 > 0.
Then we discuss the case in which p! ✓F so that an infinitesimal increase
in  1 let the follower changes from waiting to immediate investment. Sup-
pose  
0
1 <  
00
1 , denote ✓
0
F and ✓
00
F as the corresponding follower’s investment
thresholds. From the expression of ✓F , ✓0F > ✓
00
F . Consider the posterior
belief at ⌧1 satisfies ✓
00
F < p < ✓
0
F , then the di↵erence in the leader’s payo↵s
due to the increase in  1 is given by sEp(µ)/r   k   {Ep(µ)/r   [(1  s)/r]
E✓F (µ)[ (p,  1)/ (✓F ,  1)] k} < sEp(µ)/r k (sEp(µ)/r k) = 0, because
of the optimality of ✓
0
F at  1 =  
0
1. Hence, the leader’s payo↵ decreases in
this case.
Lastly, when p > ✓F , V L⌧1 (p) is a constant in  1.
Proof of Lemma 7
Given the current posterior belief p < ✓¯F , let ⇡ˆFt (p) be the follower’s payo↵
if it chooses waiting, then ⇡ˆFt (p) satisfies the following ODE:
(1 + rdt)⇡ˆFt (p) =  dt

 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
 
R¯F (✓¯F )  k
  
+ (1   dt)⇡ˆFt+dt(p).
Solving this ODE yields that ⇡ˆFt (p) = [ /(r˜ +  )] [ (p,  1)/ (✓¯F ,  1)](R¯F (✓¯F ) 
k). If the follower chooses to invest immediately, it receives payo↵ R˜F (p) k.
Consider
g(p) = R˜F (p)  k   ⇡ˆFt (p)
= (
s˜
r
Ep(µ)  kˆ)   
r˜ +  
 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
(
s¯
r
E ✓¯F (µ)  kˆ).
Firstly, when p! 0, g(p) ⇠  [ /(r˜+ )]  1(✓¯F ,  1)(s¯E ✓¯F (µ)/r kˆ)p( 1+1)/2+
o(p( 1+1)/2). Hence g(p) < 0 for su ciently small p. When p ! ✓¯F ,g(p) !
s˜E ✓¯F (µ)/r   kˆ   [ /(r˜ +  )](s¯E ✓¯F (µ)/r   kˆ) > 0, because s˜   s¯ = (1  
s)r ]/[(r+ )(r+2 )] > 0 and  /(r˜+ ) < 1. Therefore, there exist at least
one pˆ such that g(pˆ) = 0.
Secondly, we prove the uniqueness of pˆ. The function g(p) is a concave
function because R˜F (p) is linear and ⇡ˆFt (p) is convex in p. Hence g
0(p) is a
decreasing function, and g0(p) > g0(✓¯F ) for all p 2 (0, ✓¯F ). g0(✓¯F ) = s˜(µH  
µL)/r   [ /(r˜ +  )] [ 0p(✓¯F ,  1)/ (✓¯F ,  1)](R¯F (✓¯F )   k) = s˜(µH   µL)/r  
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[ /(r˜ +  )] s¯(µH   µL)/r > 0. The second equality is from the optimality
condition of ✓¯F . Therefore, g0(p) > g0(✓¯F ) > 0, 8p 2 [0, ✓¯F ), i.e., g(p) always
increases in p. Consequently, there is a unique pˆ 2 (0, ✓¯F ) such that R˜F (p) 
k < ⇡ˆFt (p) if only if p < pˆ.
Proof of Lemma 9
For x 2 [0, pˆ), define
g3(x) = V¯
F
⌧1 (x)  V¯ L⌧1 (x) = ⇡ˆFt (p)  R¯L(p)  k
=

 
r˜ +  
  
 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
 
(R¯F (✓¯F )  k) 
⇢
 
r(r +  )
Ep[µ]
 
✓
1  s
r
◆
 
(r +  )
E ✓¯F [µ]
 
r˜ +  
 (p,  1)
 (✓¯F ,  1)
  c
r +  
 
.
When x! 0, limx!0 Vˆ F⌧1 (x) > 0 and limx!0 Vˆ L⌧1 (x) < 0. Hence limx!0 g3(x) >
0. Whenx! pˆ, R¯L(pˆ)  k > V¯ F⌧1 (p) = ⇡ˆFt (pˆ). Hence limx!pˆ g3(x) < 0.
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